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Abstract 
The Bad Good Life: On the Politics of  Impasse addresses the narrowness of  conditions of  
political change. Political theorists have detailed the promise of  events in sparking political 
change but few have examined why events occur rarely or not at all. Impediments to 
political change are also not fully captured by important analyses of  coercion, ideology, 
and disciplinary power. Meanwhile, the pursuit of  social justice in the United States has 
been at an impasse due to unresolved issues of  racism, the normalization of  sexuality, 
settler colonialism, global war, and ecological crises. The Bad Good Life addresses these 
theoretical and political predicaments by developing a concept of  “impasse” from critical 
comparisons of  political theory, American studies, feminist and queer theory, and 
anthropologies of  ordinary life. It finds impasse to be more than a deadlock in beliefs, 
values, or political positions; impasse involves deeply rooted affective attachments that 
impede change even when it is strongly desired. The Bad Good Life clarifies how dominant 
political systems in the US manage to persist despite the powerful efforts of  minoritized 
subjects to build alternative worlds. It also develops forms of  politics that risk the loss of  
attachments even when full-bodied alternatives have yet to arise. 
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The Bad Good Life was written across a United States that has been strained and enriched 
by economic crises, eruptive histories, minoritarian protests, and ecological fragilities. It 
presumes that these intensities have made increasingly untenable an image of  the good 
life that is bound up with the US nation-state and its social fantasies, economies of  affect, 
public cultures, terms of  belonging, and future aspirations. Nonetheless, powerful forces 
have been scrambling to suture together the good life as they desire it. They range from 
militarized police squads that have brutalized black and indigenous peoples in particular 
to the post-9/11 machinery of  surveillance, detention, torture, and slaughter. They 
resound in stern voices of  economic austerity that have called for water to be shut off  to 
the racialized poor in cities like Detroit and Baltimore while deeming water filled with 
toxins to be okay for Flint, Michigan. They clamored “Love wins!” in response to the 
legalization of  same-sex marriage but have been largely quiet in the face of  the ongoing, 
everyday aggression and violence faced by queer and trans people, especially those of  
color. At the same time, movements have gained traction on national and global fronts, 
such as: Occupy Wall Street and its many offshoots; the antiracist movements rallied 
under “Black Lives Matter” (a slogan created by three queer black women); and Native 
Hawaiian protection of  Mauna Kea from the construction of  a Thirty Meter Telescope 
(an effort that has attained global support under the hashtag #WeAreMaunaKea). 
	 These and countless other activist movements contest political business as usual. 
Rather than supplying one position amongst others, they anticipate a US that is unhinged 
from capitalism, racism, hetero- and homonormativities, and settler colonialism. Because 
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those legacies of  power have long taken root in the US, such imaginations are radical; 
they demand the loss of  the US as it has been, along with its identities, fantasies, 
privileges, and violences. The United States is caught in an impasse between a world that 
hasn’t worked for so many for so long and a world that is yet to come—a world that is less 
exploitative, less violent, more rich, more equitable, more sustainable, more plural, more 
wild. What such a world could be is presently unimaginable. Nonetheless, it has a real life 
in longings that teem on the verge. One political question is how to discern the differences 
already made by them. Another is how to amplify their pressure until they burst into 
being even as the process may be risky, jarring, and deeply painful. 
	 Informed by these problems and possibilities, The Bad Good Life gauges how life 
persists without much traction. It does not aim to document the links between neoliberal 
capitalism, white supremacy, racism, settler colonialism, and hetero- and 
homonormativities. This is not an investigation into how specific demographics have been 
affected as dominant systems of  power strive to persist, oftentimes violently. Nor is it an 
investigation into the histories that have created the predicaments in which the US finds 
itself  today. Instead, The Bad Good Life develops a concept of  “impasse” that emerges from 
many situations and may be calibrated to many others. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari 
observe that concepts are not tools of  analysis that can be merely applied to the world. 
They are consistencies drawn across disparates whose charge may be modulated but not 
neutralized. Essential to concepts is their adaptability. The life of  a concept is not found 
in core features and sharp contours; it is found instead in a capacity to transform through 
different connections and to inflect a variety of  situations in turn.  1
 	 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell 1
(New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1994), 15-34.
2
	 The present inquiry elaborates a few dimensions of  impasse: the attachments that 
hold together lives and worlds; the affective atmospheres in which anxiety and hope 
become a muddled mess; the temporalities in which alternative futures are half-present 
but forestalled; and the mixed fortunes of  a politics that accepts the possibility of  loss, 
even when full-bodied alternatives are undesirable or unavailable. 
	 Impasse resonates with a rich family of  other concepts. My endeavor is not to 
clearly delineate impasse from similar situations. Part of  the troubling nature of  impasse is 
the lack of  certainty that it is one: can’t a situation at hand just be a temporary setback on 
the way to better times? And while I seek to deepen our understanding of  impasses, I do 
not seek to tailor that knowledge to resolution and surefire action. I aim to open more 
wiggle room within the strange, befuddling, oftentimes depressing experience of  impasses. 
Because this experience is at once personally and politically meaningful, it calls for 
revisions to what is usually denoted by “impasse.” 
Deadlock 
“Impasse” typically refers to a deadlock of  beliefs, values, morals, or political positions. It 
became a political buzzword during the Fall of  2013, when the US federal government 
veered close to financial shutdown over the inability of  Congress to form a budget. 
Disagreeing on numerous matters, Democrats and Republicans hit a block that had long 
been in the works.  The non-negotiating stance of  the GOP had intensified since the 
George W. Bush years and throughout the Barack Obama presidency, especially as the 
Affordable Care Act was being hotly debated. The approval rating of  Congress 
plummeted to a low of  fifteen percent in 2014 as the American public viewed Congress to 
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be largely inept at compromise and progress. 
	 Although impasse usually evokes an opposition that is irreconcilable, I develop an 
understanding based on the notion of  difference elaborated by Deleuze. In Difference and 
Repetition, Deleuze criticizes Hegel for pigeonholing difference into a framework of  
opposition. That extreme mode of  difference, notes Deleuze, is merely epiphenomenal to 
difference as an open multiplicity of  divergences. Deleuze insists that differences do not 
negate each other; they intensify each other, alter one another, in an affirmative mode.  2
	 I emphasize this abstract philosophical point because I sense in impasses a 
plenitude of  alternatives that do not manage to gain traction and become inhabitable. 
This blockage is not merely the result of  mechanisms of  violence, coercion, discipline, 
regulation, and ideology, though these surely play a role. Rather, it is due to complex 
relations between attachment, affect, and time. Intensive differences vie for a space in the 
world, and it is due to the dissonance and friction between these propensities that some 
attain greater solidity while others fizzle for the time being. 
	 Impasse helps to address a long-standing puzzle across pursuits of  social justice 
and numerous academic fields (such as political theory, American studies, and feminist 
and queer studies): how is it that an abundance of  desires, wild thoughts, and experiments 
in living otherwise tends to not attain the traction and durability that are enjoyed by 
power-backed worlds? I am not suggesting that wayward potentialities only ever seek a 
habitable world; their propensity if  not intention may be to maintain energetic 
transformations in defiance of  calcification and stagnancy. But conditions could be surely 
be forged that would allow minor moments and tiny intimacies to fade beautifully without 
 	 Gilles Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2
1994), 50-2.
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being targeted for denigration and death. I develop impasse to insist that alternative 
worldings are not unrealistic, undesirable, or impossible, to suggest that regimes of  power 
are not the only reason why they do not attain greater traction, and to maintain that 
utopian imaginations and radical desires are not inept. In short, impasse depicts how 
dominant worlds can be remarkably resilient even as they swell with intensities to the 
bursting point. 
	 To take up impasse is to ask how it is that political change can be so rare despite 
there being a plenitude of  creativity in ordinary life. Impasse touches upon a question 
that is at once theoretical and political: given the inconceivably broad range of  intensities 
that shoot off  in so many directions, how do things ever manage to hold together? 
Deleuze and Guattari discuss this matter in “On the Refrain” in A Thousand Plateaus, 
partly to address how it is that an ontology of  becomings could account for the 
emergence of  states of  consistency from intensive flows.  Arun Saldanha captures this 3
puzzle best when he writes, “It is not difficult to affirm the rhizomatic, the nomadic, and 
the creative potential of  the world. The trick is to explain how, even then, we are faced 
with the slime molds of  racism, sexism, capitalism, and what have you.”  For Lauren 4
Berlant, it is affective attachments that bind people to worlds that are unsustainable, 
inequitable, and even harmful to them; she find impasse to be “a holding station that 
doesn’t hold securely but opens out into anxiety, that dog paddling around a space whose 
contours remain obscure.”  Informed by these concerns, my account of  impasse draws 5
 	 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi 3
(Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota Press, 1987), 310-50.
 	 Arun Saldanha, “Re-ontologising Race: The Machinic Geography of  Phenotype,” Environment and 4
Planning D: Society and Space 24 (2006), 18.
 	 Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 199.5
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together the ontological and the experiential, the personal and the political. 
	 I work alongside scholarship that has elaborated connections between politics and 
events. Within and around political theory, scholars such as Gilles Deleuze, Alain Badiou, 
Jacques Rancière, and William Connolly have elaborated the capacity of  events to 
instigate political change. In these accounts, the event marks a dramatic interruption in 
business as usual. In some versions, the event allows something new to emerge (an 
identity, a right, a sensibility, or a political formation) that in turn sparks a chain reaction 
of  disturbances and adjustments. My project shares this interest while exploring in greater 
detail the period that hangs between rupture and novelty. I argue that we do not yet know 
enough about the conditions under which disturbances may amount to events. The Bad 
Good Life develops impasse to offer a better understanding of  blockages to events and the 
long preparatory work needed to pursue political change. 
Seeking Good, Feeling Bad 
The Bad Good Life further revises the conventional understanding of  impasse by developing 
an affective framework. It recasts impasse a from cul-de-sac between conflicting interests 
to socially situated peoples at odds with a dominant world. More specifically, it concerns 
affective attachments that bind selves to worlds that don’t quite work for them. If, as I 
argue, impasses concern the potential loss of  deeply rooted attachments, then affect is a 
pivotal site where politics in an impasse plays out. 
	 Feminist and queer studies have addressed the affective experience of  impasse. 
Scholars of  “Public Feelings,” such as Berlant, Ann Cvetkovich, Sara Ahmed, and 
Kathleen Stewart, have, in distinct ways, taken up the problem of  impasse due to 
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longstanding concerns over the tenability of  minor desires in a world that offers little 
sustenance. Politics here concerns the navigation of  tensions between threat and promise, 
anxiety and hope, negativity and utopia. These scholars foreground affect to emphasize 
the inability of  abstract reason, clear knowledge, or sharp evidence to amount to political 
change on their own. 
	 Berlant has given the most attention to the vexing affective experience of  
impasses. For her, contemporary conditions of  neoliberal precarity have impeded 
attainment of  the good life. Pursuits of  the good life end up wearing out people, who 
come to hit an impasse in what has defined their lives and aspirations for so long. Yet 
without alternatives in place that could be taken up with confidence, when what could 
happen is rightly sensed to involve drastic changes in oneself  and one’s world, people may 
remain bound to things that are ailing, failing, and downright dreary. What results is “‘the 
bad life’—that is, a life dedicated to moving toward the good life’s normative/utopian 
zone but actually stuck in what we might call survival time, the time of  struggling, 
drowning, holding onto the ledge, treading water—the time of  not-stopping.”  Just what 6
can one do when what seemed to be so good turns out to be so bad? 
	 What I call “the bad good life” is central to understanding the composition and 
experience of  impasses. Here, the good life is a placeholder for a complex set of  desires, 
social ideologies, public cultures. It is a force-field of  aspirations and repulsions that hold 
together a life, shape a world, etch out trajectories, and divide time into the past, present, 
and future while aligning them toward particular ends. The good life is not so static or 
consolidated to appear in one form, in no small part due to alternative visions of  it. 
 Berlant, Cruel Optimism, 169.6
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Nonetheless, dominant notions of  the good life are not dispelled by simple choices to opt 
out. They have accrued enough mass to hold people in their gravity even as they fight to 
escape. In the United States, those forces are composed of, among other things, neoliberal 
capitalism, hetero- and homonormativities, sexism, racisms of  various types, settler 
colonialism, ableism—you name it. The good life organizes so much of  this world that 
crises in it may throw even the most deviant of  us off  our wheels. Whatever exclusions 
and hierarchies it has enforced, whatever damage it has exacted, the good life has 
magnetized rhythms, identities, aspirations, ways of  sensing, knowing, and experiencing 
the world that, without being determinative, have at least served as powerful coordinates. 
And so, as Sara Ahmed writes, “It is difficult to give up an idea of  one's life, when one has 
lived a life according to that idea.”  Fissures in the good life open both the possibility for 7
marginalized groups to ascend into greater livability but also for unexpected changes to 
be made to aberrant desires, fanciful dreams, and wild intimacies. As a result, 
anticipation, excitement, and relief  at the possible loss of  dominant brands of  the good 
life are criss-crossed with anxiety, worry, and concern over what’s next. 
	 The “bad” of  the “bad good life” is meant to register this capacious range of  
affective and bodily experiences of  impasse, which also includes the damage endured by 
bodies therein. These experiences arise within the double-bind between sticking with a 
damaging world in hopes that it will turn out better and running against the grain without 
guarantees that one will find intimacy, community, and belonging. It is from this 
predicament that Berlant writes, “‘Impasse’ is the name for the space where the urgencies 
of  livelihood are worked out all over again, without assurances of  futurity, but 
	 Sara Ahmed, The Promise of  Happiness (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 75.7
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nevertheless proceeding via durable norms of  adaptation. People are destroyed in it, or 
discouraged but maintaining, or happily managing, things, or playful and enthralled.”  8
People might grow exhausted and sick in the pursuit of  the good life. They may adjust 
themselves to its demands at great cost to their physical and emotional health. Even when 
an impasse can be experienced as promising, the pursuit of  other worlds therein will 
confront a battery of  people and institutions that strives to save the bad good life through 
all sorts of  ugly, cruel means. Never underestimate the lengths to which people will go to 
defend their world, especially when they are positioned with great power. 
	 Ahmed elaborates that socially authorized notions of  happiness coordinate 
fantasies of  the good life in unevenly accessible ways. Ahmed reveals how the “promise of  
happiness” is shaped by lines of  gender, race, sexuality, and nation. Underlying that 
promise is what she calls a “political economy of  the good life”: “Some people have to 
work in order to give others the time to pursue the good life, the time, as it were, to 
flourish.”  This clustering of  bodies, time, and the good life pertain to the domain of  9
impasse. Some people are poised to effortlessly attain returns on the promise of  
happiness. Others are left in a rut. People of  very different social positions get swept up in 
an impasse that is zoned in very unequal ways. I find that some groups, both human and 
nonhuman, are abandoned to impasses so that others may seek the good life. These latter 
construe impasse as a setback on the way to better times, throwing others under their 
boots as they march onward. The minoritized and the abjected are made to live an 
interrupted or foreclosed flow. An impasse between body and world. 
 	 Berlant, Cruel Optimism, 200.8
 	 Ahmed, The Promise of  Happiness, 139
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Between the World and Me, an Impasse 
That impasses are encountered very differently across various social positions is reason to 
criticize Berlant’s narrative of  impasse, which seems to center on those who have had 
attachments to the good life. This narrative is due to Berlant’s distinctive approach to 
normativity, which exceeds the rubric of  disciplinary practices. Berlant calls normativity 
“aspirational” since it promises safe haven from the crunch of  power. She develops this 
understanding throughout her work on national sentimentality and particularly in her 
essay “Nearly Utopian, Nearly Normal,” which details the precarity of  those who hustle 
for sustenance within gray economies. The precarious maintain an attachment to the 
good life even as it remains inaccessible. Berlant phrases this impasse as a “situation 
tragedy,” in which “one moves between having a little and being ejected from the 
social.”  By framing impasse in relation to a potential loss, she seems to presume a prior 10
situation of  having had, however tenuously or fantasmatically. Her notion of  impasse thus 
does not accommodate well enough what impedes attachments from taking root. Even in 
the extreme case of  situation tragedies, attachment is about being in the same room as 
something. What of  those who have been far removed from proximity to the good life 
such that it has not been viewed as a possibility? What of  those who cannot be ejected 
from the social because they were always already denied entry? 
	 To illustrate the capacious range of  experiences of  impasse, this section explores 
the bad good life through recent predicaments involving the American dream. Following 
the economic crisis of  2008, the American dream and its promises of  financial well-being, 
job security, and upward mobility came under fire. Unable to find adequate employment, 
 	 Berlant, Cruel Optimism, 177.10
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many graduates from elite universities admitted that hard work wasn’t the sole or 
dominant factor in determining the attainment of  the dream. They also acknowledged 
how one’s well-being rested in the hands of  a fickle economy as the weight of  student 
loan debt dragged them down. Nonetheless, they also maintained hope for a better 
tomorrow, claiming that more job applications and more patience would eventually pay 
off.  They reinvested in the American dream, whose promises were deferred but not 11
destroyed. They treated the recession as a setback but not an impasse. 
	 President Barack Obama also acknowledged that intensification of  economic 
precarity had shifted the conditions of  the dream. Gone were the days when hard work 
secured one’s own welfare. Now, as Obama has put it in numerous speeches, hard work 
sets up your children for their success. What Lee Edelman has called “reproductive 
futurism” facilitates an understanding of  this deferral: it is in the name of  the Child that 
persons and societies engage in feats of  self-amputation to preserve hope for a future that 
is defined by a heteronormative image of  the present.  Here, the American dream is 12
made for the Child instead of  oneself. If  “queer” denotes anyone who rejects the nation-
state’s call to reproduction, then this updated version of  the American dream is 
predicated upon the continued elimination of  queerness. Denial of  this crisis to be an 
impasse in the American dream is founded upon a recommitment to reproductive 
sexuality, which has recently expanded marginally to include gays and lesbians so long as 
they approximate white heteronormativity in domestic, public, and legal life. 
 	 This narrative was repeated in an explosion of  articles published by The New York Times during the early 11
years of  the “Great Recession.” For one example, see Louis Uchitelle, “American Dream is Elusive for 
New Generation,” The New York Times, 6 July 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/07/business/
economy/07generation.html. Accessed on 6 July 2010.
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	 The conjunction between neoliberal fantasies of  the good life and reproductive 
futurism in the American dream is a powerful tool for renarrating systemic racism in the 
United States. In a speech on 17 July 2009 at the centenary for the National Association 
for the Advancement of  Colored People, Obama acknowledged how the American 
dream is denied to large swaths of  people “by accident of  birth” under systemic racism.  13
He doubted that government programs could rectify these injustices and insisted that 
black parents and neighborhood communities would have to take charge. So too would 
their children. In Obama’s speech, “structural inequalities” became “hardships” and even 
“challenges” that, if  met and overcome, would make black children “stronger” and 
“better able to compete.” While Obama began his speech with an acknowledgment of  
the potency of  collective action (regarding electoral politics and the civil rights 
movement), he quickly shifted to notions of  individual responsibility and neighborhood 
vigilance. These disciplinary mechanisms patched up the American dream by turning 
antiblack racism from wound into bandage. The neoliberal capitalist rhetoric employed 
by Obama rescripted systemic antiblack racism into opportunities for stronger resolve and 
heightened competitiveness in a twisted version of  Nietzsche’s famous insistence that 
“What does not kill you makes you stronger.” This repackaging denies that the American 
dream is at an impasse. 
	 The conjunctions between neoliberalism, heteronormativity, and antiblack racism 
may be seen from a very different angle. In his recent book Between the World and Me, Ta-
Nehisi Coates details the trepidations of  being black in the face of  the American dream. 
 	 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President to the NAACP Centennial Convention,” The White House, 13
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“In America,” Coates writes, “it is traditional to destroy the black body—it is heritage.”  14
That heritage involves two fantasies: the belief  of  oneself  to be white and the American 
dream. Both depend upon the plunder and destruction of  black bodies. The pivotal 
concern for Coates is “how one should live within a black body, within a country lost in 
the Dream” (12). Blacks are caught in this impasse because people who believe themselves 
to be white are in hot pursuit of  the American dream—a dream that is foreclosed to 
blacks because antiblack racism lies at its heart. 
	 Struggle is the response, which occupies a central place in Between the World and Me. 
It is struggle because no amount of  willpower on part of  blacks could alone determine 
whether antiblack racism will be overcome; while he acknowledges that change can and 
does happen, Coates emphasizes that “history is not solely in our hands” (97). He alludes 
to the fact that belief  in an exaggerated, centralized account of  agency feeds into a 
dangerous fantasy of  democratic progress. That fantasy is not only misguided; it 
recuperates the past in a narrative of  redemption that buries the singularity of  lives that 
were lost and the alternative futures they might have envisioned: 
You must resist the common urge toward the comforting narrative of  
divine law, toward fairy tales that imply some irrepressible justice. The 
enslaved were not bricks in your road, and their lives were not chapters in 
your redemptive history. They were people turned to fuel for the American 
machine. Enslavement was not destined to end, and it is wrong to claim 
our present circumstance—no matter how improved—as the redemption 
for the lives of  people who never asked for the posthumous, untouchable 
 	 Ta-Nehisi Coates, Between the World and Me (New York: Spiegel & Grau, 2015), 103.14
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glory of  dying for their children. (70) 
	 The belief  that blacks could effect political change overlooks the intransigence of  
antiblack racism, which scholars in African American studies have shown to have lasted 
through Reconstruction and the Civil Rights Era. Following what Saidiya Hartman has 
called the “afterlife of  slavery,” Jared Sexton writes, “it is not inappropriate to say that the 
continuing application of  slave law facilitated the reconfiguration of  its operation with the 
passage of  the Thirteenth Amendment to the US Constitution, rather than its 
abolition.”  The expansion of  civil rights has been insufficient redress to the ongoing 15
plunder and destruction of  black bodies. 
	 So too will be anything short of  a tremendous loss on the part of  those who 
believe themselves to be white—a loss that they are often unwilling to face. “Without the 
right to break you,” Coates writes, “they must necessarily fall from the mountain, lose 
their divinity, and tumble out of  the Dream. And then they would have to determine how 
to build their suburbs on something other than human bones, how to angle their jails 
toward something other than a human stockyard, how to erect a democracy independent 
of  cannibalism” (105). 
	 An instructive example of  the unwillingness to face loss is found in David Brooks’s 
“Listening to Ta-Nehisi Coates While White,” an op-ed in The New York Times. Mimicking 
the style of  Between the World and Me, Brooks’s op-ed is a letter to Coates that performs 
white level-headed paternalism in a feat of  disrespect as evident in, among other things, 
the glaring lack of  a signature. Brooks does affirm the importance of  reading Coates’s 
book, but he sharply criticizes Coates for, in his eyes, being overdramatic in argument and 
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tone, especially regarding the American dream: “Sometimes in your phrasing you seem 
determined to be misunderstood.”  Brooks criticizes Coates for “distort[ing] American 16
history” by not acknowledging the goodness of  some people and groups. The American 
dream has been tainted by antiblack racism but is, in his eyes, redeemable: “The 
American dream of  equal opportunity, social mobility and ever more perfect democracy 
cherishes the future more than the past. It abandons old wrongs and transcends old sins 
for the sake of  a better tomorrow.” According to Brooks, the American dream is what 
lured his ancestors to “here”—which, as a vague referent stripped down of  any history, 
supports a settler mythology that has obscured European conquest of  the Americas in a 
narrative of  harmless immigration. To insist on the continued power of  antiblack racism 
and maintain that the United States as we know it lies on stolen lands would be to 
extinguish optimism; according to Brooks, “By dissolving the dream under the acid wash 
of  an excessive realism, you trap generations in the past and destroy the guiding star that 
points to a better future.” 
	 That sounds good to me, but Brooks writes as though it would be a bad thing. 
Here, Brooks finds the Dream to anchor hope and progress, themselves tightly connected. 
The loss of  the Dream represents the loss of  optimism for better times—an optimism that 
seems to be more for those who believe themselves to be white than for those who have 
been forced to live through ongoing legacies of  racial slavery and dispossession. Brooks 
finds that loss to be unbearable. According to Edelman, the unbearable “names what 
cannot be borne by the subjects we think we are. We build our worlds in the face of  it so 
 	 David Brooks, “Listening to Ta-Nehisi Coates While White,” The New York Times, 17 July 2015, http://16
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as to keep ourselves from facing it, as if  we implicitly understood that the unbearable as 
such can have no face and works to deprive us of  ours.”  What does it mean that losing 17
the power to destroy black bodies is felt by a white man to be unbearable? How might the 
loss of  the dream entail the loss of  a teleology that guarantees a better future? How might 
such a loss turn us to dark pasts that are unresolved and that unsettle liberal fantasies of  
democratic progress that have anchored national identity in the US and optimism in the 
state? 
	 Should blacks devote themselves to getting people who believe themselves to be 
white to not only face the unbearable but to welcome it? Coates says no because such an 
engagement would distract blacks from more vital tasks. “It struck me,” Coates observes, 
“that perhaps the defining feature of  being drafted into the black race was the inescapable 
robbery of  time” (91). The immediate context of  this statement is Coates’s observation 
that blacks are often pressured to “be twice as good,” which demands so much vigilance 
and fine-tuning throughout every moment of  every day just to minimize the possibility of  
being violated or killed. His statement is nonetheless related to his belief  that blacks ought 
not waste precious time and energy; as he advises his son, “you cannot arrange your life 
around [people who believe themselves to be white] and the small chance of  the 
Dreamers coming into consciousness. Our moment is too brief. Our bodies are too 
precious” (146). 
	 Struggle does not adopt an oppositional stance that seeks to change the hearts and 
minds of  people who believe themselves to be white. It is certainly not an attempt to 
secure the good life by working twice as hard. It is to foster love, truth, and beauty without 
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forgetting for a second just how delicate they are. Hope is besides the point. As Lester 
Spence notes, “Black people have never been threatened by the realities of  struggle, nor 
have black people ever been demobilized by the lack of  hope.”  This world-building 18
endeavor surely provides indirect friction to worlds organized by antiblack racism, if  only 
by crowding out the latter’s efforts to appear natural or inevitable. But it is foremost about 
cultivating life in the impasses between the world and me—without hope, without 
optimism, without progress but, at the same time, without despair. 
	 This montage of  encounters with the American dream illustrates a range of  social 
positions in and experiences of  the bad good life. It juxtaposes efforts to deny impasse 
with those that acknowledge it. At the heart of  the former is the reinstatement of  hope, 
optimism, and progress as demanded by the machinations of  neoliberal capitalism, 
heteronormativity, and antiblack racism. The costs of  keeping the American dream on 
life support are distributed widely, but experienced more often, more acutely, more 
severely if  you’re black, poor, and queer. To find the American dream at an impasse is to 
take up the call to struggle, which looks different if  one faces immense loss only recently 
or if  one has long been captive to a state of  never-had. 
The Matter of  Impasse 
One of  my principal points of  departure from current scholarship on impasse is over the 
status of  matter and materiality. While Public Feelings scholarship has generated 
important insights into the experience of  impasses, the human remains centered in their 
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inquiries. Anthropocentric starting points have recently been challenged from numerous 
angles. Posthumanisms, new materialisms, speculative realisms, object-oriented ontologies, 
and critical animal studies are but a few strong force-fields of  inquiry that have unsettled 
the borders between the human and the nonhuman, the animal, nature, matter, and so 
on. 
	 I draw upon these lines of  inquiry while noting that some of  these concerns have 
long been anticipated by other fields. For example, the “newness” of  the new materialisms 
is questionable given that challenges to the inertial status of  objects have been a 
longstanding concern in, for example, African American studies.  I do not mean to 19
suggest that there is nothing distinct about the new materialisms; rather, part of  my 
concern lies in the politics of  intellectual genealogies. Theory tends to be centralized in 
certain forms and objects of  inquiry and performed by typically white, male subjects such 
that examinations of  race, sexuality, and nation are not seen to bear on seemingly 
“larger” or “more philosophical” issues of  the human, life, and matter. As Alexander 
Weheliye points out, critical theory tends to be demarcated from so-called “minority 
discourses” as though the latter pertain only to specific demographics and do not engage 
ontological or theoretical matters.  Weheliye’s observation is evident in how new 20
materialisms have become popular at the expense of  similar, long-established work within 
fields associated with people of  color. That is, why has the scholarship of  those who have 
been dehumanized not often been taken up in discussions of  the human? 
 	 As Fred Moten writes, “The history of  blackness is testament to the fact that objects can and do 19
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	 Alongside this concern is my effort to bring together questions that have largely 
been conducted separately. Specifically, new materialist inquiry often brackets questions 
that have been seen as best examined within frameworks of  social constructionism and 
representation—questions of  race, sexuality, and nation. This parsing generates an 
intellectual periodization that elides the scholarship of  those who have worked between, 
to use Karen Barad’s formulation, “matter and meaning.”  Scholars such as Michel 21
Foucault and Judith Butler have examined the materiality of  discursive practices. Others, 
such as Rosi Braidotti and Elizabeth Grosz, have maintained that sexual difference itself  
is material. Mel Chen, Zakiyyah Jackson, Rachel Lee, Jasbir Puar, and Arun Saldanha 
have been forerunners in elaborating new ontologies of  race that avoid the pitfalls of  
racist essentialism and the limits of  social constructionism. 
	 This project lies within the orbit of  these theorists and their concerns. It views 
impasse as a situation in which materialities of  various sorts are being rearranged in ways 
that unsettle anchors of  the good life. This means that the matter of  race, sexuality, and 
nation cannot be untangled from the matter of  matter. I continue to employ the term 
“new materialism,” not because I adhere to its implied periodization (which new 
materialists themselves have questioned) but simply to use a referent for work in the past 
decade or so that have tended to questions of  materiality, especially as it is vibrant or 
lively. 
	 I navigate new materialisms and work on race, sexuality, and nation in American 
studies out of  a hunch that impasses in contemporary political life increasingly confront a 
dire question: what does it means to be human in a world that is becoming increasingly 
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inhospitable to human life and has long been unsustainable for so many humans for so 
long? As the ecological impasses in which we find ourselves intensify, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to ignore how race, sexuality, nation, and matter bear on each other. 
The costs of  doing so are hinted at in, for instance, Coates’s observation on the recent 
intensification of  violence by those who believe themselves to be white. Through 
technological developments, the destructiveness behind antiblack violence has expanded 
to the Earth itself  (150-1). Though it is not elaborated in detail, this imbrication between 
antiblack violence and ecological devastation provokes further thought. It raises questions 
of  how human life and its others (death, matter, nonhumans, and the dehumanized) are 
increasingly difficult to disentangle from questions of  race, sexuality, and nation. 
	 As chapter one argues, contemporary impasses in the good life raise questions of  
the human, matter, agency, and attachment that cannot be separated from the 
machinations of  neoliberal capitalism, imperialism, settler colonialism, racism, sexism, 
and heteronormativity. Development of  more sustainable, equitable, and hospitable 
relations amongst humans and nonhumans requires a heightened sensitivity to our 
imbrications with the fragility and capacities of  matter, an expansion of  those entities and 
ecologies that fall under the umbrella of  care and concern, and ultimately an 
abandonment of  forms of  the good life that afford agency, value, and life to only certain 
humans—and all this without forgetting how the heart of  these issues is shaped by lines of  
race, sexuality, and nation. 
20
The Air Will Not Be Cleared 
While I encounter the historical present as an impasse, I am not quite trying to demystify 
it. Behind demystification lies the presumption that the historical present masks subtle 
truths about the workings of  power. It also presumes that the unearthing of  power would 
set off  tremors of  political change. In short, demystification is a critical tool concerned 
with relations between knowledge and power. 
	 The value of  demystification is undeniable, as demonstrated by countless works 
that have shed light on the damaging and deadly conjunctions between capitalism, 
imperialism, settler colonialism, racism, and homophobia, among other things. 
Demystification is, however, of  limited use where impasses are concerned. As I will argue, 
impasses are emergent situations; what they have been and will become remains 
indeterminate. This condition entails that the contours of  impasse are obscure, the 
composition to some degree unknown. Impasse is a period in which systems of  power 
reorganize themselves to maintain particular ends that are sensed to be on the cusp of  
loss, as when the American dream absorbs shifts in political economy. While there are 
good reasons to treat the historical present as an impasse—which I do—final, definitive 
confirmation will never occur. It is on account of  the indeterminacy and uncertainty of  
impasse that demystification, in its quest for truth, falls short. 
	 Some may rightly point out that impasse is a rather nebulous situation and that a 
concept of  it may be difficult if  not impossible to generate. I insist that impasse calls for 
shifts in what a concept could be and how it matters politically. As mentioned earlier, 
Deleuze and Guattari maintain that a concept offers practical connections instead of  
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clear knowledge. The concept of  impasse developed here calls for revisions to notions of  
knowledge, method, and politics, which I explore toward the end of  this project. 
	 For now, I note that this understanding of  impasse suggests the untenability of  
pinning hope for political change on the exposure of  good-life fantasies as costly 
delusions. While surely that endeavor is part of  the process, it needs to be complicated 
and supplemented by techniques that affectively work on attachments. Part of  the 
political value of  impasse lies in anticipating and even preempting the ways in which 
power reorganizes itself—practices that are not served well through efforts to secure clear 
knowledge. The political wager here is that instead of  only striving to directly engage the 
powers that be, the proliferation of  alternative worldings may stretch and thin out the 
conditions under which more nefarious futures seem like they’ll arrive. 
	 Moreover, I do not believe that political change entails moving beyond impasses 
per se. Such would presume that impasses are mere barriers to a predefined end that is 
held to be valuable and that change cannot happen in and around impasses themselves. 
To follow these presumptions may be to wield a model of  agency that is unfeasible and to 
recenter a notion of  progress that, for so many forms of  life, has been dangerous and 
lethal. My rendition of  impasse rethinks the centrality and value of  blockage. While 
“impasse” generally denotes a stopping point, I find it to be full of  potentiality, 
movement, and alternatives that have just been unable to gain enough traction to be lived 
in any robust way. This unusual understanding of  impasse shapes my effort to detect the 
possibilities that are opened when a world seems to be at its end. 
	 Indeed, blockage itself  bears a lot of  potentiality. For the good life to serve as an 
end, there must be a particular track, a series of  benchmarks, and a timeline. It grounds a 
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notion of  progress that is enforced by all sorts of  disciplinary, coercive, and biopolitical 
mechanisms. Impasse marks an interruption that may or may not be temporary. Could be 
a little glitch. Or a turning point. No one can tell in advance. Rather than maintaining 
the value of  forward movement, I destigmatize blockage and being stuck to develop 
impasse as a space wherein the reproduction of  the world grinds to a halt. In such 
periods, novelty becomes possible even as it remains forestalled. One might explore lines 
of  flight within impasses even if  the world as it has been persists in some loose way. 
	 This is an argument that favors persistence in the face of  the impractical. More 
accurately, it favors persistence with and from the impractical, which is not an impediment 
but, as Jack Halberstam puts it, “a space of  possibility and newness.”  To speak in terms 22
of  practicality is to cede too much to a world that is in no way destined or determining. It 
is also to diminish the world’s capacity to become otherwise and to neglect the alternative 
worlds that are budding and thriving today. Mine is an argument for greater sensitivity to 
shifts afoot and for the value of  what is depicted by a dominant world as too fleeting, 
perverse, impractical, or wild to be worthwhile. In this vein, to be halted in a track laid 
down by a damaging world can be a plus—even if  the outcomes of  that pause cannot be 
determined in advance of  the unfolding of  its life. 
	 Finally, I also develop impasse as a political technology of  the minoritized and the 
abjected. For examples, one might think of  Occupy Wall Street reclaiming of  public 
space, Black Lives Matter protestors bringing highway traffic to a standstill, and Native 
Hawaiian protestors blocking construction vehicles atop Mauna Kea from desecrating 
what is at once land and kin. When impasse operates as a political technology, it generates 
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a crisis at the heart of  formidable and long-standing systems of  power, such as antiblack 
racism, homophobia, and settler colonialism. This activity is radical as it takes up the 
seemingly impossible task of  uprooting systems of  power that have saturated political life. 
To insert an impasse in what has appeared to be natural and inevitable for so long is not 
quite to seek a true understanding of  the present moment. It is to scramble the conditions 
by which understandings of  the present offer simple solutions that oftentimes reinforce 
the powers that be. It is to reject models of  politics that merely seek recognition and 
inclusion, for these efforts more often than not further entrench systems of  power without 
much modification. It is to find interim and piecemeal efforts valuable though ultimately 
unsatisfying, partly for being too slow, partly for being overly cautious, partly for not 
venturing far enough from what is held to be practical. It is to open worlds yet to be 
imagined. 
Hopeless (A Trigger Warning) 
The bad good life lies raises issues of  optimism and pessimism, hope and despair. The 
experience of  impasse is being caught between a rock and a no-place. People may feel 
helpless. They may veer dangerously close to despair. And yet, impasses overflow with 
potentiality. Should this “it-could-be-otherwise” be solid ground for optimism and hope? 
	 I remain suspicious for numerous reasons. Hope and optimism are often brought 
in the service of  realigning people with the bad good life when it is in crisis. In Bright-Sided: 
How the Relentless Promotion of  Positive Thinking Has Undermined America, Barbara Ehrenreich 
has documented how positive thinking has saturated numerous sites in the United States, 
including breast cancer circles, positive psychology, megachurches, business schools and 
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corporate workplaces. Positive thinking is an ideology and a disciplinary practice. A whole 
industry that has spawned around it has been extremely lucrative for a few while 
incredibly damaging for many. The public culture of  positive thinking has shrunken the 
place and diminished the value of  negative affects, repackaged subjectivity from the 
collective to the individual, reduced change from redistribution of  social goods to 
adjustments of  one’s affect, attitude, and behavior, and furnished oversight of  economic 
and ecological fragilities. Importantly, Ehrenreich argues that pessimism is not the 
antidote to optimism. The world projected by optimism and pessimism alike is simple and 
static. “The alternative to both,” avers Ehrenreich, “is to try to get outside of  ourselves 
and see things ‘as they are,’ or as uncolored as possible by our own feelings and fantasies, 
to understand that the world is full of  both danger and opportunity.”  This realism is 23
scientific in ethos; it is vigilant to change and experimental in practice. 
	 I follow Ehrenreich in moving away from optimism and pessimism, and the ethics 
and politics I develop affords value to vigilance and experimentation in impasses. 
Nonetheless, realism is not the framework that I would adopt. It has valences of  truth and 
veracity that can disparage what is cast as unrealistic, impractical, or utopian. It also 
posits that more knowledge and better information are slaves for the ills of  optimism and 
pessimism. In its effort to be distanced from “feelings and fantasies,” realism does not 
capture the affective hold of  impasses, which is not necessarily loosened by the best 
evidence for the costs of  the good life. Like proponents of  demystification, Ehrenreich 
exaggerates the political efficacy of  knowledge while treating feelings as impediments 
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rather than as vital resources. At its worst, Ehrenreich’s call to realism may actually keep 
impasses in place. 
	 I am also not interested in hope because it often projects an image of  progress that 
follows too conservative a notion of  what is “better.” To be overly interested in betterment 
is to maintain too much of  the world in which that measure has emerged. It is also to 
follow an idea of  progress that separates now and later while placing them on the same 
path; the future is held to be predetermined and thus implicit in the present and the past. 
What I pursue is shifts in the conditions of  possibility for other worlds to take hold—
worlds that mark a departure from what could be considered better, worlds that are in 
some sense already here. The pursuit of  novelty contains the necessity of  surprise. The 
arrival of  a new world would change us, which means that what and how we have 
dreamed and desired will not be the same, in the words of  Stefano Harney and Fred 
Moten, “after the break.” As Halberstam writes of  them, “We cannot say what new 
structures will replace the ones we live with yet, because once we have torn shit down, we 
will inevitably see more and see differently and feel a new sense of  wanting and being and 
becoming. What we want after ‘the break’ will be different from what we think we want 
before the break and both are necessarily different from the desire that issues from being 
in the break.”  In short, I am not interested in hope because I pursue what is presently 24
unimaginable. Unable to imagine precisely what the future may be, we might cultivate 
greater space for intuition, speculation, and surprise. 
	 In short, I shift politics away from hope and despair, from optimism and 
pessimism. None of  these coordinates are necessary for prying open the good life enough 
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to question its seeming inevitability and to open more breathing room for alternatives 
even as they may not secure traction in this world. 
	 The Bad Good Life asks people to face the unbearable experience of  impasse 
without hope and without optimism. Yet, it is deeply utopian. This seemingly 
counterintuitive orientation arises from a hunch that other worlds are indeed possible 
and, in some ways, are already here—worlds that do not reproduce the damage of  ones 
that have been salient and have seemed inevitable for so long. Within impasses are so 
many possibilities and alternatives that do important work today even if  they cannot be 
lived in a robust, safe, sustainable way. They might also enjoy greater traction and a 
different life tomorrow.  I call these alternatives “worlds” to emphasize the unbound 
cluster of  things that are pulled in their wake. It is also to shift “world” away from the 
imperium of  solidity, traction, and longevity, which are often used as measures of  viability 
to disqualify alternatives. Acknowledgment of  these possibilities is a lifeline out of  despair; 
acknowledgment of  their fragility is a flag against hope. Politics is the exploration of  
alternative imaginations, discernment of  the potencies that spark up along the way, and 
cultivation of  the tiny intimacies and worlds that bustle all around us regardless of  
whether they may rind up with any durability. 
	 Finally, the utopian aspirations of  this project make it a queer one. Although I 
briefly take up critiques of  same-sex marriage and homonormativity in chapter four, the 
queerness of  The Bad Good Life lies in its valuation of  wayward desire. I do not mean 
anything special or idiosyncratic about desire, which has been explored by countless 
others in great detail. I am lightly informed by psychoanalytic accounts of  desire as lack 
and Deleuze-inspired understandings of  desire as productivity, both of  which, in very 
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different ways, point to the insufficiency of  what is available. Here, I connect desire to 
impasse because it conjures images of  attraction, propensity, and longing for something 
else. Politics that follows desire astray from socially enforced destinations might be seen as 
queer. “For a life to count as a good life,” writes Ahmed, “it must return the debt of  its life 
by taking on the direction promised as a social good, which means imagining one’s 
futurity in terms of  reaching certain points along a life course. A queer life might be one 
that fails to make such gestures of  return.”  This queerness does not quite seek the 25
erasure of  “bad” from the bad good life per se; it gets lost in the aura of  the bad and, 
having fallen off  the track to the good life, finds detours to new worlds, new futures, and 
new forms of  life. In short, the queerness of  this project lies in its conception of  impasse 
as a personal and political situation of  impasse in which people burst with longing and 
find that there isn’t enough satisfaction and sustenance. 
Chapters and Pockets 
The first three chapters of  The Bad Good Life detail key aspects of  impasse: attachment, 
affect, and temporality. Chapter One, “Impasse Matters,” argues that attachments inhibit 
political change. It elaborates attachments as complex webs of  psychic, social, 
disciplinary, and material forces by drawing upon new materialisms and Public Feelings 
scholarship, the work of  Lauren Berlant and Jane Bennett in particular. Whereas Berlant 
develops a concept of  impasse without attending to the vibrancy of  matter and Bennett 
develops the vibrancy of  matter without regard to impasses, I argue that matter plays a 
crucial role in the composition and experience of  impasse because they shape 
 	 Sara Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), 25
21.
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attachments. I read Jennifer Egan’s short story “Found Objects” to develop this line of  
thought and to bridge typically distinct accounts of  affect: one that tends to nameable 
feelings, another that explores impersonal forces. 
	 The second chapter, “Dark Atmospheres, or Affect at the End of  a World,” 
describes the experience of  impasses as acutely felt but not clearly understood. It critically 
engages the work of  cultural geographers on affective atmospheres, much of  which 
focuses on a clearly defined mood, a given space, and a phenomenology of  experience. I 
find that the atmosphere of  impasse is better understood through: a plenitude of  affect 
that amounts to mixed feelings rather than a clear mood; a temporal rather than spatial 
framework; and the experience of  a disorganization of  sensoria that is not captured by 
phenomenology. The chapter draws upon Gilles Deleuze and Kathleen Stewart to 
develop these points while also elaborating the impassive, intuitive sensibility that arises in 
impasses and complicates political judgment. 
	 Chapter Three, “Without End,” argues that impasses are not temporary setbacks 
on the way to the good life because they raise the prospect of  loss. I develop a non-
teleological account of  time that is appropriate for impasses by drawing upon the works 
of  Immanuel Kant, Alfred North Whitehead, and Walt Whitman. Although I criticize 
Kant’s teleological notion of  time, I also uncover in The Critique of  Judgment the possibility, 
unexplored by Kant himself, of  a non-teleological temporality that derives from the self-
organizing capacities of  what he calls “anomalous creatures.” I develop that notion of  
time by working between Whitehead and Whitman on themes of  creativity, poetics, and 
the dangers of  social stagnancy. I elaborate impasse as a situation of  blocked novelty and 
abundant creativity within a world that becomes without end. 
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	 While the first three chapters begin to develop the political implications of  their 
themes, the final chapter develops the political dimensions of  impasse in greatest detail. 
“Tragic Affirmations, Queer Trajectories…” fashions a politics that resists the temptations 
to violence, against oneself  and others, that arise from the experience of  an impasse. I 
critically navigate Friedrich Nietzsche’s and William Connolly’s theories of  “the tragic” 
and literature around the “antisocial turn” in queer theory by Lee Edelman, Heather 
Love, and José Esteban Muñoz. Although the tragic and queerness align on the value of  
nonsovereignty, impermanence, and an openness to loss, they differ on other issues. 
Nietzsche and Connolly develop the tragic in relation to joy and the sweetness of  life 
while some forms of  queerness (that of  Edelman and Love) place greater emphasis on 
woe. Strands of  queer negativity resist positive elaborations of  attachments while that 
problematic but important task is undertaken by utopian forms of  queerness (that of  
Muñoz) and the tragic. I sort through this thicket to develop a political response to 
impasses that welcomes the possibility of  loss, explores the potentialities available when 
change is impeded, and strives to fashion attachments that are flexible and transient. 
	 The last installment of  The Bad Good Life is not a conclusion but an afterthought 
that reflects on the question of  method. It gauges how the conduct and genre of  political 
theory might be expanded and revised in light of  the problem of  impasse, which resists 
efforts for accurate or clear description. Allowing the murky, half-formed character of  
impasse to find expression in writing might productively alter the theorization and activity 
of  politics. The afterthought performs one such engagement by writing autoethnography 
as political theory. It works through a thicket of  forces that gather as “Asian settler 
colonialism” in Hawaiʻi. I encounter Asian settler colonialism as an impasse in my 
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attachments to Hawaiʻi as home and allow that impasse to find expression in my writing. 
	 Interspersing the chapters are little pockets. According to Kathleen Stewart, a 
pocket is a fold within ordinary life. It marks something afoot that may or may not 
amount to anything significant.  In an impasse, pockets hold longings, intimacies, and 26
practices that do not sit comfortably with the world at large. The pockets of  this 
dissertation are folds between the chapters that connect themes, but not only. They are 
also resting points that unfold with the life of  a pause. They are snags that might pull 
thought and feeling on tangent. They are holding stations where all that falls in the cracks 
can have some semblance of  belonging, at least for the time being. 
What Remains 
The Bad Good Life is animated by immense love. It is love for the potency of  fleeting 
contact, little gestures, and wild intimacies. For the courage of  those who untie their 
anchors from all familiarity. For the shyness of  those who burn with longing for other 
worlds. It is love for the countless lives that are torn apart and cut short when power 
double-downs on selfish ambitions. For those who link arms and hearts in feats of  survival 
and creativity. For a vitality that is unbound by death. And, above all, it is love for those 
who proclaim, by the simple fact of  existing, “This is not all that there is nor all that will 
ever be. You may think that our lives are tiny, but they are the strongest evidence that 
other worlds are already crowding out this one. So take care, fellow traveler; our time is 
now.”  




The drone of  the days: soothing in one phase, grating in another. 
Anxiety replaces comfort. Or maybe it lurked there all along. 
Lives in mirror are more fragile than they appear. Gaze long 
enough and it’s not the glass that breaks.
1.     Impasse Matters 
Attachments to human mastery thrive even as the world is increasingly inhospitable to 
them. Following the 2008 economic crisis, neoliberal fantasies in the United States largely 
bounced back rather than being abandoned in favor of  social justice. After 11 September 
2001, the US showcased its sovereignty abroad and domestically to protect a national 
identity shaped by global hegemony, colonial settlement, and white supremacy. A host of  
disasters due to anthropogenic climate change, including the prospect of  mass extinction, 
has yet to be met with widespread shifts toward sustainable living. Underlying these issues 
is a faith in human mastery, which posits in these moments the capacity of  individuals 
and collectives to preserve the world as it has been by marshaling enough ingenuity and 
willpower. Alternative responses to these issues, productive though they may be, have yet 
to gain widespread traction. As a result, many lives remain caught in the gravity of  
unsustainable, destructive worlds, while minoritized populations—human and not—
continue to bear the evermore dire costs of  attempts to protect dreams of  human 
sovereignty. 
	 These predicaments are what Lauren Berlant calls “impasses,” whose salience 
today, I argue, calls for rethinking the human, agency, and attachments. More than a 
deadlock between values, beliefs, or political positions, an impasse involves the possible 
loss of  a world when alternatives are not available or readily adoptable. “Impasse” 
emphasizes that change may be slow to happen even when one’s world is so bad. While 
connoting blockage, an impasse also simmers with all sorts of  activity: defense of  
attachments through adaptation, self-sacrifice, and the surveillance and eradication of  
33
others who are framed to be threats; or experiments to generate more flexible and 
sustainable lives, aspirations, and worlds. “Impasse,” in short, “is the name for the space 
where the urgencies of  livelihood are worked out all over again, without assurances of  
futurity.”  1
	 While Berlant has developed “impasse” in regard to neoliberalism, this chapter 
calibrates it to questions of  what attachments are sustainable in the Anthropocene. A 
controversial term coined by Paul Crutzen, the Anthropocene is a new epoch in which 
human activity constitutes a geological force as seen in climate change, among other 
things. It has drawn criticisms of  anthropocentrism, which holds that human life is of  
paramount value and, in versions that advance masterful agency or sovereignty, that 
humans can secure their flourishing by routing the world to their advantage. 
Anthropocentrism in the West has long imbued humans with sovereignty, from individuals 
to the state.  2
	 Investigations of  the Anthropocene have largely focused on the disasters that 
humans have wreaked on ecosystems. Some have urged as well a more exquisite 
sensitivity to the animateness, liveliness, or even agency of  nonhumans. I join these latter 
efforts because the work of  undercutting anthropocentrism demands the cultivation of  
different modes of  relating to nonhumans—modes that, in turn, change our 
understanding of  the human. Critiques of  human mastery as a (neoliberal, racialized, 
gendered, colonialist) fantasy are important but will not make much headway in impasses 
	 Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 200. Cited hereafter in this 1
chapter as CO.
	 Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2
2004); Sharon R. Krause, Freedom Beyond Sovereignty: Reconstructing Liberal Individualism (Chicago: University 
of  Chicago Press, 2015); Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall, “Sovereignty and the UFO,” Political 
Theory 36, no. 4 (2008), 607-33.
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unless they are joined with positive accounts of  how nonhumans affect human life for 
good and ill. What if  impasses today were shaped by nonhumans, such as rising seas, 
food, and heaps of  everyday things? How might politics be rethought accordingly? 
	 This chapter addresses these questions principally by navigating the work of  
Lauren Berlant and Jane Bennett. The bulk of  this chapter describes the materiality of  
attachments that are in crisis during impasses. Berlant frames impasse as mediated by 
fantasy, which supplies humans with a sense of  coherence, of  continuity between 
themselves and the world, and the optimism for living and living on. An impasse emerges 
when the objects of  desire that house those fantasies turn out to be jeopardized or toxic. 
Berlant does not elaborate the role of  matter in the anxious, exhausting, exhilarating 
struggles of  humans in an impasse. I thus turn to Bennett’s articulation of  matter as 
vibrant and forceful. Matter makes a difference to human life in ways irreducible to 
human intention, understanding, instrumentality, and, I add, fantasy. Drawing upon 
Bennett’s “vibrant materialism,” I treat attachments as shaped in part by matter. 
	 Attentiveness to matter not only develops a more detailed picture of  impasses. It 
alters ethical and political life by shifting agency away from human mastery. Take 
impasses of  the Anthropocene, wherein neoliberal capitalist fantasies of  the good life and 
the drive to privatize the planet have raised the specter of  our imminent derailment and 
even extinction, as well as that of  countless species. If  a strong anthropocentric bent has 
played a starring role in creating this fragility, then attuning to nonhumans as lively actors 
rather than as passive tools or dead meat may enable more sustainable, less wasteful, less 
harmful living on and with the earth, other species, and other humans. More productive 
engagements with impasses of  the Anthropocene could follow, which question what it 
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means to be human in a world pulsing with vibrant matter. 
	 This chapter tracks questions of  attachment and agency across numerous 
interlocking scales of  impasses in the Anthropocene: a planetary one of  ecological crises; 
a bodily one marked by anxiety, exhaustion, and ailing health; and a national one in 
which the US has sought to salvage its image of  sovereignty. Rather than tracing the 
concrete links between these domains, I map them together by crises in human mastery. 
The intensified precarity of  life, both human and not, is reason to develop relationalities 
that are not organized by anthropocentrism. I develop a feminist, queer, and ecological 
relationality by drawing upon the work of  Berlant and Bennett and by reading Jennifer 
Egan’s short story “Found Objects.” The effort of  this chapter is to explicate the dangers 
of  attachments to sovereignty, to locate human agency amongst rather than above 
nonhumans, and to discuss the reconfiguration of  the human as a productive way of  
moving in impasses of  the Anthropocene. 
For the Love of  Impasse | Fantasy, National Sentimentality 
This section demonstrates that Berlant’s work on national sentimentality is part of  a 
longstanding concern with various aspects of  impasse: crises in identity, intimacy, and 
belonging; a suspension of  the present in favor of  a predetermined future; a politics that 
strives to remain in proximity to what is deferred, foreclosed, or damaging rather than 
one in which people welcome loss and become open to being transformed. 
	 Berlant’s national sentimentality project tracks “the emergence of  the U.S. 
political sphere as an affective space, a space of  attachment and identification that is not 
saturated merely by ideological or cognitive content, but is also an important sustainer of  
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people's desires for reciprocity with the world.”  In the face of  a messy or hostile world, 3
people have been drawn to the genre of  sentimentality for a sense of  belonging. 
Sentimental subjects don't set out to change that world; they adjust themselves to salvage 
fantasies of  belonging and reciprocity. 
	 Fantasy underpins national sentimentality. Berlant writes that 
fantasy donates a sense of  affective coherence to what is incoherent and 
contradictory in the subject; provides a sense of  reliable continuity amidst 
the flux of  intensities and attachments; and allows out-of-sync-ness and 
unevenness of  being in the ordinary world at once to generate a secure 
psychotic enclave and to maintain the subject's openness to the ordinary 
disturbances of  experience.  4
Fantasy makes desire feel realizable. Its work is affective because desiring and imagining a 
world aren't the same as building and having one. In other words, fantasy expresses desire 
as an affective rather than an actual fact.  Fantasy does not mystify reality but creates an 5
affective space of  thriving, even in the absence of  the necessary social and political 
infrastructure. It buoys the subject in a world that would drown it. National sentimentality 
depends on fantasy to secure optimism for the nation as a space of  belonging, especially 
for those who are scarred by its historical exclusions. 
	 In The Anatomy of  National Fantasy, Berlant explores the United States's tenuous 
	 Lauren Berlant, The Female Complaint: The Unfinished Business of  Sentimentality in American Culture (Durham: 3
Duke University Press, 2006), x-xi. Cited hereafter in this chapter as FC.
	 Lauren Berlant, Desire/Love (Brooklyn: punctum books, 2012), 75. Cited hereafter in this chapter as DL.4
	 Brian Massumi distinguishes between affective and actual facts to denote effects that are real because, 5
rather than in spite of, something's nonexistence. His primary case is threat as addressed by preemptive 
power. See “The Future Birth of  the Affective Fact: The Political Ontology of  Threat” in The Affect 
Theory Reader, eds. Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2010), 52-70.
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national imaginary. “America” is a set of  practices and an “occasion for exploring what it 
means that national subjects already share not just a history, or a political allegiance, but a 
set of  forms and the affect that makes these forms meaningful.”  Fantasy consolidates 6
legal, territorial, linguistic, aesthetic, and affective forces into a “National Symbolic” that 
bears utopian promises of  the good life. It also reverses course to render palpable the 
nation's abstractions. But the pristine geometry of  the utopian nation cannot encompass 
everyday life, which is a thicket of  historical trajectories and power-induced embodiments 
of  race, class, and gender. Those who are juridically and biopolitically written out of  
America come to see the nation as a threat, its promises as untenable and damaging. 
They intuit their own bodies as battlegrounds between the utopian and the quotidian. A 
cloud of  ambivalence thus shrouds national fantasy. Berlant notes of  Nathaniel 
Hawthorne’s time that “it became a matter of  fierce contention whether the nation truly 
fulfilled its juridico-utopian promise to protect the local while abstracting the person from 
his body and everyday life experience to another, more stable, symbolic order” (ANF, 12). 
When everyday life upsets the nation's utopian promises, to where might the minoritized 
turn for belonging and reciprocity, as well as the resources for surviving and thriving? 
	 This question frames The Female Complaint, which tracks the turn to sentimentality 
in the “intimate publics” that emerge amidst disappointment with political institutions of  
privilege. An intimate public “foregrounds affective and emotional attachments located in 
fantasies of  the common, the everyday, and a sense of  ordinariness” (FC, 10). Intimate 
publics posit that its subjects share certain historical experiences of  exhaustion, shame, 
and depression. The intimate public of  “women’s culture” in the United States from the 
	 Lauren Berlant, The Anatomy of  National Fantasy: Hawthorne, Utopia, and Everyday Life (Chicago: University 6
of  Chicago Press, 1991), 4. Cited hereafter in this chapter as ANF.
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1830s to the present emerged in response to the political public of  white men. It has 
gathered fantasies of  belonging, surviving, and thriving as mediated by norms of  
femininity. It espouses a love plot that is viewed to save women from the stresses and 
incoherence of  ordinary life, politics, and history: love is where living really takes place. 
That this love plot is sometimes disappointed doesn't make it any less desirable. As Berlant 
notes, disappointment makes love promissory. The love plot absorbs disappointment, 
recalling a line from Terrence Malick’s To the Wonder: “You fear your love has died; 
perhaps it is waiting to be transformed into something higher.” This is love as an impasse 
matter; disappointment doesn't lead to detachment but to adaptation, bargaining, and 
waiting for tomorrow—a tomorrow “in which fantasies of  the good life can be lived” (TF, 
2). The intimate public of  women's culture stitches historical wounds with the fantasy of  
overcoming love's disappointments. 
	 Because the love plot sanctifies feelings, women's culture finds its highest 
expression in the genre of  sentimentality. Berlant writes that “what makes a thing 
sentimental is the presumption of  emotional clarity and affective recognition in the scene 
of  the mediated encounter” (FC, 271). The sentimental genre translates feelings and 
emotions into the truth of  a person and holds that these true feelings allow people, 
whatever their differences, to feel right at home together in publics. In the intimate public 
of  “women's culture,” sentimental fantasies register love and its disappointments as true 
feelings. 
	 Berlant criticizes sentimentality as a genre of  the political. Sentimental politics in 
the US has mixed humanism, vulnerability, and empathy into an ethos that exaggerates 
the capacity of  feeling to transform worlds of  suffering. It presumes that painful feelings 
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cement alliances across social and political fault-lines. It also posits that shifts in feeling, 
such as the generation of  compassion, are evidence that a political world has changed 
even if  its material structures remain largely intact. In the US, sentimental politics has 
been a liberal project of  compassionately absorbing the historically wounded into the 
utopian nation. But “compassionate liberalism” is for Berlant “at best, a kind of  
sandpaper on the surface of  the racist monument whose structural and economic solidity 
endures” (FC, 6). Sentimental politics reduces justice to the solicitation of  compassion 
from political majorities and the maintenance of  optimism for liberal equality on part of  
minorities. 
	 In short, sentimentality is where desires for political change end up against the 
best interests of  the minoritized: “As when a refrigerator is opened by a person hungry for 
something other than food,” Berlant writes, “the turn to sentimental rhetoric at moments 
of  social anxiety constitutes a generic wish for an uncomplicated world, one wherein 
structural inequities, not emotions and intimacies, are epiphenomenal” (FC, 21). The 
optimism of  sentimental politics lies in “change without trauma,” or adjustments that 
strive to salvage damaging fantasies rather than losing them to build better ones (FC, 146). 
Sentimental politics does not aspire to gut structural disparities along imbricated lines of  
race, gender, and class. Nor does it seek the loss of  a dominant worlds. At best, it offers at 
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best a tiny breath of  relief  from the noose of  power.  7
	 The Queen of  America Goes to Washington City explores national sentimentality during 
the Reagan years, when the dominant public became an intimate space colored by the 
dreams of  white elites.  Consolidation of  this sentimental public by both the right and the 8
	 Berlant acknowledges the achievements of  sentimental politics: “As a force for the conversion of  the 7
politically privileged, sentimental politics has had powerfully transformative effects on which 
subordinate populations are recognized as candidates for inclusion in the body politic” (FC, 35). 
	 	 Nonetheless, sentimental politics has tons of  problems. Berlant elaborates her criticisms of  
sentimental politics in “The Subject of  True Feeling.” There, she explores the trauma culture of  the US 
in which pain has counted as true feeling. Berlant sees Wendy Brown's notion of  “wounded 
attachments” at work not only US identity politics but in the longer genealogy of  national sentimentality 
which includes not only minoritized but also privileged populations. Sentimentality renders pain a 
“universal true feeling,” making it the political instrument of  empathic identification and social change. 
The ameliorative action induced by exposure to another's pain would transform the nation from a site 
of  historical contradiction into a utopia wherein the absence of  suffering signals the securement of  
justice. In this utopia of  belonging, the personal, the emotional, and the universal coincide, providing 
optimism for the minoritized in the form of  overcoming of  pain rather than the redressing of  historical 
injustice. As a result, sentimental politics silences “an analytically powerful and political rage,” forfeits 
“an equivocation of  demand and radical critique,” and favors “short-term coalition building” over “a 
politics of  the long haul” (Lauren Berlant, “The Subject of  True Feeling: Pain, Privacy, Politics” in 
Cultural Studies & Political Theory, ed. Jodi Dean [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000], 61. Cited 
hereafter in this chapter as “TF”). Berlant notes, for example, that the conditions of  quotidian hardship 
faced by women remain unaddressed by the focus on trauma and reparation, which can neither detect 
nor deal with the intricacies of  “a world where women are responsible for sustaining the conditions of  
intimacy and sexual desire; where they are made radiant by having more symbolic than social value...; 
where their anger is considered evidence of  their triviality or greed and lack of  self-knowledge” (“TF,” 
60). By simplifying the life-worlds of  the minoritized, sentimental politics confines them “to spin[ning] 
negative value into the gold of  an always deferred future, meanwhile coping, if  they can, in the 
everyday” (“TF,” 60). In other words, the minoritized become poster children of  pain who wait, cope, 
and relay true feeling rather than demanding and striving for broad social, cultural, and political change 
outside constellations of  nation, utopia, fantasy, and law.
	 What makes Berlant's analysis of  the Reagan years distinct is its focus on the sentimentalization of  8
mainstream politics. In this structural transformation of  the public sphere, personal, private, and 
intimate matters—such as abortion, marriage, proper sexuality, and family values—took centerstage 
such that sex rather than civics constituted citizenship. Political, social, and economic concerns became 
refracted through the intimate, so much so that sex lurked somewhere in even the most unsexy matters. 
Berlant notes, for example, how fantasies of  upward mobility interwove hard work and heteronormal 
family-building. Reaganite conservatism repackaged the public through national sentimentality such that 
one belonged to the nation as a private person rather than as a civic citizen or historical subject. 
	 	 Reaganite sentimental politics consisted in protecting that private person as a subject unmarked by 
history. Troubled by “the antiwar, antiracist, and feminist agitations of  the sixties [that] denounced the 
hollow promises of  the political pseudopublic sphere,” Reagan's sentimental politics sought to reinstall 
the fantasy of  the national utopia (Lauren Berlant, The Queen of  America Goes to Washington City: Essays on 
Sex and Citizenship (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997], 3. Cited in this chapter hereafter as QA). 
It framed the struggles of  the subaltern as an assault on its right to be unmarked, inflating its discomfort 
into trauma and generating claims that the privileged too ought to be free from pain, history, and 
political trouble. In this era, national sentimentality was “a politics that abjure[d] politics, made on 
behalf  of  a private life protected from the harsh realities of  power” (QA, 11). It's not that Reaganite 
conservatism sought to dismantle politics and the state; rather, like most conservatisms in the US, it 
privatized the state in order to restrict its capacities to provide social welfare and protection for the 
subaltern, and to enhance its capacities to enforce an official fantasy of  the utopian nation.
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left had cast political experimentation as an obstacle to realizing the utopian nation; 
hence, it was viewed to be in need of  policing and silencing.  “Moments of  oppressive 9
optimism in normal national culture” bubbled up while domination was repackaged as a 
social good, utopian desires were absorbed into conservative ambitions, and weary people 
bargained for well-worn fantasies organized by heteronormativity and capitalism (QA, 13). 
Berlant is concerned with the taming of  desire and the loss of  sexual and political 
experimentation.  Were the left to desist from sentimental fantasies of  the nation, other 10
forms of  political world-making could emerge from this impasse. 
	 Cruel Optimism develops a notion of  impasse most explicitly even as it is anticipated 
in Berlant’s previous works. In The Anatomy of  National Fantasy, Berlant notes that 
Hawthorne, by unhinging the utopian from the nation, opened an impasse in national 
identity: “If  the nation were no longer held to be the ideal type of  political structure that 
secures justice for its citizens, what other forms of  identity might be construed to 
relegitimate its incorporation of  utopia-in-practice?” (ANF, 208). The nation attempts to 
close that problem through what, in The Queen of  America, Berlant calls “technologies of  
patience,” which align the minoritized with hopes of  belonging to the national utopia in 
the future as they bear the burdens of  exclusion in the present (QA, 222). Berlant aims to 
	 The intimate public of  privatized citizenship didn't become dominant due to right-wing efforts alone; 9
nor was it only because the right adopted a sentimental frame by appropriating the political strategies of  
the minoritized. Rather, the ascendance of  the intimate public was also due to those on the left that who 
capitulated to the terms of  national utopia, privatized citizenship, and true feeling. Berlant criticizes 
leftist efforts to appropriate normative fantasies of  the good life, such as legalizing gay marriage or 
adopting “critical” consumption practices, because they reify the public as an intimate space, bargaining 
with rather than challenging “exploitation and normativity” and thus furthering abjecting those who are 
furthest from exemplifying normativity (QA, 9).
	 For example, she, along with Michael Warner, respond to the charge that their opposition is too 10
constraining for queers. They write that “the space of  sexual culture has become obnoxiously cramped 
from doing the work of  maintaining a normal metaculture” (Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner, “Sex 
in Public,” Critical Inquiry 24, No. 2 [Winter 1998], 557).
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orient politics away from maintenance of  those technologies and to detachment from 
national sentimentality. In The Female Complaint, she writes: 
The political question is how to understand the difficulty of  detaching 
from lives and worlds that wear out life, rather than sustain it. To interfere 
with the ordinary precarity of  both domains [love and the social] requires 
a loss of  confidence in normativity, which one can sense as the loss of  a 
beloved object. This suggests that, whatever else it is, an object of  desire is 
not only a thing, scene, or person, but an affect: the affect associated with 
the pleasure of  binding or attachment itself. The loss of  a world is thus not 
only of  a singular thing, but also the loss of  the capacity to keep having the 
feelings that were represented in the ongoingness of  the thing.  (FC, 266-7). 
Berlant's political aim is to incite detachment from problematic objects of  desire, to 
untether optimism from the normative. Detachment entails parting with an anchor in 
favor of  a murk that feels like nothing or overwhelming plenitude, a situation of  too much 
or too little to secure a stable rhythm of  living. Detachment is difficult since there does not 
yet exist an alternative that can be adopted with the confidence of  the normative. 
	 These concerns are explored in Cruel Optimism, which treats neoliberalism in the 
historical present as an impasse. This impasse has concerned the jeopardization of  
fantasies of  meritocracy, upward mobility, job security, and durable intimacy. Amidst the 
crumbling of  the aesthetic forms through which people have grown accustomed to 
apprehending ordinary life, the historical present has spawned the “precariat,” an 
affective class whose sensoria are clustered around precarity instead of  expectation. This 
tenuous position enables people to detach from neoliberal fantasies of  the good life and to 
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begin the hard work of  building more equitable, sustainable ones. The precariat might 
aim to weave more equitable good-life fantasies from the “loose sense of  solidarity in the 
political that now occupies the ordinary amidst the exhausting pragmatics of  the 
everyday” (CO, 262). Berlant does not champion this “lateral politics;” she warns that it 
can turn sentimental by overvaluing the “sense of  belonging in relation to dealing with the 
hard questions of  distributing resources, risk, and vulnerability in the polis” (CO, 262). 
Nonetheless, she hopes that lateral politics might develop “new idioms of  the political, 
and of  belonging itself ” as people are drawn together into survival mode (CO, 262). In 
short, Berlant stages the historical present as an impasse to attend to the adjustments, 
scramblings, and innovations of  precarious lives in the face of  crumbling fantasies of  the 
good life that had grounded identities, the nation, and optimism. 
Planetary Precarity | Neoliberalism, Colonialism, and the Anthropocene 
Scholars have criticized Berlant’s characterization of  the historical present, which focuses 
on neoliberalism in isolation of  other political dynamics such as settler colonialism and 
global imperialism. Jodi Byrd emphasizes that efforts to rebuild neoliberal fantasies in the 
United States continue the erasure of  indigenous peoples; settlers maintain “an 
attachment to Indians as affective fantasy” in order to protect themselves “from the 
destruction the United States wreaked upon actual Indian lives.”  Dia Da Costa criticizes 11
Berlant’s isolation of  the West from global relations of  power and situates impasses in 
 	 Jodi A. Byrd, The Transit of  Empire: Indigenous Critiques of  Colonialism (Minneapolis: University of  11
Minnesota Press, 2011), 36.
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neoliberalism within centuries of  global development, capitalism, and colonialism.  In 12
light of  these criticisms, Byrd and Da Costa maintain the notion of  impasse as a useful 
lens with which to understand the historical present. 
	 This section builds upon Byrd’s and Da Costa’s critiques by exploring 
contemporary impasses through the angle of  ecological precarity and by beginning to 
describe the role of  matter in those impasses. Neoliberal capitalism is only part of  the 
picture; matter also helps to intensify climate change and its biopolitical effects. My 
approach does not mean to displace questions of  human responsibility in contemporary 
ecological issues; rather, it emphasizes that the agency of  the human is neither sovereign 
nor distributed evenly across different populations. Some humans are situated with great 
power, others with grave vulnerability. As impasses in neoliberal life raise the prospect of  
human extinction, they become inseparable from impasses in human life: crises in 
fantasies that define the good life through market freedom become interwoven with crises 
in fantasies of  what it means to be human. They amplify the urgency of  reconstructing 
the human apart from long-held, long-contested beliefs in sovereignty, exceptionality, and 
futurity.  13
	 Accounts of  neoliberalism have been richly diverse and deeply conflictual. I follow 
the understanding elaborated by Michel Foucault.  While liberalism allowed the market 14
to follow logics that were not shaped by society, neoliberalism holds that the market logic 
 	 Dia Da Costa, “Cruel Pessimism and Waiting for Belonging: Towards a Global Political Economy of  12
Affect,” Cultural Studies, published online 25 March 2014, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/
10.1080/09502386.2014.899607
	 Roy Scranton, “Learning How to Die in the Anthropocene,” The New York Times, 10 November 2013, 13
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/10/learning-how-to-die-in-the-anthropocene/
 	Michel Foucault, The Birth of  Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979, trans. Graham Burchell 14
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
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should dictate the organization of  society. Neoliberals espouse the unfettered agency of  
market processes while treating humans as though their agency were consummate. This 
construction of  humans as free has a dark underside: an emphasis on individual 
responsibility, which grounds harsh discipline and practices of  social abandonment for 
humans who are treated as failures. 
	 Neoliberalism is the latest phase of  a system of  power whose ecologically 
destructive potency has been traced to industrialization. Combined with an ethos of  
overconsumption and wastefulness, it has been an engine of  the “Great Acceleration,” or 
a period beginning around 1950 of  rapid deforestation, human population explosion, 
unprecedented levels of  greenhouse gases, rising sea levels, intensified storms, and long 
droughts. One study reports that two-thirds of  the greenhouse gas emissions since the 
advent of  industrialization were produced by only 90 companies—and that half  of  that 
amount was produced in the last 25 years alone.  Neoliberal capitalist life has strained 15
the Earth’s resources, intensified regional and global inequality, and proliferated toxic 
wastes, such as those of  electronics that pile up in the neighborhoods of  already 
vulnerable populations in Asia and Africa.  Impasses in neoliberalism within the 16
Anthropocene concern how people remain attached to neoliberal life, the role played by 
nonhumans in exacerbating the unsustainability of  neoliberal life, and the biopolitical 
and ecological consequences that follow. 
 	 Suzanne Goldenberg, “Just 90 Companies Caused Two-Thirds of  Man-Made Global Warming 15
Emissions,” The Guardian, 20 November 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/nov/
20/90-companies-man-made-global-warming-emissions-climate-change. Accessed on 20 November 
2013.
 	 John Vidal, “Toxic ‘E-Waste’ Dumped in Poor Nations, Says United Nations,” The Guardian, 14 16
December 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/dec/14/toxic-ewaste-illegal-
dumping-developing-countries. Accessed on 1 August 2015.
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	 Situating impasses in neoliberalism within the Anthropocene necessitates 
foregrounding the role of  colonial and imperial powers. While many scholars date the 
Anthropocene to the beginning of  agriculture, industrialization, or the Great 
Acceleration, some have recently tied it to imperial expansion, colonization, and 
genocide.  Of  particular importance is the work of  Simon Lewis and Mark Maslin who, 17
after reviewing various proposed origin dates, defend 1610 as that which best exemplifies 
a “golden spike,” or a geological event that is both global in scope and rapid in 
occurrence.  That date marks the nadir of  a plunge in global carbon dioxide levels. Why 18
was there less CO₂ in the air? The wars, diseases, and famine that followed contact with 
European explorers and colonists resulted in the death of  approximately 50 million 
Native Americans by 1650. The consequent decline in farming and fire use marked an 
explosion of  flora—over 50 million hectares worth (an area about eighteen percent larger 
than California). In short, CO₂ levels plummeted because there were more plants and far 
fewer humans. The epoch heralded as worthy of  the name “Man” is haunted by the 
breath of  millions of  exterminated Native Americans. 
	 At first glance, dating the Anthropocene to 1610 strays from the term’s usual focus 
on the dangers of  increases in carbon emissions. What that date highlights, however, is how 
the geological impact of  Man has a legacy rooted in colonial and imperial distributions of  
precarity, life, and death that continue today in albeit different forms. As Sylvia Wynter 
insists, ecological issues concern a “central ethnoclass Man vs. Human struggle” wherein 
	 For an excellent synthesis of  research on this point, see Kent G. Lightfoot, Lee M. Panich, Tsim D. 17
Schneider, and Sara L. Gonzalez, “European Colonialism and the Anthropocene: A View from the 
Pacific Coast of  North America,” Anthropocene 4 (2013), 101-15.
	 Simon L. Lewis and Mark A. Maslin, “Defining the Anthropocene,” Nature 519 (2015), 171-80.18
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the former is Western, bourgeois, and white.  One might respond that China and India 19
also have been heavy polluters, but that fact cannot be separated from the context of  
historical encounters with the colonial and imperial West. In any case, Wynter’s point 
remains: humans are not equally implicated in the Anthropocene by either cause or 
effect. Climate change undoubtedly affects all humans but it does so in different ways and 
at different speeds. As Elizabeth DeLoughrey and George Handley underscore, “Although 
postcolonial nations are lowest in terms of  carbon emissions, they are the most vulnerable 
to climate change.”  20
	 DeLoughrey and Handley’s point is exemplified by rising sea levels that are 
already affecting postcolonial island-states such as Fiji, Tuvalu, and the Maldives. Their 
precarity, marked by intensified flooding and the impending submersion of  their homes, 
involves the biopolitical devaluation of  indigenous peoples, carbon emissions, and the 
impending collapse of  the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (which is projected to raise sea levels 
by up to thirteen feet).  The activities of  Man can catalyze and intensify climatological, 21
geological, and oceanic processes that have disastrous effects, even if  such was not 
intended. Oceans, atmospheres, and ice sheets connect pursuits of  neoliberal fantasies to 
the precarity and displacement of  indigenous peoples of  low-lying island-states. 
	 The colonial and imperial dimensions of  ecological precarity call attention to how 
humans are interwoven with nonhumans and how, as a result, nonhumans shape human 
	 Sylvia Wynter, “Unsettling the Coloniality of  Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, 19
After Man, Its Overrepresentation—An Argument,” CR: The New Centennial Review 3, no. 3 (Fall 2003), 
260-1.
	 Elizabeth DeLoughrey and George B. Handley, “Introduction: Toward an Aesthetics of  the Earth” in 20
Postcolonial Ecologies: Literatures of  the Environment, eds. DeLoughrey and Handley (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 26.
	 Fred Pearce, With Speed and Violence: Why Scientists Fear Tipping Points in Climate Change (Boston: Beacon 21
Press, 2007), 56-7.
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life. Dipesh Chakrabarty, for example, argues that climate change is the product of  
imbrications between human life, natural processes, and capital. Ecological calamities that 
can be tied to the industrial revolution were made possible by the agricultural revolution 
which, according to Chakrabarty, “was made possible by certain changes in the amount 
of  carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, a certain stability of  the climate, and a degree of  
warming of  the planet that followed the end of  the Ice Age (the Pleistocene Era)—things 
over which human beings had no control.”  Humans have not generated climate change 22
on their own, no matter how ecologically destructive neoliberal capitalism may be.  23
Chakrabarty supplements Wynter’s point that all humans cannot be held evenly 
responsible for climate change by adding that the human species cannot be held fully 
responsible, as though its agency were sovereign and as though matter were inert. 
	 While Chakrabarty uncovers the effects of  nonhumans by historicizing climate 
change, William Connolly addresses how nonhumans shape neoliberal life today. For 
Connolly, proponents of  neoliberalism such as Friedrich Hayek are right to believe that 
markets demonstrate powers of  self-organization but overlook how other systems, human 
and nonhuman, self-organize as well. Neoliberals also pretend that markets are not 
affected by biological, geological, and cosmic events such as cross-species transfer of  
viruses, earthquakes, and solar flares. Connolly insists that only by taking stock of  
nonhuman systems can one “come to terms more thoughtfully with the volatile ecology 
of  late modern capitalism and the contemporary fragility of  things.”  24
	 Dipesh Chakrabarty, “The Climate of  History: Four Theses,” Critical Inquiry 35, no. 2 (2009), 217.22
	 Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Climate and Capital: On Conjoined Histories,” Critical Inquiry 41, no. 1 (Autumn 23
2014), 21.
	 William E. Connolly, “Steps toward an Ecology of  Late Capitalism.” Theory and Event 15, no. 1 (2012), 24
muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v015/15.1.connolly.html
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	 Chakrabarty and Connolly, to a lesser extent, elide questions of  the role played by 
nonhumans in making and breaking the attachments that keep neoliberal capitalism 
running in the face of  its ecological destructiveness. Thoughtful engagements with 
impasses of  the Anthropocene, I argue, not only convey how neoliberal life affects, is 
affected by, and is composed of  diverse human populations and nonhumans on a 
planetary scale; they also would detail how nonhumans play a role in the attachments 
between humans and their worlds. 
The Lively Matter of  Cruel Optimism 
Neoliberal capitalist life has barely flinched in the face of  oncoming waves of  ecological 
devastation, many of  which have already shored. Nor has it shifted much in light of  the 
2008 economic crisis and the important efforts of  movements like Occupy. “Why do 
people stay attached to conventional good life fantasies,” Berlant asks, “when evidence of  
their instability, fragility, and dear cost abounds?” (CO, 2). 
	 People in an impasse aren't stupid. Nor are they masochists, if  “masochist” 
denotes a person who enjoys structurally-induced exhaustion, attrition, and pain.  25
Berlant proposes instead that people are optimists; they remain attached to the possibility 
of  overcoming inhibitions to the promises of  fantasies (CO, 184). They apprehend 
impasses as glitches on the way to better times. But people are not optimists in the sense 
of  feeling hopeful. For Berlant, optimism is not an affect but the structure of  attachment 
between subjects and objects of  desire. Optimistic attachments form partly due to the 
	 That is how Judith Butler, according to Berlant, conceives of  the subject that, in a mode of  infantile 25
dependency, desires its own subordination in order to persist as an “I.” In doing so, Berlant argues that 
Butler “equates infantile dependency with normative attachments and normative attachments to power 
and privilege” (CO, 183). 
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efforts of  law, the state, and liberal democracy, as well as the technologies of  patience 
adopted by a subject of  impasses. 
	 Ideology, repression, and disciplinary power cannot fully account for why people 
remain attached to neoliberal life. As Berlant points out, attachments to objects of  desire 
ground a sense of  self  and world that is derived from psychic, social, and disciplinary 
mechanisms. Something becomes an object of  desire when it is misrecognized as bearing 
the good life. Social fantasies inform subjects to desire certain objects. Disciplinary 
technologies of  patience keep people aligned with those fantasies. Neoliberal capitalism 
persists because it has organized life for many people regardless of  whether they believe in 
its fantasies.  Perhaps Slavoj Žižek is onto something when he insists that the end of  26
capitalism is more horrifying than the end of  the world.  27
	 An optimistic attachment turns cruel when its subject would sooner destroy others 
or be destroyed by its fantasies than let them go. “Cruel optimism” denotes “a relation of  
attachment to compromised conditions of  possibility whose realization is discovered to be 
impossible, sheer fantasy, or too possible, and toxic” (CO, 24). This discovery is cruel 
because fantasy seems unable to ground the subject's sense of  self  and world after all. 
Cruel optimists feel the loss of  fantasy as the loss of  oneself  and reciprocity with the 
world. It is a situation of  potentially losing something fundamental and intimate, no 
matter how damaging it might be. In the absence of  another source of  optimism for 
	 One might be reminded of  Wendy Brown's description of  “wounded attachments,” which are fetishized 26
injuries used by minoritized peoples to ground political claims that are inadvertently self-defeating (States 
of  Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995], 52-76). Injury 
may be the object of  attachment, but Berlant convinces me that the structure of  attachment is 
optimistic.
 	 Slavoj Žižek, “Slavoj Žižek Speaks at Occupy Wall Street,” Lacan, http://www.lacan.com/27
thesymptom/?page_id=1476. Accessed on 20 June 2015.
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living and living on, losing a fantasy feels worse than being consumed by it. 
	 An impasse is a situation in which something changes in the objects of  desire that 
have anchored a fantasy. Berlant’s conception of  impasse accommodates materiality in 
the form of  objects of  desire and what troubles them. How does Berlant account for the 
relationship between matter and fantasies? 
	 When it is summoned as an object of  desire, matter is less a lively thing than a 
fantasmatic investment. “When we talk about an object of  desire,” Berlant writes, “we are 
really talking about a cluster of  promises we want someone or something to make to us 
and make possible for us. This cluster of  promises could seem embedded in a person, a 
thing, an institution, a text, a norm, a bunch of  cells, smells, a good idea—whatever” (CO, 
23; emphases mine). Talking about an object of  desire means focusing not on things but 
the promises hovering about them, so much so that the things themselves don't seem to 
matter (“whatever”). This emphasis on promises rather than objects neglects the solicitation 
of  desire by diverse materialities. For Berlant, social fantasy, desire, and the human psyche 
do the work of  generating optimistic attachments with things, as though those things had 
nothing to do with the process. It’s as though the object of  desire were a purely psychic 
achievement. 
	 Berlant attributes the formation of  objects of  desire to misrecognition, “the 
psychic process by which fantasy recalibrates what we encounter so that we can imagine 
that something or someone can fulfill our desire” (CO, 122). Because “desire has bad 
eyesight,” humans misrecognize things as objects that promise wholeness and a place in 
the world (D/L, 76). Those promises are misrecognition's gift-wrapping of  things in 
fantasy. Berlant writes that “to misrecognize is not to err, but to project qualities onto 
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something so that we can love, hate, and manipulate it for having those qualities—which 
it might or might not have” (CO, 122). Misrecognition is what gives humans a handle on 
what lies beyond them. 
	 But does the materiality of  an object of  desire have any part to play in allowing or 
composing fantasy? Berlant’s remarks on apostrophe clarify that, for her, it does not. 
According to Barbara Johnson, apostrophe is the direct address that summons and 
animates “an absent, dead, or inanimate being.”  Berlant observes that apostrophe 28
involves the misrecognition of  an absent entity as an interlocutor, and this misrecognition 
is enacted for the sake of  the speaker. A human apostrophizes x (Johnson’s examples 
include lost lovers and aborted fetuses), which is “affectively present but physically 
displaced” (CO, 25). Because x doesn't actually arrive, this apostrophic relation is one that 
speakers have with themselves; x is ventriloquized by me. Apostrophe opens a dreamy 
moment of  imagined intersubjectivity (“affective presence”) due to the “convenient 
absence” of  x (CO, 25). The subject is vitalized because it can successfully project its 
fantasies onto an absent object. Berlant concludes that apostrophe is a “physically 
impossible but phenomenologically vitalizing movement of  rhetorical animation” (CO, 
26). Apostrophe reveals how misrecognition, when it works, turns humans inward to enjoy 
an imagined scenario. Humans flourish as they shy away from materialities swarming 
outside their heads. 
	 In cruel optimism, misrecognition no longer works and flourishing becomes 
imperiled. The materiality of  a thing, a human, a pet, Earth—whatever—refuses to be 
ignored. It makes itself  present, gets too close, grows wild, bites back. By unsettling 
	 Barbara Johnshon, “Apostrophe, Animation, and Abortion,” Diacritics Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spring 1986), 30.28
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misrecognition, matter exhibits a power, elaborated by speculative realists and object-
oriented ontologists, to tease humans with an inky trace while eluding access and 
understanding.  An object of  desire, which always defers satisfaction, then seems 29
incapable of  ever making good on its promises. The subject enters an impasse in the 
midst of  matter that no longer sustains fantasy. 
	 While Berlant develops a compelling account of  the human experience of  
impasse, I want to bring into focus how the power of  matter plays a role in it. In an 
impasse, matter scratches at the screen of  fantasy. In Cruel Optimism, there are human 
bodies, spiders, yards, bees, vineyards, wires, dust, dollar bills, cigar boxes, rubber bands, 
safes, wedding rings, cartons of  canned sardines, books, paintings, tobacco cans, pianos, 
glass jars of  pennies, bagpipes, sections of  a dead tree, elevators, refrigerators, 
mannequins, windows, a watch, a cot, piss, vomit, blood, vending machines, microwaves, 
sugar, fat, salt, caffeine, alcohol, drugs, and a blind dog named Zora. But the hum exuded 
by these materialities is soft, muffled by Berlant’s focus on fantasy. What if  matter is more 
than a prop in the scene of  fantasy?  What if  it sparks desire and forges attachments? If  30
matter solicits, sustains, and troubles attachments, then impasses are entanglements of  
	 Ian Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, or What It's Like to be a Thing (Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota Press, 29
2012); Levi R. Bryant, The Democracy of  Objects (Ann Arbor, MI: Open Humanities Press, 2011); Graham 
Harman, The Prince of  Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics (Melbourne: re.press, 2009); Quentin 
Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of  Contingency (London, UK: Continuum, 2008); 
Timothy Morton, Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality (Ann Arbor, MI: Open Humanities Press, 
2013).
	 “The object of  cruel optimism here appears as the thing within any object to which one passes one's 30
fantasy of  sovereignty for safekeeping. In cruel optimism the subject or community turns its treasured 
attachments into safety-deposit objects that make it possible to bear sovereignty through its distribution, 
the energy of  feeling relational, general, reciprocal, and accumulative. In circulation one becomes happy 
in an ordinary, often lovely, way, because the weight of  being in the world is being distributed into space, 
time, noise, and other beings. When one's sovereignty is delivered back into one's hands, though, its 
formerly distributed weight becomes apparent, and the subject becomes stilled in a perverse mimesis of  
its enormity. In a relation of  cruel optimism our activity is revealed as a vehicle for attaining a kind of  
passivity, as evidence of  the desire to find forms in relation to which we can sustain a coasting sentience, 
in response to being too alive” (CO, 43).
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matter and fantasy. 
	 For example, one might recall Connolly’s point that, by situating neoliberalism as 
one system amongst others, one may better appreciate and address “the pressures on so 
many constituencies to reinstate faith in neoliberal ideology a short time after the latest 
[2008] meltdown.”  Connolly’s words could gesture to cruel optimism though they do 31
not describe enough the perils of  striving to protect an attachment to neoliberal fantasies. 
But if  grasping cruel optimist attachments to neoliberal fantasies demands attention to 
the affectivity of  nonhuman systems, then Berlant’s account of  the materiality of  impasse 
is partial and a different account of  matter is important. 
	 There has been increasing attention to the place of  nonhumans in and about 
human life. Differences aside, scholarship from object-oriented ontology to new 
materialism remove the human from the bookends of  the known world. They show the 
human to be a particular material configuration amongst innumerable others. In doing 
so, they rethink the human and the humanities. 
	 I enlist new materialisms to argue that matter positively inflects the shape of  
attachments. Because new materialisms are richly diverse,  I draw upon those strands 32
that find matter to be neither passive nor inert, that blur divisions between life and non-
life, and that dethrone the human from its assumed place atop hierarchies of  being. 
	 Jane Bennett’s vibrant materialism suspends problematic divisions between life 
and matter that have dogged classical theories of  vitalism. Whereas the latter have viewed 
	 Connolly, “Steps toward an Ecology of  Late Capitalism.”31
	 Key introductions to new materialisms include William E. Connolly, “The 'New Materialism' and the 32
Fragility of  Things,” Millennium: Journal of  International Studies 41, no. 3 (2013), 399-412; Rick Dolphijn 
and Iris van der Tuin (eds.), New Materialism: Interviews & Cartographies (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities 
Press, 2012); Samantha Frost and Diana Coole (eds.), New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010).
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matter as inert, Bennett hears “a vitality intrinsic to materiality as such” and heeds matter 
as self-organizing—that is, freed from “figures of  passive, mechanistic, or divinely infused 
substance.”  (VM, xiii). The differences made by matter, however large or small, escape 33
human control. Matter exhibits “thing-power,” or the capacity “to act as quasi agents or 
forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of  their own” (VM, viii). Part of  the 
range of  thing-powers has been theorized by others who articulate matter as a shy object 
that retreats into its depths, teasing humans with an inky trace while thwarting access and 
understanding.  This power of  matter inhibits human pursuits. Bennett tends more 34
toward the “productive” power of  things—their ability to mark, entice, allure, provoke, 
enliven. Matter contributes to the shape of  lives and worlds. 
	 This latter form of  thing-power can be discerned in the allure exerted by matter 
on humans. I draw this attractive power from an encounter Bennett had with an eclectic 
mix of  matter: 
On a sunny Tuesday morning on 4 June in the grate over the storm drain 
to the Chesapeake Bay in front of  Sam's Bagels on Cold Spring Lane in 
Baltimore, there was: 
one large men's black plastic work glove 
one dense mat of  oak pollen 
one unblemished dead rat 
 	 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of  Things (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), xiii. 33
Cited in this chapter hereafter as VM.
	 Bennett notes Martin Heidegger, Stephen Jay Gould, Theodor Adorno, and Graham Harman as 34
theorists of  the thing-powers of  “recalcitrance, elusiveness, and the ability to impede (and thus perhaps 
to chasten) the will to truth” (Jane Bennett, “Powers of  the Hoard: Further Notes on Material Agency,” 
in Animal, Vegetable, Mineral: Ethics and Objects, ed. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen [Brooklyn, New York: punctum 
books, 2012], 243. Cited in this chapter hereafter as “PH”).
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one white plastic bottle cap 
one smooth stick of  wood 
Glove, pollen, rat, cap, stick. As I encountered these items, they shimmied 
back and forth between debris and thing… [S]tuff  exhibited its thing-
power: it issued a call, even if  I did not quite understand what it was 
saying. (VM, 4) 
Bennett heard a call and headed over. The items kept her in place for a few moments 
during which she “caught a glimpse into a parallel world of  vibrant, powerful 
things” (“PH,” 239). Things buzz with their own power, which can lure over an 
unsuspecting passerby and get her to stay awhile. 
	 What becomes clear in this encounter is that no particular thing encased material 
vibrancy. The glove, rat, pollen, bottle cap, stick, and Bennett congregated for a few 
moments. It is difficult to tell which component was key to Bennett’s vibrant materialist 
revelation: “For had the sun not glinted on the black glove, I might not have seen the rat; 
had the rat not been there, I might not have noted the bottle cap, and so on. But they were 
all there just as they were” (VM, 5). These various bits of  matter became an ecology, a 
“contingent tableau” of  human and nonhuman forces in this singular place and time. 
	 Bennett quickly shifts from a language of  thing-power to the agency of  
assemblages. She notes that while the concept of  thing-power unsettles sharp divisions 
between life and matter, it tends to present materiality as discrete lumps of  matter. It also 
risks the presentation of  things as full-fledged agents and humans as mere patients. A turn 
to assemblage emphasizes that material vibrancy is not a property of  any particular thing 
but a force that emerges through ecologies of  matter. Bennett draws upon Gilles Deleuze 
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and Félix Guattari’s concept of  assemblage while inflecting it with vibrancy, tactility, and 
movement: 
Assemblages are living, throbbing confederations that are able to function 
despite the persistent presence of  energies that confound them from 
within. They have uneven topographies, because some of  the points at 
which the various affects and bodies cross paths are more heavily trafficked 
than others, and so power is not distributed equally across its surface… 
[N]o one materiality or type of  material has sufficient competence to 
determine consistently the trajectory or impact of  the group. The effects 
generated by an assemblage are, rather, emergent properties… Each 
member and proto-member of  the assemblage has a certain vital force, but 
there is also an effectivity proper to the grouping as such: an agency of  the 
assemblage. (VM, 23-4). 
Assemblages are the criss-crossing of  impacts and trajectories, the knitting of  patterns of  
difference and repetition. Bits of  matter jostle and jive together, improvising a rhythm 
whose maintenance requires “creative compensations” for external shocks and internal 
discord (VM, 22). Agency in an assemblage is impersonal and distributed, not personal 
and sovereign. Assemblages blossom into effects larger than any one member could 
produce alone while being reconfigured in turn.  35
	 I return to what Bennett calls “distributed agency” in the next section. Now, I note 
that the attractive force of  matter—what Bennett calls “the power that things have to 
	 Manuel DeLanda describes this “autonomy” of  assemblages as a result of  feedback loops between parts 35
and whole and the irreducibility of  interactions between assemblages to their respective parts (A New 
Philosophy of  Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity [London, UK: Continuum, 2006], 40).
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draw us near and provoke our deep attachments to them” —resonates with what Berlant 36
calls optimism. The latter is “the force that moves you out of  yourself  and into the world 
in order to bring closer the satisfying something that you cannot generate on your own but 
sense in the wake of  a person, a way of  life, an object, project, concept, or scene” (CO, 
1-2). Whereas optimism is the spiraling-outward of  the human subject through the 
propulsive force of  desire, thing-power here is the allure of  matter. The former concerns 
the human power of  misrecognition, fantasy, and promises of  coherence, continuity, and 
reciprocity, the latter thing-powers expressed as vibrancy, rhythm, and duration. The 
former centers upon the human and its needs; the latter foregrounds the hold of  matter 
irrespective of  human desire. 
	 I note these differences not to select Berlant or Bennett as the source of  a better 
account of  attachments but to better understand the complexity of  attachments and 
hence impasses. While it is hard for me to not see desire, misrecognition, social fantasy, 
and disciplinary technologies as themselves particular expressions of  material vibrancies, 
I do not feel that vibrant materialism fully captures their operations. To understand 
psychic, social, and disciplinary forces as material ones is partly to acknowledge how the 
vibrancy of  matter may inflect their effects away from human understanding and control, 
but it does not account for their relative though distinctive contributions to the form, 
durability, and fragility of  attachments. My endeavor is to discern how materialities of  
various sorts operate through each other in impasses, sometimes in concert, sometimes 
with great friction. 
	 Attachments are assemblages that hold together an expanse of  materialities. As 
	 Bennett, “Powers of  the Hoard,” 243.36
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Kathleen Stewart writes, “An attachment circulates across bodies of  all kinds—human 
bodies, bodies of  thought, plant and animal bodies, bodies of  pain and pleasure.”  Each 37
of  these bodies contributes, though not necessarily evenly, to the composition of  an 
attachment. In other words, attachments stays intact if  psychic, social, disciplinary, and 
material lines stay in phase. Bennett and Connolly describe a “phase” as a porous, 
shifting, elastic, and yet relatively stable state that emerges through resonances and 
frictions.  Phases vary in duration and degree, from a moment to a lifetime, an encounter 38
to an attachment. 
	 As a form of  phase, an attachment emerges only if  matter sustains, enables, and 
even solicits the collaboration of  misrecognition, social fantasy, and disciplinary power. If, 
for example, the Earth is misrecognized as a bounty of  resources to be mined for the 
good life, it is not because it is inert or because humans are sovereign. Nor is it only the 
effect of  Western liberal, capitalist, and colonialist fantasies of  human sovereignty and of  
property. Those fantasies take hold when earthly matter changes slowly relative to 
humans. They are unsettled in events that demonstrate the more spectacular capacities of  
the Earth, like earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and superstorms.  In other words, an 39
object of  desire emerges on account of  misrecognition and matter at work behind the 
curtain of  fantasy. Matter is not a hapless surface that awaits the adornment of  human 
fantasy. Its rhythms, durations, and forces enable misrecognition; thing-power allows 
	 Kathleen Stewart, “An Autoethnography of  What Happens.” in Handbook of  Autoethnography, eds. Stacy 37
Holman Jones, Tony E. Adams, and Carolyn Ellis (Walnut Creek: Left Coast Press, 2013), 661.
	 Jane Bennett and William E. Connolly, “The Crumpled Handkerchief.” In Time and History in Deleuze and 38
Serres, ed. Bernd Herzogenrath (London, UK: Bloomsbury, 2012), 156-8.
	 Jane Bennett describes a similar redistribution of  human time and geological time. See “Earthling, Now 39
and Forever?” in Making the Geologic Now: Responses to Material Conditions of  Everyday Life, eds. Elizabeth 
Ellsworth and Jamie Kruse (New York: punctum books, 2013), 244-6.
60
fantasy to stick. When matter and fantasy are thrown out of  phase, thing-power oozes 
through the pores of  objects of  desire. 
	 An impasse is not merely a crisis in fantasy, as Berlant largely depicts it, but a crisis 
in assemblages. As assemblages, attachments are marked by attraction and repulsion; their 
diverse materialities are drawn together close enough to affect each other but far enough 
to avoid tumbling into a larger whole that is devoid of  energetic remainders. The tension 
between materialities nears a breaking point in impasses. In the version described here, 
matter pulls humans away from where social fantasies, disciplinary regimes, and even 
those humans would like them to be. Creative compensations seem unable to stop the 
spread of  hairline cracks throughout the assemblage. 
	 Some might frown upon the reach for matter beyond the human: isn’t this mere 
talk? How can a human even hope to shake off  human perception to discern and express 
the “powers” of  nonhumans? Isn’t vibrant materialism anthropomorphic and 
performative—that is, isn’t it a cultural semiotics of  objects or a discursive practice that 
materializes and animates what is otherwise inanimate or nonhuman?  Wasn’t Bennett 40
merely seeing what she had already expected to see due to her intellectual and cultural 
background? Might the glove, pollen, rat, cap, and stick be Bennett’s own objects of  
desire that house a fantasy of  matter as vibrant? Might they be the objects of  an 
apostrophic relation? 
	 These criticisms, neither right nor wrong, issue from an anthropocentric 
framework. They risk imbuing the human with sovereign power by quarantining thing-
power and reestablishing divides between the human and the nonhuman that they might 
	 For one elaboration of  how discourse produces material reality, see Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the 40
Discursive Limits of  “Sex” (New York, NY: Routledge, 1993).
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otherwise seek to deconstruct. They neglect the nonhuman materialities that make up the 
human, such as the minerals in our bones and blood. They overemphasize the 
distinctiveness of  the human’s psychic powers of  misrecognition without acknowledging 
enough how they might be particular things-powers. Vibrant materialism insists that the 
human is not fully human, perhaps by issuing a Whitmanian rejoinder: “I find I 
incorporate gneiss, coal, long-threaded moss, fruits, grains, esculent roots, / And am 
stucco'd with quadrupeds and birds all over.”  It might also adopt an evolutionary view 41
to problematize clean-cut species demarcations and maintain that what we typically 
reserve as human has been emerging through long genealogies of  interleavings with a 
diverse host of  nonhumans.  42
	 Read in this light, the anthropomorphic quality of  Bennett’s account is partly the 
expression of  things-powers. Bennett isn’t quite describing her encounter with thing-power; 
instead, thing-power expresses itself  in Bennett’s writings through anthropomorphic 
images. I surmise that things nudged Bennett to reach toward anthropomorphic 
expressions, appealing for their capacity to flag the material vibrancy running across 
humans and nonhumans. Along with her rhythmic and sonorous writing style, 
anthropomorphism is Bennett’s tool for tuning readers to the vibrancy of  matter; it “can 
catalyze a sensibility that finds a world filled not with ontologically distinct categories of  
being (subjects and objects) but with variously composed materialities that form 
confederations” (VM, 99). 
	 Finally, is vibrant materialism a testament to the cultural encoding of  perception? 
	 Walt Whitman, “Song of  Myself ” in Leaves of  Grass and Other Writings, ed. Michael Moon (New York, 41
NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2002), 52.
	 Elizabeth Grosz, Becoming Undone: Darwinian Reflections on Life, Politics, and Art (Durham, NC: Duke 42
University Press, 2011).
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Yes, to an extent. Bennett admits that an “anticipatory readiness,” a “perceptual style 
open to the appearance of  thing-power,” had played a role in her encounter; she had 
been reading Spinoza, Thoreau, and Merleau-Ponty (VM, 5). To attribute the results of  
this encounter solely to cultural and perceptual filters is, again, to dampen thing-powers, to 
exaggerate the efficacy of  more abstract ideas, and to parse ideas and matter instead of  
viewing them collectively as part of  an assemblage. 
	 When encountering impasses of  the Anthropocene, it is important to lean away 
from skepticisms over vibrant materialism, even if  one cannot prove that matter is 
vibrant, to devise new approaches to intense ecological shifts. Chakrabarty finds that 
climate change, by raising the prospect of  human extinction, disrupts a presumption that 
has been central to the discipline of  history: “that our past, present, and future are 
connected by a certain continuity of  human experience.”  He thus argues for a revision 43
in historical sense that would accommodate entanglements between natural history, 
human history, and histories of  capital. Eugene Thacker argues that climate change poses 
a problem for philosophy: as the intensification of  planetary fragility makes nonhuman 
activities increasingly difficult to ignore and as the prospect of  human extinction draws 
nigh, we are compelled to undertake the paradoxical and even horrifying endeavor of  
thinking a world that is without us—that is, a world beyond what is thinkable.  Finally, 44
McKenzie Wark insists that “At a minimum, the Anthropocene calls on critical theory to 
entirely rethinks its received ideas, its habituated traditions, its claims to authority. It 
 	 Chakrabarty, “The Climate of  History,” 197.43
 	 Eugene Thacker, In the Dust of  This Planet: Horror of  Philosophy, Vol. 1 (Winchester: Zero Books, 2011).44
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needs to look back in its own archive for more useful critical tools.”  Wark calls for 45
greater alliances with technical and scientific knowledges. These varied historical, 
philosophical, and multidisciplinary efforts collectively point to the needs to develop new 
modes of  critical engagement in the face of  the Anthropocene. They identify the dangers 
of  neglecting the force of  nonhumans, which will affect us regardless of  our theoretical 
affiliations. As sea levels rise, droughts intensify, large swaths of  vegetation wither, and 
countless species vanish from the cosmos forever, matter will decide for us whether its roar 
will be tamed by debates over critique. 
	 When matter veers off  a course mapped by fantasy and human desire, it can begin 
a little world of  its own. This potency can indeed be rerouted, but not even the most 
austere regimes of  discipline and violence can neutralize it. The force of  matter (exhibited 
in, say, earthquakes that can level cities and selves) entails that someone, somewhere, 
might spy through the painful cracks of  an impasse a glimmer of  another world: 
“Terrified, bewildered, frantic, covered with blood, quivering all over, Candide said to 
himself  [after the Lisbon earthquake], ‘If  this is the best of  all possible worlds, what are 
the others like?’”  46
Bad Vibes | Digesting Slow Death 
Candide’s speculation is explored throughout this dissertation. For now, I elaborate in the 
next two sections the affective and bodily dimensions of  agency in impasses of  the 
 	McKenzie Wark, “Critical Theory after the Anthropocene,” Public Seminar, 9 August 2014, http://45
www.publicseminar.org/2014/08/critical-theory-after-the-anthropocene/. Accessed on 9 August 2014.
	 Voltaire, Candide, trans. Lowell Bair (New York: Bantam Classic, 2003), 29. Candide's question signals an 46
impasse in a Leibnizian optimism that construes the world anthropocentrically—as centered on human 
flourishing.
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Anthropocene: mixed feelings, anxiety, and the sense of  being stunned as bodies grow 
fatigued. How does human agency take shape within impasses? Does it align with the 
masterful, productive, and responsible forms demanded by neoliberalism and 
anthropocentrism? What happens when humans remain attached to unfeasible and costly 
images of  agency? 
	 To better understand how talking about impasses of  the Anthropocene as an 
assemblage recasts the agency available to humans therein, I turn to experiences of  bodily 
pleasure and attrition under neoliberal capitalism. This moment has given rise to what 
Berlant has called “slow death,” a condition in which human life is worn out by the very 
activity of  reproducing it. When burnout is a defining feature of  labor under late 
capitalism, calls for sovereign agency are a drag. The subjects of  slow death are exhausted 
and seek relief  from full-throttle sovereign subjectivity. 
	 Berlant’s chief  example of  slow death is the so-called “obesity epidemic” in the 
United States. To counter a neoliberal biopolitics of  individual responsibility that shames 
impoverished and racialized populations, Berlant depicts obesity to be the effect of  
environmental and historical conditions. While beginning with an obesogenic approach, 
though, she ultimately zooms in on food as a culprit of  health problems. Unhealthy foods 
erode bodies while providing marginal reprieve from intense labor demands. As a result, 
“morbidity,” Berlant writes, “marks out slow death as what there is of  the good life.”  47
	 While concurring with criticisms of  Berlant’s hasty equation of  eating and food 
	 Berlant, Cruel Optimism, 114.47
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with body size and health,  I develop what food, pleasure, and bodily attrition illuminate 48
about forms of  human agency that don’t align with neoliberalism's demands for personal 
sovereignty. That is, what if  agency were modeled off  eating rather than freedom?  49
	 Anthropocentrism, liberalism, and neoliberalism, amongst their differences, have 
professed an image of  agency that is free, centralized in humans, and enacted through the 
will, intentionally and consciously.  While that form of  agency may be approximated in 50
circumstances of  high privilege, slow death gives way to what Berlant calls “lateral 
agency,” or nonsovereign experiences of  floating sideways that follow hits of  pleasure. 
Examples include eating, having sex, and spacing out. Lateral agency marks what little 
there is left of  the good life for those whose time is tuned to the clock of  capital; under 
slow death, “life feels truncated, more like desperate doggy paddling than like a 
magnificent swim out to the horizon” (CO, 117). 
	 Within the “obesity epidemic,” eating is a lateral agency that spans morsels of  
matter and exhausted, sick-to-the-stomach human bodies. Lateral agency is not locatable 
in a person, place, or thing; it emerges through an assemblage of  humans and 
nonhumans. While agency is always distributed this way, as Bennett argues, what makes 
lateral agency distinctive is that it pertains to human experiences of  pleasure, relief, or 
numbness in the suspension of  calls to sharp consciousness and robust intentionality. 
“Food is poison here,” as Kyla Tompkins puts it, “but it is also something of  a magic 
	 Anna Kirkland, “The Environmental Account of  Obesity: A Case for Feminist Skepticism,” Signs: 48
Journal of  Women in Culture and Society 36, no. 2 (2010), 463-85; Heather Love, “What Does Lauren 
Berlant Teach Us about X?” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 9, no. 4 (December 2012), 320-36; 
Anna E. Ward, “Fat Bodies/Thin Critique: Animating and Absorbing Fat Embodiments,” S&F Online 
11, no. 3 (Summer 2013), http://sfonline.barnard.edu/life-un-ltd-feminism-bioscience-race/fat-
bodiesthin-critique-animating-and-absorbing-fat-embodiments/
	 Here, I draw upon Bennett's “Edible Matter” chapter in VM, 39-51.49
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substance;”  it carries bodies on tangent from sharp alertness and energetic activity on 51
the one hand and slumped-over states on the other. 
	 Eating reveals that bodies are not self-contained—they incorporate what is outside 
for sustenance and taste. The processing of  food also reveals that a human body is a nest 
of  many bodies: limbs, parts, organs, tracts, membranes, and fluids.  Not all of  those 52
materialities are clearly human, such as the two or three pounds of  bacteria crawling on 
your skin and camping in your gut. Human bodies are ecologies of  matter of  various 
shapes and sizes, properties and capacities, durations and transformations. “It is thus not 
enough to say that we are ‘embodied,’” Bennett insists. “We are, rather, an array of  
bodies” (VM, 112). Notions of  embodiment, which have fruitfully countered liberal and 
neoliberal tendencies toward gendered, racialized, and colonialist abstractions of  human 
subjectivity, do not quite capture the most ordinary operations of  bodily agency. 
Ecological images better capture the dispersal of  agency in impasses in contemporary 
neoliberal life. 
	 The dispersed agency signaled by eating hardly aligns with the kind of  
autonomous, self-directed subject that is demanded by neoliberalism. Alimentary 
processes such as digestion reflect agential powers other than intentionality, consciousness, 
and willfulness. When those latter capacities are in play, they are neither fully 
determinative nor separable from the force of  matter. While one could flag that there is 
no “I” in agency, eating might suggest that the grammar of  agency is, as Michael Pollan 
	 Kyla Wazana Tompkins, “How Does It Feel?” Social Text Periscope, 13 January 2013, http://51
socialtextjournal.org/periscope_article/how-does-it-feel/
	 I have been inspired to think about body parts by Rachel C. Lee's The Exquisite Corpse of  Asian America: 52
Biopolitics, Biosociality, and Posthuman Ecologies (New York: New York University Press, 2014).
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puts it, the first-person plural.  53
	 That grammar is apt for impasses in neoliberal life, which mark an “I” that 
becomes increasingly tenuous, fractured, and diffuse. Furthermore (and to repeat the last 
section with a difference), impasses involve not only the disorganization of  identities but 
the disorganization of  matter. Agency under slow death circulates through evermore 
fragile and volatile assemblages of, among many other things, human bodies, body parts 
that are aching and ailing, metabolic processes, foods of  all sorts, bacteria, fertilizers and 
pesticides, food markets and community-supported agriculture associations, health care 
infrastructure, urbanization, and racialized, gendered norms of  beauty and body shape. 
Consider the Anthropocene and add to that list crop failure amongst prolonged droughts 
and rising temperatures, food shortages and riots, carbon emissions from long-distance 
transportation of  foods and the production of  meat, and the hardship that would follow 
the looming extinction of  honeybees. 
	 Amidst this complex ecology, neoliberalism demands that agency be sovereign, 
exacerbates drastically uneven conditions for its approximation, and marshals draconian 
responses against those that it casts as failed agents. Impasses in neoliberal life arise partly 
because it produces bodies that cannot abide its dictates even as it solicits cruel optimist 
commitments by closing alternative images of  agency, human life, and politics. The 
damage of  those impasses is being intensified as we plunge further into the Anthropocene. 





To deepen the previous sections and further elaborate how matter refigures human 
agency, attachments, and impasses, I read Jennifer Egan’s short story “Found Objects.” 
My reading crosses different focal points of  recent work on affect: nameable feelings on 
the one hand and impersonal forces on the other.  Greater convergence between these 54
typically separate pursuits helps to clarify how impasses of  the Anthropocene take shape 
through ecologies of  humans and nonhumans and webs of  feelings and forces. Here, I 
track what Jasbir Puar calls “ecologies of  sensation and switchpoints of  bodily 
capacities.”  While Puar develops those concepts in relation to technological and 55
informational control societies, I discern them in the ordinary experience of  impasses.  56
In “Found Objects,” pleasure, shame, and immobility shape and are shaped by 
interactions between humans and nonhumans (“ecologies of  sensation”), which allow 
bodies to move or catch them in an impasse (“switchpoints of  bodily capacities”). 
	 “Found objects” names an artistic practice that heeds everyday things as, in 
Marcel Duchamp’s words, “ready-mades.” The story exhibits this self-organizing power 
of  things as it swarms the main character, Sasha, who is at an impasse in neoliberal 
fantasies of  the good life, intimacy, and sovereignty. Sasha’s career and aspirations for self-
enrichment are on hold. Her love life is fraught with failure. She is less in control day by 
day. Her troubles seem to lie in what one could call her “kleptomania” (a word that Egan 
strategically avoids). Sasha’s world has codified the finding of  objects as theft and has built 
	 I follow the divergence between lines of  affect identified by Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth in 54
“An Inventory of  Shimmers” in The Affect Theory Reader, 5-9.
	 Jasbir K. Puar, “Coda: The Cost of  Getting Better (Suicide, Sensation, Switchpoints),” GLQ  18, no. 1 55
(2011),157. 
	 Kathleen Stewart, Ordinary Affects (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007).56
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legal, clinical, and carceral institutions accordingly; as Sasha recognizes, getting caught 
would “unleash a cascade of  horrors: arrest, shame, poverty, death.”  The story exhibits 57
a struggle to survive and thrive in an impasse when vibrant matter unsettles neoliberal, 
gendered, heteronormative, and anthropocentric partitions of  agency. 
	 Because I am drawn to Sasha’s exquisite attunement to the charge of  matter, I 
encounter Sasha as an “aesthetic figure” and not a “psychological character.” Michael 
Shapiro observes that the “movements and dispositions” of  aesthetic figures “are less 
significant in terms of  what is revealed about their inner lives than what they tell us about 
the world to which they belong.”  Framing Sasha as a psychological character aligns with 58
the disciplinary gaze of  her therapist Coz, reduces attachments to psychic constructs, 
turns matter into mere property, shames the appetites, enforces neoliberalism's restriction 
of  social change to personal and private life, and views Sasha’s struggles as setbacks on 
the way to a neoliberal good life. On my reading, Sasha’s psychic subjectivity matters less 
than how her “movements and actions (both purposive and non-purposive) map and 
often alter an experiential, politically relevant terrain.”  Although Sasha ultimately does 59
not practice a politics of  detachment, her impasse reveals how alternative connections 
with matter are stifled by demands for sovereign agency within neoliberal, gendered, 
heteronormative, and anthropocentric frames of  the world. I follow Sasha as an aesthetic 
figure because commitments to human mastery might be broken through a more open 
relationship with matter. 
	 Jennifer Egan, “Found Objects” in A Visit from the Goon Squad (New York: Anchor Books, 2011), 10. 57
Hereafter cited in text.




	 Sasha is at an impasse, she is “hanging by a thread” (11). Sasha is caught up in 
what Berlant describes as “a holding station that doesn't hold securely but opens out into 
anxiety, that dogpaddling around a space whose contours remain obscure” (CO, 199). The 
story is Sasha’s recounting to Coz of  yet another night in her impasse. Its first few words, 
“It began in the usual way,” could be phrased into the ending: “It ended in the usual way” 
(4). The story ends in Coz’s office: 
They sat in silence, the longest silence that ever had passed between them. 
Sasha looked at the windowpane, rinsed continually with the rain, 
smearing lights in the falling dark. She lay with her body tensed, claiming 
the couch, her spot in this room, her view of  the windows and the walls, 
the faint hum that was always there when she listened and these minutes 
of  Coz’s time: another, then another, then one more. (18) 
This lyric atmosphere registers the rhythm of  an impasse as absorptive of  all sorts of  
swerves and impacts and happenings without becoming an event.  It expresses what is 60
episodic and elastic about treading water. It sounds the present as an ongoing hum 
against the repetitive ticking of  time. 
	 “Found Objects” depicts ordinary things as quasi-agents. Sasha is not attracted to 
things that house consumerist fantasies of  the good life; she has stopped taking things 
from stores since “their cold, inert goods didn’t tempt her” (4). She is sensitive to specific 
things, and that sensitivity is neither law-like nor random; her found objects include “five 
sets of  keys, fourteen pairs of  sunglasses, a child’s striped scarf, binoculars, a cheese 
grater, a pocketknife, twenty-eight bars of  soap, and eighty-five pens” (4). Things exert a 
	 Berlant cautions the use of  event rhetoric whose scale distorts that of  ordinary happenings and episodes. 60
See CO 100-1, 278 fn 17.
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hold on Sasha when they make her hungry. In the story, things have the allure of  food: a 
wallet is “tender and overripe as a peach” (5); a screwdriver has the sheen of  a lollipop. 
That Sasha’s found objects bear the qualities of  food recalls how agency is dispersed 
amongst humans and nonhumans. 
	 Just as matter can spark desire, so too can it shift moods. Sasha is disgusted when a 
dirty plumber crawls around her bathtub in search of  a leak. Then, she spots a 
screwdriver in his tool belt, “the orange translucent handle gleaming like a lollipop in its 
worn leather loop, the silver shaft sculpted, sparkling” (7). Egan’s lyricism expresses a 
circuit of  material vibrancy that sparks an urge in Sasha. She “plucks” the screwdriver: 
“Not a bangle jangled; her bony hands were spastic at most things, but she was good for 
this—made for it, she often thought, in the first drifty moments after lifting 
something” (8). Sasha slides into lateral agency, a moment of  “instant relief ” followed by 
a “blessed indifference” (8). Her whole body is set in motion, though not by an external 
power nor by the will, intentionality, or consciousness. Instead, it is her hands and a host 
of  nonhuman materialities that excite a mix of  feelings and electrify a stream of  
happenings. 
	 After the plumber leaves, however, the screwdriver oddly looks “normal... like any 
screwdriver” (8). It had been a vibrant thing; it resembles a “cold, inert good.” This 
transformation recalls Thoreau's insistence that huckleberries in the market no longer 
supply their sweetness because “the ambrosial and essential part of  the fruit is lost with 
the bloom which is rubbed off  in the market cart.”  They become “mere provender,” 61
having been plucked from one ecology (bushes, soil, fields, and open air) and inserted into 
	 Henry David Thoreau, Walden, in A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers, Walden, The Maine Woods, 61
Cape Cod (New York, NY: The Library of  America, 1985), 461.
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another (wooden carts and market prices).  The screwdriver is no longer part of  the 62
assemblage in which it had been desirable; or, it is no longer a part of  the assemblage in 
which it had become desirable. When an attractive thing has been plucked from its 
assemblage, it turns into a found object. But while Thoreau’s concern lies with 
authenticity, Sasha’s is with attachment. Found objects are not flavorless fruits but the 
stuff  of  impasses. 
	 Matter continues to exert a hold even if  the feelings they once provoked seem to 
be lost. Sasha piles found objects in a heap to stop “their power from leaking away” (17). 
Her efforts bespeak an attachment to things whose initial vibrancy has fizzled. That she 
cannot resuscitate their former powers reveals a power beyond human control and not 
designed for human flourishing. It also shows that cruel optimism is more than a 
realignment of  oneself  with fantasy; it is partly the experience of  being bound by things. 
An impasse is a complex ecology of  desire, fantasy, and matter. Though it had once 
“seemed like a way station to some better place,” Sasha’s apartment “had ended up 
solidifying around Sasha, gathering mass and weight, until she felt both mired in it and 
lucky to have it—as if  she not only couldn't move on but didn't want to” (14). The 
apartment is a symbol of  Sasha’s impasse, a stale object of  desire, and a rut in itself. 
	 “Found Objects” dramatizes how matter can redirect a happy flow into an 
impasse. The plot follows Sasha on a ho-hum first date with Alex. Sasha goes to the 
restroom, spies an open purse on the sink, and plucks a wallet—not for its money but due 
to its peach-like allure. Though previously “in the grip of  a dire evening,” she returns to 
her table “postwallet” to find the “scene tingl[ing] with mirthful possibility” (5). Sasha and 
	 Ibid.62
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Alex return to her apartment, where he is captivated by its sights and scents: “The place 
smelled of  scented candles, and there was a velvet throw cloth on her sofa bed and lots of  
pillows, and an old color TV with a very good picture, and an array of  souvenirs from her 
travels lining the windowsills: a white seashell, a pair of  red dice, a small canister of  Tiger 
Balm from China, now dried to the texture of  rubber, a tiny bonsai tree that she watered 
faithfully” (13). “It feels like old New York,” says Alex, “You know this stuff  is around, but how 
do you find it?” (14; emphasis mine). Shaken by a question that evokes her impasse of  found 
objects, Sasha sees her apartment as Alex might: “a bit of  local color that would fade 
almost instantly into the tumble of  adventures that everyone has on first coming to New 
York” (14). The feeling of  being forgettable unsettles Sasha; it recalls how her objects have 
forgotten her as their initial charm faded away. 
	 When Alex spots the heap of  objects, Sasha is filled by both pride and shame over 
the “raw and warped core of  her life” (14). Those mixed feelings lead her to initiate sex 
with Alex—next to the objects, though he tries to lead her to the bedroom. This is a 
moment of  queer lateral agency, wherein desire emerges from mixed feelings and is 
energized more by nonhumans than by a differently sexed human; it is a vibrant 
materialist intimacy, not a heteronormative romance.  Afterwards, “All [of  Sasha’s] 63
excitement had seeped away, leaving behind a terrible sadness, an emptiness that felt 
violent, as if  she’d been gouged” (16). Alex proposes a bath. He runs the water and Sasha 
watches him poke about the pile for a packet of  bath salts, “hoping for a tremor of  the 
excitement that she’d felt before, but it was gone” (16). Alex bathes, leaves, and never 
	 Chad Shomura, “Love in a Cinematic Time of  Race: Deleuze and Race-Intimacy Assemblages” in 63
Deleuze and Race, eds. Arun Saldanha and Jason Adams (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 
208-24.
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returns. The objects lie in a heap. Sasha ends up on Coz’s couch again. Her impasse 
continues. 
	 This episode details the twists of  promise-threat in an impasse, the mixed feelings, 
the turns of  matter. Fantasy and matter can hum with promises for a while, but a phase 
shift sours things. Feelings emerge, take shape, and change by the fickle powers of  things. 
An impasse trembles with rhythms that feel too truncated or too wild for traction to be 
possible. It upsets what had once supplied pleasure, secured optimism, sealed 
attachments, generated a sense of  possibility and anticipation, and grounded habits and 
paths to the good life. Humans and nonhumans stick together in stuckness. Humans find 
themselves in a rut which they cannot resolve at will. What if  they were to follow the 
worldings of  matter away from a predetermined end? 
Sasha’s Longing, or Touching Fleeing 
Human mastery presumes a teleology: there can be setbacks but not impasses, the hope 
of  personal redemption but not political change. Coz does not believe in impasses; he 
refers to Sasha’s episodes of  finding objects as “personal challenges,” as opportunities for 
“Sasha to assert her toughness, her individuality” by leaving things rather than taking 
them (4). This form of  personal sovereignty bespeaks a mind-over-matter mentality that 
supports: a neoliberal fantasy of  atomistic individualism; a gendered valuation of  the 
rational over the sensory; a heteronormative sexualization of  sensual pleasure; and an 
anthropocentric denial of  the agentic capacities of  things. Commitment to sovereignty 
generates a moralizing gaze of  discipline and pursues a teleology of  normalization. Sasha 
and Coz are “writing a story whose end had already been determined: she would get 
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well” (6). 
	 Social fantasies of  redemption have been prevalent in the contemporary national 
culture of  the United States. “Found Objects” takes place in post-9/11 New York City, 
which emblematizes an impasse in a US national identity based on fantasies of  global 
sovereignty and on a teleology of  neoliberal democratization. “[Sasha] hated the 
neighborhood at night without the World Trade Center, whose blazing freeways of  light 
had always filled her with hope” (12). The Ground Zero of  shattered hope connects a 
personal impasse to a national one, the micropolitics of  found objects to the macropolitics 
of  the “war on terror.” 
	 The “war on terror” exemplifies the cruel optimism of  post-9/11 national culture. 
In this impasse, the US could have developed greater international solidarity by 
abandoning its claims to global sovereignty. As Judith Butler suggests, the US could have 
“agree[d] to undergo a transformation (perhaps one should say submitting to a 
transformation) the full result of  which one cannot know in advance.”  Mourning in an 64
impasse suspends fantasies of  sovereignty and affirms vulnerability, codependence, and an 
openness to being changed. Instead of  mourning, the US turned to melodrama; it largely 
asserted its “toughness,” its supposed “individuality” to repair a national and capitalist 
track.  Soon after 11 September 2001, George W. Bush urged an end to mourning and 65
insisted on a return to consumer life—of  shopping for commodities (“cold, inert goods”)
—that contains the vibrancy of  matter. The US declared itself  to be a beacon of  
democracy as it restricted civil liberties, intensified surveillance, solidified its colonialist 
	 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of  Mourning and Violence (London, UK: Verso, 2004), 21.64
	 Elisabeth R. Anker, Orgies of  Feeling: Melodrama and the Politics of  Freedom (Durham, NC: Duke University 65
Press, 2014), 17-8.
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claims through tropes of  the “homeland,” and extended its imperial reach through an 
intricate machinery of  detention, torture, and slaughter. The upturned lives and 
landscapes of  the last fourteen years register the havoc generated by a nation-state that 
desperately holds onto a dream. 
	 Sasha also clings to fantasies of  sovereignty and of  the good life she once pursued. 
Yet, like many within the US, she is also ambivalent: “Redemption, transformation—God 
how she wanted these things. Every day, every minute. Didn't everyone?” (18; emphasis 
mine). That she pauses to ask whether everyone desires redemption signals uncertainty 
and hesitation, as though Coz’s couch isn’t the only place to be. Her desire for redemption 
attests to the gravity of  a good life that would sever her connection to vibrant matter 
while soliciting a desire for commodities. Her ambivalence attests to longings for a less 
neoliberal, less consumerist, less gendered, less anthropocentric world; she desires 
redemption, but she also loves the touch of  vibrant matter. 
	 An impasse is a murky window into other lives, other worlds, other futures. What 
if  its openings were pursued? What if  one were to, as Sasha describes the cusp of  finding 
something, “seize the moment, accept the challenge, take the leap, fly the coop, throw 
caution to the wind, live dangerously?” (3-4). That pursuit would confront, in Berlant’s 
words, “the difficulty of  detaching from lives and worlds that wear out life, rather than 
sustain it. The hardest acts of  changing are acts of  breaking, even when desire is on the 
side of  a break: they require being optimistic about loss” (TFC, 266-7). 
	 In an impasse, loss becomes palpable in lateral agencies that upset fantasies of  
sovereignty. Although Berlant rightly cautions against viewing lateral agency as inherently 
political (CO, 116), the integration of  mind, body, and things in lateral relations could be a 
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feminist, queer, and ecological experience that runs aslant from human centrality and 
mastery. Ann Cvetkovich draws attention to how lateral relations emerge in ordinary 
activities such as swimming, yoga, and crafting. Some ordinary activities are political in 
themselves when they are practices of  self-fashioning that integrate mind, body, and 
matter in non-sovereign ways. Lateral activities may also produce political effects when 
they foment what Cvetkovich calls the “utopia of  ordinary habits,” in which “the affective 
cultures of  nuclear family life, consumerism, mass media, and neoliberal culture” are 
remade.  Crafting, for example, “emerges from the domestic spaces that are at the heart 66
of  women’s culture to provide a model for ways of  living that acknowledge forms of  
structural inequity while also practicing modes of  bodily and sensory life that incorporate 
or weave them into the fabric of  a daily life that literally includes texture, color, and 
sensory pleasure.”  Crafting is a feminist lateral activity that knits together gender, class, 67
culture, humans, and matter into an intimate public that runs aslant from ones that gather 
around sentimentality. Regarding impasse, the political question is how to turn laterality 
into solidarity, not only with other humans but also with other life forms, ecosystems, and 
the earth. Such a process involves experimentation with situations in which human 
sovereignty and centrality are suspended and in which selves and worlds are creatively 
refashioned. 
	 Within impasses, politics that is attuned to the vibrancy of  matter does not issue a 
universal call to nonsovereignty. To dispense with sovereignty entirely would ignore 
nonwestern figurations of  it and may amount to complicity with colonial power by 
	 Ann Cvetkovich, Depression: A Public Feeling (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012), 183.66
	 Ibid., 168.67
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inhibiting a key goal of  many indigenous movements. For example, Jonathan Goldberg-
Hiller and Noenoe Silva criticize the dominant Western metaphysical tradition that aligns 
sovereignty, anthropocentrism, and coloniality. In settler Hawai‘i, sovereignty could be 
reconfigured through Native Hawaiian cosmology, which holds that “humans are part of  
a vast family that includes celestial bodies, plants, animals, landforms, and deities.”  68
Distributed agency and indigenous sovereignty are productive alternatives to Western 
notions of  human agency as masterful. 
	 Nor does such a politics advocate a dispensation of  the human. Black studies 
scholars have challenged this posthumanist creed; as Tavia Nyong’o asks, “have we ever 
been human? And if  not, what are we being asked to decenter, and through what 
means?”  In a short dossier, Zakiyyah Jackson similarly insists that attempts to move 69
“beyond the human” reproduce “the reach of  antiblackness into the nonhuman”: 
“Whether machine, plant, animal, or object, the nonhuman's figuration and mattering is 
shaped by the gendered racialization of  the field of  metaphysics.”  Jackson’s critique is 70
important but remains underdeveloped due to the space constraints of  its present form (a 
short dossier). At the moment, it is predicated upon the consolidation of  an image of  
Western metaphysics without enough attention to internal dissent by minor ontologies 
and cosmologies. Nonetheless, I agree with Jackson that efforts to move away from Man 
need to take up alternative humanisms, like those of  Frantz Fanon and Sylvia Wynter. 
	 Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller and Noenoe K. Silva, “Sharks and Pigs: Animating Hawaiian Sovereignty 68
against the Anthropological Machine,” South Atlantic Quarterly 110, no. 2 (Spring 2011), 436.
	 Tavia Nyong'o, “Little Monsters: Race, Sovereignty, and Queer Inhumanism in Beasts of  the Southern 69
Wild,” GLQ: A Journal of  Lesbian and Gay Studies 21, no. 2-3 (2015), 266.
	 Zakiyyah Iman Jackson, “Outer Worlds: The Persistence of  Race in Movement 'Beyond the Human',” 70
GLQ: A Journal of  Lesbian and Gay Studies 21, no. 2-3 (2015), 216, 217.
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	 Rather than dispensing with sovereignty and the human, I have been elaborating 
more expansive notions of  being and relating within impasses of  the Anthropocene that 
defy colonialist, imperialist, and anthropocentric distributions of  vulnerability and could 
facilitate the survival and flourishing of  humans and nonhumans. As José Muñoz 
suggests, “Once one stops doing the incommensurate work of  attempting to touch 
inhumanity, one loses traction and falls back onto the predictable coordinates of  a 
relationality that announces itself  as universal but is, in fact, only a substrata of  the 
various potential interlays of  life within which one is always inculcated.”  Keener 71
sensitivity to the powers of  matter may help the cultivation of  relationalities that differ 
from those that have been organized my human mastery. Human species thinking, as 
urged by Chakrabarty, is important, so long as it develops a more capacious 
understanding of  the human. At the same time, the human needs to be refigured by an 
ecological relationality, for nonhumans are members of  the Anthropocene’s precariat. 
	 Impasses of  the Anthropocene halt pursuits of  the good life that have intensified 
slow death under looming planetary devastation. More sustainable relations become 
possible within them. They are explored in efforts to touch the nonhuman and to be more 
sensitive to the nonhuman’s touch of  us—a touch that draws us away from centrality and 
mastery through a rush of  anxiety and allure. That touch might lead us to take up the 
hard work of  unlearning harmful attachments, cultivating new solidarities, and pursuing 
futures whose aura can be faintly felt in impasses today. Those are, anyway, a few paths in 
impasses of  the Anthropocene that have been opened by the powerful longings of  Sasha, 
which burn with the vibrancy of  matter. 





Sometimes a touch is all it takes. We get caught up in something 
vague and powerful. Whispers from the growing ruins hint at the 
frailty of  attachments that can only be lived ambivalently if  at all. 
Disbelief  sets in. Things that bottled so much potency fall flat 
while latencies bloom as tiny promises. Aspirations hit road 
blocks. Or pipe dreams branch out wildly. The present begins to 
flicker as the undead past looms up in the mist. 
We feel a brush with the end of  a world and just don’t know what 
to do about it.
2.     Dark Atmospheres, or Affect at the End of  a World 
Something is in the air. Vague, but palpable. The senses get caught up in a swarm of  
forces. They are pulled into a dim sentience amidst nascent forms. Into a loom of  ghostly 
histories breathing open the present. Mixed feelings stir about. Hard-won attachments 
unravel. Lifelines to the world are actively cut short. Half-formed thoughts bubble up. 
Bodies tense up. The architecture of  action and reaction hangs in suspense. As a world 
cracks open, lives are carried through fog on tangents and surges. On waves of  threat and 
promise that might induce tender moments of  watching and waiting. 
	 This chapter performs the dark atmospheres of  impasse. Lauren Berlant argues 
that impasses are experienced through an atmosphere and Ann Cvetkovich describes that 
atmosphere as a muddled mix of  threat and promise, of  stuckness and movement.  This 1
chapter develops these points with guidance from Andreas Phillippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos’s insight that “atmosphere is a seductive thing, an earthly force of  attraction 
that does not let bodies escape.”  I adopt these felicitous words to draw the last chapter’s 2
vibrant materialist rendition of  impasse into questions of  affect through a concept of  
atmosphere. Dark atmospheres gather from chains of  affect that spark up in an impasse, 
the potential end of  a world. 
	 I call the atmosphere of  impasse “dark” because it arises as the undead past opens 
the present to an uncertain, indeterminate future. Because its swarm of  affects doesn’t 
amount to a clear mood. Because it registers the decay of  worlds when there isn’t a new 
	 Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 5-6; Ann Cvetkovich, 1
Depression: A Public Feeling (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012), 21.
	 Andreas Philoppopoulos-Mihalopoulos, “Atmospheres of  Law: Senses, Affects, Lawscapes,” Emotion, 2
Space and Society Vol. 7 (2013), 41.
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world to inhabit. Because it can turn expression poetic amidst the inability to pinpoint 
what is going on. My elaboration of  dark atmospheres is partly a response to Berlant’s 
question of  why people remain attached to fantasies while “evidence” of  their costliness 
piles up. The darkness of  impasse atmospheres obscures whether a given situation is really 
an impasse rather than, say, a momentary setback on the way to brighter times. This 
indeterminacy can, as will be elaborated in chapter four, generate responses of  self-
damage and outward violence. But it might also breathe life into delicate forms of  care 
for what may be rising out of  a mist of  potentialities. 
	 By tending to the affects of  impasse, I provide an account of  atmosphere that 
differs from those in cultural geography and performance studies. In those fields, 
atmospheres are often discussed in regard to a stable time with a clear mood. Confusion 
of  temporality for spatiality ensues, which renders atmosphere as a soft enclosure in which 
humans are immersed. While that notion of  atmosphere is certainly appropriate for many 
situations, it is not so for impasses. It may overlook circuits of  material vibrancy, identify a 
mood at the expense of  a rich plurality of  low-level affect, leave the ephemerality of  
atmospheres unelaborated, and overlook nonhuman becomings. The atmosphere of  
impasse is full of  transpersonal, preindividuated affects due to haunted temporalities. I 
develop this notion by drawing primarily upon the work of  anthropologist Kathleen 
Stewart and philosopher Gilles Deleuze (as well as his writings with Félix Guattari). 
Notions of  atmosphere are productively inflected by Stewart’s and Deleuze’s attentiveness 
to unsettled rhythms, subtle intensities, and low-level attunements. 
	 Why “atmosphere” instead of  environment, ecology, intersubjectivity, abstract 
machine, or plane of  consistency? This rich family of  concepts inspires me, but I 
83
foreground atmosphere because it, more than the others, emphasizes felt experience. It 
also enfolds the crossings of  nature and culture, floats amongst ontological and 
experiential registers, gathers without collapsing the concrete and the abstract, bodies and 
affects, highlights the intertwining of  multiple timelines, evokes a consistency strewn with 
porosity, emphasizes becoming over being, and remains open to the strange effects of  
ghosts, spirits, and magic. 
	 This chapter holds open the tensions and opacities of  atmosphere in defiance of  
intellectualist and disciplinary calls for coherence, categorization, and closure. It draws 
politics away from nameable phenomena to sense forces in their emergence, resilience, 
and diffusion. At its best, such a politics suspends judgments based on readymade morals 
and knee-jerk reactions in order to more carefully and generously tend to atmospheres 
that are messy, elusive, ghostly. Atmosphere becomes a breathing space for the ineloquent, 
the intuitive, the tentative. I begin to develop a politics in impasses that depends upon 
ethical practices of  (1) a heightened sensory awareness to the potentialities that loom 
within a haze of  threat and promise and (2) experimental refashioning what is too brittle 
or too resilient, overwhelming, or damaging. It cultivates openness to being transformed, 
for good and ill. 
Swarming Feeling 
Intensity was the air they breathed.  3
—Kathleen Stewart 
I begin by elaborating how atmospheres are composed of  affects. Then I develop a notion 
	 Kathleen Stewart, “Atmospheric Attunements,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space Vol. 29 3
(2011), 447. Cited in this chapter hereafter as “AA.”
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of  atmosphere that departs from discussions that focus on a clearly defined, single mood. 
	 When describing the mise-en-scène of  stage productions, Gernot Böhme writes 
that atmospheres are ekstases that pull things into a gathered radiance.  Tonino Griffero 4
writes that atmosphere is a “a quality that things do not ‘have’, but in the manifestation of  
which, if  anything, they extinguish themselves.”  Although Griffero overstates the absence 5
of  things in atmospheres, he rightly points to affect as that which transcends the contours 
of  things. In these accounts, atmosphere is a soft and strange something-more that 
emerges in the midst of  solid things. 
	 These and other discussions of  atmosphere recall Deleuze’s concept of  bodies. 
Following Spinoza, Deleuze defines bodies not by properties, forms, or functions. Bodies 
may be distinguished by their relative speeds and slownesses and their capacities to affect 
and to be affected. They are “ambulant couplings” of  events and affects, or timely 
clusters of  unformed materialities in shifting relations of  mutual affection.  Put simply, 6
bodies are defined through the differences they make in specific connections. 
	 Atmospheres are composed of  bodies in their affective state. Although critical 
work in the humanities often refer to humans when they invoke “the body,” for Deleuze, 
“a body can be anything; it can be an animal, a body of  sounds, a mind or an idea; it can 
be a linguistic corpus, a social body, a collectivity.”  Stewart shares a similar 7
	 Gernot Böhme, “The Art of  the Stage Set as a Paradigm for an Aesthetics of  Atmospheres,” Ambiances, 4
10 February 2013, http://ambiances.revues.org/315. Accessed on 25 January 2014.
	 Tonino Griffero, “The Atmospheric 'Skin' of  the City,” Ambiances, 20 November 2013, http://5
ambiances.revues.org/399. Accessed on 13 January 2014.
	 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi 6
(Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota Press, 1987), 408. Cited in this chapter hereafter as ATP.
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understanding when she describes her sensitivity to the many “bodies literally affecting 
one another” in ordinary life: “human bodies, discursive bodies, bodies of  thought, bodies 
of  water.”  Griffero draws upon a similar understanding of  bodies when he writes that 8
atmospheres are also composed of  more abstract bodies like “geographical-climatic 
situation, historical and socio-economical condition, architectural-infrastructural quality, 
value expressiveness, language, nutrition, and so forth.”  What matters for atmospheres is 9
how bodies of  various types gel together. The rhythms that develop.  The variations 10
played on capacities to affect and to be affected. 
	 Atmospheres are consistencies of  affect that score across bodies. The affects come 
from bodies of  all sorts: humans, plants, ideas, gestures, accents, fantasies, norms, 
histories. From an eclectic range of  bodies emerges a consistency that is not due to a 
common feature or origin. Nor is that consistency purely the organized effect of  power. 
Consistency is a dark precursor, a force-field that gathers bodies into a composition 
underway. Take the dark precursor that is Vermont: 
It is fall colors, maple syrup, tourist brochures, calendars, snow, country 
stores; liberalism and yet the fight over gay marriage; racial homogeneity 
and yet everywhere white lesbian couples with babies of  color; the influx 
of  New York wealth long ago rushing in to shore up that certain look of  
rolling hills and red barns and yet also the legacy of  the dairy industry 
	 Kathleen Stewart, Ordinary Affects (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 128. Cited in this 8
chapter hereafter as OA.
	 Griffero, “The Atmospheric 'Skin' of  the City.”9
	 Henri Lefebvre writes that “there is no separation nor an abyss between so-called material bodies, living 10
bodies, social bodies and representations, ideologies, traditions, projects and utopias. They are all 
composed of  (reciprocally influential) rhythms in interaction” (Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday 
Life, trans. Stuart Elden and Gerald Moore [New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 2013], 51).
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written onto the landscape and property laws; and the quirkiness, 
quaintness, dullness, and/or violence of  village life in this time and place. 
(OA, 30) 
And surely many things besides. Vermont is neither a geopolitical entity nor a social 
construction; it is a “regionality,” a place that culls itself  from a potpourri of  elements that 
fall into phase, stick together, change with time.  11
	 “Atmosphere” names the palpability of  this assemblage: Vermont is a regionality, 
but Vermontness is an atmosphere. An atmosphere has a “character,” a certain feel that is 
experienced.  Accounts of  atmospheres often posit this character as a predominant, 12
clearly definable mood or set of  feelings. Böhme describes atmospheres as “totalities” that 
“unify a diversity of  impressions in a single emotive state.”  Ben Anderson begins his 13
notion of  atmospheres from transpersonal, preindividuated affect but ultimately echoes 
Böhme by qualifying atmospheres in terms of  “singular affective qualities,” such as 
“serene, homely, strange, stimulating, holy, melancholic, uplifting, depressing, pleasant, 
moving, inviting, erotic, collegial, open, sublime.”  In these and similar accounts, bodies 14
	 Kathleen Stewart, “Regionality,” The Geographical Review Vol. 103, No. 2 (2013), 275-284.11
	 Böhme, “The Art of  the Stage Set as a Paradigm for an Aesthetics of  Atmospheres.”12
	 Ibid.13
	 Ben Anderson, “Affective Atmospheres,” Emotion, Space, and Society 2 (2009), 78.14
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gather together and invoke a shared mood  or divergent emotions.  15 16
	 I return to questions of  the experience of  atmospheres later in this chapter. Now, I 
wish to deal with several pressing questions: how do diverse bodies compose an 
atmosphere if  they do not share a common origin and are not organized by an 
overarching force? Is the consistency of  an atmosphere located solely within the feeling 
that is generated by it? If  so, does that mean that atmospheres are merely subjective 
experiences that do not have any ontological reality? Or is there a consistency between 
bodies themselves regardless of  whether and how they are felt? As Stewart asks, “how are 
such elements constituted as an atmosphere for living? How do they sometimes and for 
some people hang together to produce a felt, or half  felt, or barely felt sense of  something 
happening?” (“AA,” 449). These questions recall the last chapter’s understanding of  
impasse as constituted through fantasy and vibrant matter. How does a fantasy of  
sovereignty fare against the allure of  a wallet? How do the rising seas upset attachments 
to the good life under neoliberal capitalism? To account for atmosphere, one needs to 
elaborate how bodies affect each other despite differences between them. What follows is 
a somewhat lengthy discussion that finds bodies of  various sorts to gather and hold 
together on account of  processes of  emergence, which become registered in atmospheres. 
	 Teresa Brennan describes this as a process of  “entrainment,” a neurological term for the transmission of  15
affect through chemical (olfactory) or electrical (tactile, visual, aural) means (see The Transmission of  Affect 
[Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004], 68-72). I appreciate Brennan's emphasis on the vibrant 
materialities involved in the transmission of  affect, which flays the dualisms of  subject/object, 
biological/social, individual/environment, mind/body, activity/passivity, consciousness/
unconsciousness. Nonetheless, her account sometimes conflates the affective and the emotive, leaves the 
nonhuman underelaborated in the transmission of  affect, and discusses atmospheres through their 
spatiality rather than temporality.
	 Sara Ahmed writes of  her classroom's atmosphere: “How many times have I read students as interested 16
or bored, such that the atmosphere seemed one of  interest or boredom (and even felt myself  to be 
interesting or boring), only to find students recall the event quite differently!” (The Promise of  Happiness 
[Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010], 41).
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	 Karen Barad thinks there is no mystery as to how different materialities could 
affect one another: “There is no need to postulate different materialities (i.e., materialities 
that are inherently of  different kinds), and so there is no mystery about how the 
materiality of  language could ever possibly affect the materiality of  the body.”  But 17
although there may be no materialities of  inherently different types, they do operate at 
different levels of  concreteness and abstraction. Louis Althusser suggests as much when he 
describes the materiality of  ideology: “The material existence of  the ideology in an 
apparatus and its practices does not have the same modality as the material existence of  a 
paving stone or a rifle.”  Barad’s important insistence that all phenomena are composed 18
of  matter and meaning overlooks how matter passes into different “modalities”—that is, 
across degrees of  concreteness and abstraction that are strewn across affective and 
temporal scales. My body might be destroyed but the gender norms I have practiced do 
not disappear with it (though they too will someday pass). The loss of  an object of  desire 
can be benign because the fantasies they housed may have other hosts at hand. At the 
same time, rocks and air and stardust have been around much longer than norms, 
fantasies, and social constructions. The elements that compose the human body will float 
around well after norms, fantasies, and ideologies can no longer be practiced in any 
recognizable way. 
	 For instance, the Anthropocene draws attention to the geological force of  humans 
as evidenced in, for example, fracking and the mad proliferation of  wastes like plastics 
	 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of  Matter and Meaning 17
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 211.
	 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes Towards an Investigation” in Lenin 18
and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 2001), 
112-113.
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and cell phones. Jussi Parikka imagines future archaeologists uncovering a geological 
stratum defined largely by the remnants of  media objects.  I aver that its plastics and 19
metals would, as artifacts of  consumer capitalist ideology, continue to affect the earth and 
its ecologies aeons into the future. The lifespan of  ideology will continue well after the last 
human breath fades from the cosmos. 
	 To address how bodies cluster into an atmosphere, I turn to Deleuze and Guattari 
for their attention to the strange crossings of  organized bodies and unorganized affects. 
While “plane of  organization” designates the arena of  formed bodies such as matter and 
semiotic codes, “plane of  consistency” concerns energetic fluctuations and transformative 
events. Because the plane of  consistency is not carved up into forms, “it is no longer even 
appropriate to group biological, physicochemical, and energetic intensities on the one 
hand, and mathematical, aesthetic, linguistic, informational, and semiotic intensities, etc., 
on the other” (ATP, 109). The plane of  consistency is immanent to the plane of  
organization: the latter subsists with the plane of  organization while being “prior” to it; 
the latter arises out of  the former, as when deposits of  sediment accrue in a stream. 
	 Although Deleuze and Guattari do not use the language of  atmospheres, one 
could understand atmosphere to involve the indistinguishability of  the two planes. As Ben 
Anderson puts it, atmospheres operate “before and alongside the formation of  
subjectivity, across human and non-human materialities, and in-between subject/object 
distinctions.”  Atmospheres have a strange ambiguity; they move across the semiotic and 20
the asignifying, affect and emotion, the personal and the impersonal. I elaborate later how 
	 Jussi Parikka, “The Geology of  Media,” The Atlantic, 11 October 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/19
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that ambiguity also arise from the strange temporality that haunts atmospheres. 
Atmospheres are “prior” to the bodies that they rise from, persist amongst, and help to 
form. 
	 It is in atmosphere that bodies come together across concreteness and abstraction 
through their affects. When writing of  ideology as situated within material practices and 
apparatuses, Althusser avers that “‘matter is discussed in many senses,’ or rather that it 
exists in different modalities, all rooted in the last instance in ‘physical’ matter.”  21
Althusser shares Barad’s insistence that various materialities are not different in kind while 
also emphasizing that materialities may differ in sense. But by attending to ideology and 
matter as organized, Althusser misses the abstract realm of  affects and events. Deleuze 
and Guattari steer toward the latter by attending to matter on the the plane of  
consistency rather than the plane of  organization. There, “functions are not yet 
‘semiotically’ formed, and matters are not yet ‘physically’ formed” (ATP, 141). Deleuze 
and Guattari demonstrate their materialist commitments in of  all places a plateau on 
linguistics.  On the plane of  consistency, 22
	 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes Towards an Investigation” in Lenin 21
and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 2001), 
112-113.
	 I refer to this part of  A Thousand Plateaus by name because it serves as a touchstone in my thinking 22
through, among other things, the relation between nature and culture. In the plateau, Deleuze and 
Guattari distinguish between the “incorporeal transformations” and “corporeal modifications.” The 
former are the instantaneous effects produced by “order-words,” whose function is not to describe or 
represent but to intervene in bodies. The latter specifies the actions and passions of  bodies. Deleuze and 
Guattari clarify the distinction through a juridical example: “In effect, what takes place beforehand (the 
crime of  which someone is accused), and what takes place after (the carrying out of  the penalty), are 
actions-passions affecting bodies (the body of  property, the body of  the victim, the body of  the convict, 
the body of  the prison); but the transformation of  the accused into a convict is a pure instantaneous act 
or incorporeal attribute that is the expressed of  the judge's sentence” (A Thousand Plateaus, 80-1). All sorts 
of  irreducibles emerge: corporeal-incorporeal, transformation-modification, function-matter, abstract-
concrete, to name a few. Deleuze and Guattari proceed to refract them through intensities in a way that 
might recoordinate discussions of  matter-meaning, nature-culture, in various, imprecise, productive 
ways. The attempt hazarded shortly is a promissory note for a longer argument.
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We witness a transformation of  substances and a dissolution of  forms, a 
passage to the limit or flight from contours in favor of  fluid forces, flows, 
air, light, and matter, such that a body or a word does not end at a precise 
point. We witness the incorporeal power of  that intense matter, the 
material power of  that language. A matter more immediate, more fluid, 
and more ardent than bodies or words. (ATP, 109). 
Matter on the plane of  consistency are affects extracted from all sorts of  bodies: “The 
most disparate of  things and signs move upon [the plane of  consistency]: a semiotic 
fragment rubs shoulders with a chemical interaction, an electron crashes into a language, 
a black hole captures a genetic message, a crystallization produces a passion, the wasp 
and the orchid cross a letter…” (ATP, 59). Diverse bodies collide and collude. Affects 
begin to stir. Formed matter breaks down or hardens. Nature throws itself  into culture. 
	 Arguments that culture materializes nature have become commonplace in the 
critical humanities. Less common are arguments that culture emerges from nature in a 
nondeterminist way. Those who have been inspired by Spinoza have discerned a 
generative power at the heart of  nature, whose products include culture. For Massumi, 
culture does shape nature, but the opposite is true as well; “the ‘natural’ and the ‘cultural’ 
feed forward and back into each other,” such that nature and culture must be thought on 
a continuum.  Bennett more pointedly writes that “culture is not of  our own making, 23
infused as it is by biological, geological, and climatic forces.”  Patricia Clough writes that 24
“race, class, sexuality, ethnicity, and gender are not simply matters of  subject identity... 
	 Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 23
2002), 10.
	 Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 115.24
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Rather they are rethought in terms of  the connections and disconnections on a plane of  
consistency, the interlacing of  given materialities of  the human body and cultural 
inscriptions.”  The affects of  nonhuman animals, plants, and minerals feed forward into 25
the ideologies, fantasies, and social norms of  race, gender, class, and ability, which feed 
back. One might also elaborate, with due caution, material and even natural compositions 
of  race and sex in order to advance antiracist and antisexist politics beyond discursive 
critique. In this pursuit, race and sex are indeed socially constructed, but not only; they 
are materialities that are nondeterministic and antiessentialist. In short, “human” culture 
is partly formed by “nonhuman” nature through feedback loops that dissolve the 
borderlines of  those terms. This argument does not fall on the side of  either the natural 
or the cultural, either the material or the ideal. Its frame is what Massumi calls the 
“ontogenetic,” which attends to processes of  emergence and becoming. 
	 Stewart performs this kind of  ontogenetic analysis in her writings by registering 
the many bodies that throw themselves into an emergent expressivity. Matter sometimes 
just reshapes matter. Other times, it emerges into a norm, an image, an ideology: “Things 
can remain ungathered into meanings and may not signify at all. Or they can throw 
themselves into a full-blown ideology” (“AA,” 452). Stewart recasts ideology as a cluster of  
things (not all of  which are human) that have become expressive. Matter does not house 
or channel ideology but constitutes it. Althusser might have developed a similar vibrant 
materialist account of  ideology had he subscribed to a different account of  matter, like 
the one he began to pursue in his later writings on “aleatory materialism.”   26
	 Patricia Clough, Auto-Affection: Unconscious Thought in the Age of  Teletechnology (Minneapolis, MN: University 25
of  Minnesota Press, 2000), 135.
	 Louis Althusser, Philosophy of  the Encounter: Later Writings, 1978-1987, eds. Oliver Corpet and Francois 26
Matheron, trans. G. M. Goshgarian (New York, NY: Verso, 2006).
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	 Atmosphere calls attention to bodies not as realized ideals, semiotic effects, or the 
products of  distant systems but as forces, potencies, affects. The key is emergence. Stewart 
writes that within atmospheres, “things matter not because of  how they are represented 
but because they have qualities, rhythms, forces, relations, and movements” (“AA,” 445). 
What passes for social or cultural abstractions (ideologies, fantasies, norms, 
representations) are self-organized bodies that have expressed themselves in ways other 
than formed matter. Gender norms exist through the bodies that perform and are shaped 
by them even if  not all of  those bodies are human. Neoliberal capitalist ideologies 
devastate ecologies through the many humans, technologies, commodities, and wastes 
that carry and inflect them. These bodies emerge from the affective interplay of  vibrant 
matter; they act upon matter only through matter, with the caveat from Deleuze and 
Guattari that this matter is more intensive than physical. Atmosphere is where bodies rub 
together to generate affects. 
	 Stewart’s writings register the planes of  organization and consistency through 
atmospheres of  ordinary life. For instance, she draws attention to what she calls “still life.” 
Stewart writes that “a still is a state of  calm, a lull in the action. But it is also a machine 
hidden in the woods that distills spirits into potency through a process of  slow 
condensation” (OA, 18). Still lifes brim with potency even when nothing seems to be going 
on: “the living room strewn with ribbons and wine glasses after a party, the kids or dogs 
asleep in the back seat of  the car after a great (or not so great) day at the lake, the 
collection of  sticks and rocks resting on the dashboard after a hike in the mountains, the 
old love letters stuffed in a box in the closet” (OA, 19). More than Deleuze and Guattari’s 
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immanent dualisms, still lifes emphasize feeling. They render palpable a pause that is full 
of  subtle affects and tiny movements. They are the felt hums of  atmospheres. 
	 Impasse reveals that mood is not always a defining feature of  atmosphere even as 
it can be full of  affect. I follow Massumi’s well-known depiction of  affect as autonomous 
from qualifications such as mood or emotion. Whereas emotion is “the sociolinguistic 
fixing of  the quality of  an experience,” affect is a preindividuated, transpersonal intensity 
that marks emergent difference.  Affect leads to no necessary feeling. It blossoms fractally. 27
It mostly falls short of  the threshold of  sensation, perception, and signification. Clear 
moods are the asymptotes which affects rarely cross. Moods arise only due to fortuitous 
circumstances. Impasses put pressure on those conditions. Impasses are palpable without 
qualification. They are felt in hesitations, nagging feelings, and fuzzy tones. As deep 
disturbances of  ordinary life. 
	 Atmospheres of  impasse induce half-formed feelings, which are more mixed than 
distinct, more dark than clear. In an impasse, a world might end and people don’t know 
how to feel about it. Numbness and disbelief  or a vague sense of  possibility set in when 
what seemed assured no longer holds a toe of  potential. Atmospheres of  impasses induce 
ambivalence, which is a placeholder for waves of  affect that pull in many ways at once—
which might mean nowhere at all. Affects may tend toward a mood, a new attachment, a 
new world. Or they hang together in dissonance as forms unwind. As the present is no 
longer what it seemed to be. As bodies huddle together in dark atmospheres. The dark 
	 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, 28. One could point out that affect and emotion may not be so distinct 27
were Massumi not working with an antiquated account of  emotion as a “subjective content” whose locus 
is the personal. For an account of  emotion without a subject, see Rei Terada, Feeling in Theory: Emotion 
after the “Death of  the Subject” (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003). Thinking about how 
emotions are not housed in bodies but circulate through worlds clarifies emotion as emergent from 
affect.
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atmosphere of  impasse undulates somewhere between promise and threat. 
 Ghostly Matter, Haunting Memory 
The concept of  atmosphere has two usual valences: a meteorological one that denotes the 
gaseous envelope of  a planet or star; an aesthetic one that references the moods evoked by 
things, a place, or a work of  art. Explorations of  atmospheres across the humanities 
typically reference the latter at the expense of  the former,  though there are exceptions.  28 29
	 For instance, Derek P. McCormack tracks atmospheres across both registers in his 
account of  a hydrogen balloon flight.  Tim Ingold lauds this endeavor and calls for more 30
challenges to a worldview propagated by divisions between meteorological and affective 
accounts of  atmospheres: namely, that atmosphere is either an immaterial ether (as 
	 David Bissell, “Passenger Mobilities: Affective Atmospheres and the Sociality of  Public Transport,” 28
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space Vol. 28 (2010), 270-289; Böhme, “The Art of  the Stage Set as 
a Paradigm for an Aesthetics of  Atmospheres;” Tim Edensor, “Illuminated Atmospheres: Anticipating 
and Reproducing the Flow of  Affective Experience in Blackpool,” Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space Vol. 30 (2012), 1103-1122; Tonino Griffero, “The Atmospheric 'Skin' of  the City;” Stephen Healy, 
“Atmospheres of  Consumption: Shopping as Involuntary Vulnerability,” Emotion, Space and Society (2012), 
1-9; Derek P. McCormack, Refrains for Moving Bodies: Experience and Experiment in Affective Spaces (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2013); Peter Sloterdijk, “Airquakes,” Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space Vol. 27 (2009), 41-57.
	 One example is Mikkel Bille's fine essay “Luminous Atmospheres: Energy Politics, Climate 29
Technologies, and Cosiness in Denmark” (Ambiances, 20 September 2013, http://ambiances.revues.org/
376. Accessed on 23 January 2014). Bille connects the Earth's atmosphere with the atmospheres of  
Denmark homes through political and cultural debates spawned by the 2012 phasing out of  
incandescent light bulb production in the EU. Efforts to address climate change through the 
introduction of  the CFL light bulb brushed against Danish cultural norms of  hygge, or the feelings of  
coziness, informality, and relaxedness that had been associated with the soft light of  LED bulbs. 
	 	 Other notable examples include: Peter Adey's investigation into the biopolitical and securitization 
practices of  the atmospheres of  megacities (“Air/Atmospheres of  the Megacity,” Theory, Culture & Society 
Vol. 30, No. 7/8 [2013], 291-308; Timothy Choy's tracking of  air in Hong Kong across bodily, medical, 
international, and poetic registers (“Air's Substantiations” in Ecologies of  Comparison: An Ethnography of  
Endangerment in Hong Kong [Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011], 139-168); Nicky Gregson, Helen 
Watkins, and Melania Calestani's discussion of  the material, economic, and political effects of  asbestos 
released into the air during demolition of  ships “Inextinguishable Fibres: Demolition and the Vital 
Materialisms of  Asbestos,” Environment and Planning A Vol. 42 [2010], 1065-1083); and Peter Sloterdijk's 
exposition of  atmospheric terrorism which emerged in World War I through the weaponization of  air by 
poisonous gases (“Airquakes”).
	 Derek P. McCormack, “Engineering Affective Atmospheres on the Moving Geographies of  the 1897 30
Andrée Expedition,” Cultural Geographies 15 (2008), 413-430.
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opposed to the material, solid Earth) or the aggregate effect of  formed matter. Both 
accounts presume that matter only comes landlocked.  This presumption has been 31
criticized by cultural geographers who pursue matter in different states, such as gases.  32
Ingold too is searching for a different account of  matter, one that is akin to that of  
Deleuze and Guattari. Through his attentiveness to intensive states of  matter, Ingold 
holds that atmospheres reveal that “the world we inhabit, far from having crystallized into 
fixed and final forms, is a world of  becoming, of  fluxes and flows.”  33
	 I follow Ingold's powerful recasting of  atmosphere as ontogenetic to focus on the 
temporal rather than spatial dimensions of  atmospheres. Ingold’s attention to atmosphere 
might be understood as a form of  what Michel Foucault calls “incorporeal materialism,” 
which describes the strange material status of  events: “An event is neither substance, nor 
accident, nor quality nor process; events are not corporeal. And yet, an event is certainly 
not immaterial; it takes effect, becomes effect, on the level of  materiality.”  To treat an 34
atmosphere as an incorporeal materiality is to approach it as too elusive to be 
consolidated as a thing yet consistent enough to assert a force. Moreover, it is to 
 “The exclusion of  air from the atmosphere of  aesthetics and its dematerialization in the atmosphere of  31
meteorology have together conspired to allow a certain view of  the world to persist unchallenged. This 
is a world that has, as it were, precipitated out from the currents of  the medium, and one in which all 
that is material is locked into the solid forms of  things. Aesthetics finds the atmosphere in relations 
among these solid things—whether human or nonhuman, animate or inanimate. Meteorology finds it in 
the immaterial ether that surrounds them” (Tim Ingold, “Lines and the Weather” in Vital Beauty: 
Reclaiming Aesthetics in the Tangle of  Technology and Nature, eds. Joke Brouwer, Arjen Mulder, and Lars 
Spuybroek [Rotterdam, NL: V2_Publishing, 2012], 23).
	 See the Aerographies special issue of  Environment and Planning D: Society and Space (Vol. 29 [2011], 435-550), 32
edited by Mark Jackson and Maria Fannin, especially Craig Martin's “Fog-bound: Aerial Space and the 
Elemental Entanglements of  Body-with-World,” Kenneth R. Olwig's “All That is Landscape is Melted 
into Air: The 'Aerography' of  Ethereal Space,” and Peta Mitchell's “Geographies/Aerographies of  
Contagion.”
	 Ingold, “Lines and the Weather,” 23.33
 	Michel Foucault, “The Discourse on Language” in The Archaeology of  Knowledge, trans. AM Sheridan 34
Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 231.
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emphasize the temporal aspect of  atmospheres because affect, as Deleuze notes in his 
definition of  bodies, bears a close relation to event. 
	 Because Ingold does not detail the temporal dimensions of  atmosphere, I turn to 
Franny Choi’s poem, “Notes on the Existence of  Ghosts.” Choi is like a shaman who 
channels the undead pasts that haunt ordinary life. Her poem expresses atmospheres 
(though it does not use the term): “Leaves stained onto the sidewalk from yesterday’s 
storm create gray-green watermarks on the pavement, like the negatives of  pressed 
flowers, or the ghost of  a letterpress still whispering up from the page. A sidewalk is a 
haunted thing.”  Choi's poem exemplifies how atmospheres are littered not with lifeless 35
things. They are full of  matter that carries the charge of  transpired events in imprints and 
outlines, negatives and whispers. Even the dead live on. Their traces attest to a strange 
vitality that is unencumbered by bodily and spatial boundaries: “Dove collides into 
window, leaving a white imprint of  its body. A crime scene outline saying, Take this, the dust 
of  me. Remember the way my body was round and would not move through glass.”  Events do not 36
perish without remainder. They live on, accrue density, exert force. They become present 
without being an embodied presence. The past rises up in the wake of  time-steeped 
things that compose a dark atmosphere. Ghosts might exist but that’s besides the point; 
Choi’s poem is not a treatise but a series of  notes, a montage of  ghostly matter. Choi does 
not define atmospheres. She breathes them in and exhales them with a poetic spirit. She 
gathers details, generates scenes, gestures toward atmospheres that are elusive yet 
captivating. Tunes the senses to atmospheres that channel the undeadness of  the past. 




	 Others have touched upon the temporal dimension of  atmospheres. Tim Edensor 
treats atmosphere in terms of  histories of  human arrival in his ethnography of  Blackpool 
Illuminations, an annual festival that draws over three million visitors to a seaside resort in 
the UK. Over 500 lighting displays generate luminous atmospheres of  colors, food, 
smells, chatter, and laughter. Edensor’s interviews uncover a strong sense of  anticipation 
that underlies yearly returns to Blackpool: feelings of  eagerness, nostalgia, and familiarity 
all shape visitors' arrivals and feed in to the festive atmosphere. Sara Ahmed similarly 
observes that the human experience of  atmospheres is inflected through particular 
trajectories. She desubjectivizes Edensor’s rendition: it’s not only that people experience 
atmospheres in particular ways, but atmospheres themselves are “full of  angles,” shaped 
by impersonal, historical structures of  gender, sexuality, nation, and capital.  37
Atmospheres consist of  entangled timelines. They bleed into feelings, dispositions, habits, 
and anticipations if  their temporality is smooth and recurrent enough. Or they float into 
something ghostly—into marks, negatives, whispers. Into little pauses and magical 
moments. 
	 I appreciate that Edensor and Ahmed draw attention to the temporal dimension 
of  atmospheres. I also appreciate Berlant’s insistence that people feel out impasses in the 
historical present through shared atmospheres before developing a clear understanding of  
what’s going on.  But if  we suspend their focus on humans and human experience, we 38
can see how nonhumans participate in the composition of  atmospheres and inflect their 
temporal character. Dark atmospheres emerge through human and nonhuman affect 
	 Ahmed, The Promise of  Happiness, 41.37
	 See Lauren Berlant, “Thinking about Feeling Historical,” Emotion, Space and Society 1, No. 1 (October 38
2008), 4-9.
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alike as the pasts rises up in undead force. 
	 The dark atmosphere of  impasse evokes temporalities that are more haunted than 
familiar. Accounts of  atmosphere that have taken stock of  time have posited temporalities 
that are more regular, smooth, or linear than the ones that characterize impasse. Edensor 
for example describes the familiarity with Blackpool Illuminations as an experience of  
“flow,” or a “temporal, rhythmic process in which a sequence of  events and sensations 
successively provoke immersion, engagement, distraction, and attraction.”  The 39
Illuminations ultimately canalize experience into the flow of  a “singular event in place.”  40
Edensor does not emphasize that flow in this and other contexts is neither experienced 
evenly nor available to all. In her discussion of  the “promise of  happiness,” Ahmed 
describes flow as predicated upon an “intimacy of  body and world” that is shaped by 
capital, gender, race, and nation.  She implies that histories of  power form a plurality of  41
nonlinear timelines that do not amount to flow. Although she does not detail the 
relationship between atmospheres and obstructed flow, Ahmed does make possible the 
thinking of  the temporal dimension of  impasse atmospheres as haunted. 
	 “Haunting” aptly expresses the atmospheres of  impasses, composed as they are of  
ghostly matter. Avery Gordon writes that “being haunted draws us affectively, sometimes 
against our will and always a bit magically, into the structure of  feeling of  a reality we 
come to experience, not as cold knowledge, but as a transformative recognition.”  42
Impasses are haunted by the undead past that shapes the affective dimension of  ordinary 
	 Edensor, 1110.39
	 Ibid., 1111.40
	 Ahmed, The Promise of  Happiness, 12.41
	 Avery F. Gordon, Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination (Minneapolis, MN: University of  42
Minnesota Press, 1997), 8.
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life. But the vibrancy of  ghostly matter entails that the atmosphere of  impasse involves 
more than social histories of  human feeling (themselves inflected by matter). Impasses 
include histories of  capital, histories of  racism, histories of  patriarchy, empire, and war. 
But biological, geological, and even cosmic time make up impasses as well. Choi 
beautifully weaves these with human time: “If  the stars have, as they say, been dead for 
millions of  years by the time their light reaches us then my retinas are a truer thing to call 
sky.”  Starlight is a ghostly trace of  death that converts human eyes into cosmic events. 43
The sidewalks described by Choi are material expressions of  technological innovation, 
resource extraction, transnational trade, urban development, and exploited labor. Those 
histories intertwine with those of  the elemental emergence of  oxygen, the patterning of  
climate to whirl up as storms, the Earth’s secretion of  minerals, and the evolutionary 
appearance of  plant and human life, and countless other ones. All of  these histories enjoy 
new life in atmospheres. In other words, in an atmosphere, one feels not only other bodies 
but other times. Disparate histories become entangled and reanimated through ghostly 
matter. Densely haunted moments pull humans out of  phase from their worlds. 
“Transformative recognition” might not happen. Movement forward might not happen. 
An impasse might... 
	 How does ghostly matter figure into the dark atmospheres of  impasses? How does 
the undeadness of  the past generate not only haunted moments but more specifically 
impasses? Does the reanimation of  the past merely recollect transpired events as they 
happened? Or do hauntings entail that the past has been opened to new destinies? To 
further express how impasses generate dark atmospheres I supplement Choi’s 
	 Choi, “Notes on the Existence of  Ghosts,” 15.43
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interarticulation of  atmospheres and the ghostly with Deleuze’s and Stewart’s comments 
on time. 
	 Deleuze writes that the present is a stretched-out period defined by formed bodies. 
It is a time of  “passive syntheses,” or “contractions” of  flows and forces into “organisms.” 
These syntheses are passive because they operate at the level of  “habit.” And while they 
do not depend upon cognition and intention, they are nonetheless “contemplations” 
through which an organism derives its composition and sustenance: “What we call wheat 
is a contraction of  the earth and humidity, and this contraction is both a contemplation 
and the auto-satisfaction of  that contemplation... What organism is not made... of  
contemplated and contracted water, nitrogen, carbon, chlorides and sulphates, thereby 
intertwining all the habits of  which it is composed?”  Even if  wheat does not have a 44
human mind, it selects certain elements of  the earth amongst others (contemplation) and 
turns them into nutrients for itself  (auto-satisfaction) that allow it to persist as an organism 
(contraction). This passive synthesis is a matter of  time. The organism folds the future 
into its present through “anticipation” of  needs being satisfied. Passive syntheses make the 
past and the future into “dimensions of  the present” (DR, 71). They mark a time of  
formed things and their ongoingness. 
	 Passive syntheses occur from the standpoint of  organisms looking to the past for 
materials with an eye to future satisfaction. But the past is more than a perspective taken 
by the present. Deleuze calls the past in itself  “memory,” the second synthesis of  time. 
Memory is not something lodged in brains; it glows in innumerable features of  the 
cosmos: imprints of  leaves, the light of  dying stars, smudges on the window, a vacant lot, a 
	 Gilles Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 44
1994), 75. Cited in this chapter hereafter as DR.
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raw electrical wire. It is the whole of  the past, the database of  transpired events. But 
memory is not the past over and done with: “it no longer exists, it does not exist, but it 
insists, it consists, it is” (DR, 82). The past is an absent presence, an incorporeal 
materiality, abstract but real. Ghostly. Memory means that the present is not quite itself. 
The present is held ajar by ghostly events. The undeadness of  memory frees the past and 
future from the sway of  passive syntheses. For Deleuze, the past causes the present to 
pass.  As the past becomes reanimated with a difference, it opens new futures. 45
	 Impasses emerge as memory jeopardizes habits. While Deleuze talks about passive 
syntheses in regard to organisms, I draw attention to an organism’s world. Without things 
outside it, the organism would no longer persist as it has. Passive syntheses form 
continuities between an organism and its world: “[passive synthesis] constitutes our habit 
of  living, our expectation that ‘it’ will continue” (DR, 74). Deleuze calls “fatigue” the 
moment when an organism “can no longer contract what it contemplates” (DR, 77). He 
does not describe what happens to the fatigued organism—whether it falls apart or fights 
back. An impasse is the onset of  fatigue. Though Deleuze does not articulate it this way, 
fatigue is a relation between the first two syntheses of  time. It happens when the force of  
memory hits the pressure points of  habit. It marks the incapacity of  humans and their 
worlds to continue as they are. In an impasse, humans are no longer able to contract their 
world. Contemplations of  the good life become overwhelmed. They change. So do what 
is usually contracted. Contemplation and contraction fall out of  phase. Fatigued humans 
struggle to maintain attachments or to undo harmful ones or to generate new ones. 
	 What atmospheres emerge amidst undead pasts and half-formed futures? What 
 “No present would ever pass were it not past 'at the same time' as it is present... Every present passes, in 45
favour of  a new present, because the past is contemporaneous with itself  as present” (DR, 81).
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are the experiences, the textures, and the affects of  fatigue? I refract Deleuze’s account of  
time through Stewart’s accounts of  ordinary life. Stewart evokes Deleuze’s notion of  
memory through atmospheres that haunt ordinary life. 
	 Stewart’s ethnography of  ordinary life in West Virginia’s coal mining camps—the 
“hills”—expresses impasses amongst social decay, or what Berlant calls “crisis 
ordinariness,” the slow erosion of  ordinary life by the grit of  social, economic, cultural, 
and political shifts. Life in the camps was luminous during the boom years of  coal; it 
darkened when the mines shuttered. Livelihoods collapsed. Dreams faded. Desperation 
filled the air. Impasses became palpable in “confusions” in which “there is nothing left to 
say but the social order itself  seems to fall apart.”  Stewart writes, 46
In the camps, where people are often enabled to stay in the hills through 
disability, and where they suffer the diseases of  an economic and cultural 
double bind with nowhere to go and you can't stay here when “here” is 
constantly disappearing before your eyes, generalized states of  the dizzy, 
the nerves, and spoils of  smothering become a kind of  remembrance that 
brings forces and encounters to life concretely in the workings of  the body. 
(SSR, 130) 
Stewart finds memory in bodily states and tendencies. The dizzy, the nerves, the 
smotherings are corporeal expressions of  crumbling worlds. They register how the camps 
became “a place that in its very abandon to the performance of  a world got down 
include[d] a utopia of  latent and remembered possibilities” (SSR, 48). Memories of  times 
past and lives that could have been loom up as impasses float across ruined landscapes 
	  Kathleen Stewart, A Space on the Side of  the Road: Cultural Poetics in an “Other” America (Princeton, NJ: 46
Princeton University Press, 1996), 83. Cited in this chapter hereafter as SSR.
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and stunned bodies. 
	 In other words, the hills bloomed with “spaces on the side of  the road,” or detours 
within ordinary life that catch people in atmospheres dense with potentiality. Stewart 
writes that “danger and promise mark the space of  the hills as a dream world born of  
contingency and desire” (SSR, 51). People drawn toward or abandoned in spaces on the 
side of  the road find themselves amidst happenings and their lingering impacts. 
	 Stewart draws attention to how atmospheres of  ordinary life are haunted by 
history. Recalling Deleuze while emphasizing lived experience, she writes that history is 
not “an accomplished fact or a formless tendency” but an “occupied space of  
contingency and desire in which people roam” (SSR, 90). People struggle to catch up to 
the reanimation of  transpired events in everyday encounters. Like Choi and Deleuze, 
Stewart locates memory not in brains but in and across worlds. Humans remember, and 
so do the most banal things and landscapes: “The vacancy of  a lot in Rhodell remembers 
the fire that burned Johnny Millsap to death while he cried out for help and the others 
could do nothing but watch; the exposed electrical wire in the hills above Amigo Mines 
#2 remembers the image of  Buddy Hall, a nine-year-old boy, hanging from it” (SSR, 
90-1). Stewart registers material vibrancy like Bennett but draws attention to its ghostly, 
memory-laden quality. And unlike Deleuze, she specifies the atmospheric effects produced 
by the biting of  memory into the present, which suspends the architecture of  action and 
reaction in moments of  keen sensitivity to something unfolding. “Physical objects, 
imaginary events, social relations, and moral and supernatural forces are united as aspects 
of  a single poetic effect gathered into a scene. Master narratives of  history as progress 
decompose into the tense confabulations of  a continuously re-membered past that hits the 
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present like a nervous shock” (SSR, 96). This “single poetic effect” is akin to what I call 
“atmosphere,” though the atmospheres of  impasse evoke multiple poetic effects without 
amounting to a scene and that generate cases of  the nerves that do not always crescendo 
in a shock. The temporality of  dark atmospheres move on tangent from progress. The 
undead past creeps into the present as atmospheres that provoke the nerves. 
	 Atmospheres of  spaces on the side of  the road re-member the past by inflecting its 
impacts and trajectories anew. Haunted moments are the reverberation of  events long 
after their immediate effects have fizzled. The lifespan of  events is not a pinpointable 
segment but an open-ended branching. One might recall Deleuze’s comments on festivals, 
which do not repeat an event that they commemorate; rather, an event repeats in advance 
all the festivals that follow.  An event is carried to new life through its offshoots. It is a 47
repetition of  potency that is on the verge of  bodying forth, which Stewart expresses as 
“re-membering.” Like Choi, Stewart attends to the hauntings that reanimate the past as 
ghostly matter: “Objects that have decayed into fragments and traces draw together a 
transient past with the very desire to remember. Concrete and embodying absence, they 
are confined to a context of  strict immanence, limited to the representations of  ghostly 
apparitions. Yet they haunt” (SSR, 93). 
	 Unlike Choi, Stewart notes how the present quivers with futures: “In the image of  
a trembling space, then, a reality that exceeds the constraints of  history is born of  the 
very remembering of  unfulfilled possibilities” (SSR, 95).  And echoing what Deleuze calls 48
the third syntheses of  time (when the repetition of  the potency born of  unactualized pasts 
	 “This is the apparent paradox of  festivals: they repeat an 'unrepeatable'. They do not add a second and 47
a third time to the first, but carry the first time to the 'nth' power” (DR, 1).
	 Here, Stewart is alluding to what I will develop in future chapters as what William Connolly calls the 48
“powers of  the false.”
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ushers forth a difference),  Stewart notes that the future folded into ghostly matter is 49
partially open: “A rambling rose vine entwined around a crumbling chimney remembers 
an old family farm, the dramatic fire in which the place was lost, and the utopic potential 
still clinging to the traces of  history” (SSR, 93). Ghostly matter is at once a register of  
what happened and a jar of  potency. Stewart describes how the ruined object or 
landscape that embodies memory is a “sign, at once, of  the power of  history on a place 
and of  the transitoriness of  history itself.” Like Deleuzean fatigue, haunting for Stewart is 
the re-membering of  the past that upsets the present and makes new futures possible. 
	 Ghostly matter strings together haunted moments from reanimated pasts and half-
formed futures. Things are not what they seem because they are haunted. They summon 
the past while undoing it. Possibility and constraint reshuffle, shape-shift. Dark 
atmospheres express ordinary life as full of  contingency and potentiality. “The traces of  
things that happen haunt the ‘ordinary world’ with the absent presence of  what could be 
despite everything, and what should be if  only” (SSR, 183). 
	 If  only: an expression of  what keeps one at an impasse, for either the good life that 
has been promised or for other worlds that could be. 
	 The atmospheres of  impasses are dark. They are dark because they pull humans 
to the side of  the road through whispers rising from the ruins. Because the haunted get 
caught up in something enigmatic and compelling, in something that is at once 
threatening and promising. Because latency becomes channeled into a force without a 
 	 For Deleuze, the third synthesis of  time is Zarathustra’s eternal return. Deleuze insists that the eternal 49
return is not the repetition of  long cycles of  time whereby everything that has happened is doomed to 
repeat itself  entirely unaltered. In “The Vision and the Riddle,” that view of  the eternal return is 
proposed by a dwarf  who functions as the “spirit of  gravity”—as that which would bind difference to 
sameness. Zarathustra dissents and eventually proclaims that difference is what returns eternally. See 
DR, 88-91; Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Modern 
Library, 1995), 157-9.
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form. Because things are not what they seem. Because the present becomes unhinged. 
Because time grows overlapping, entangled, patchy, diffuse. Because the undead past 
looms up with... 
Dark Experiences 
Atmospheres move across ontological and experiential registers. You are apart from the 
atmospheres you feel. Yet you are a part of  it. Apart and a part. Your presence means that 
you experience atmospheres at the same time it changes them. You change the 
atmosphere for others and for yourself, even if  you are doing no more than breathing in 
and out. “Immersion” becomes an inadequate description of  the experience of  
atmospheres: we cannot be immersed in something of  which we are a part, nor can we 
quite be immersed in something to which we contribute, nor can we be immersed in 
something that isn’t all there. So you can never quite put your finger on what’s going on 
amidst an atmosphere, though some atmospheres are surely stranger than others. 
Atmospheres evoke what Stewart calls a “haunted double epistemology” in which people 
are caught up “in the midst of  things and impacted by them and yet making something 
of  things” (SSR, 4). Perception and sensation are emergent and hence elusive. The 
experience and composition of  an atmosphere feed into each other. How might we 
understand this strange ambiguity? 
	 One understanding of  atmosphere proceeds through quasi-phenomenological 
terms: atmosphere is a mood that floats between sentient subjects and sensed objects. For 
Böhme, atmospheres are objective (because they are experienced as “something ‘out 
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there’”) and subjective (“without the sentient subject, they are nothing”).  For Böhme, 50
atmospheres exhibit this objective character by their communicability and their capacity 
to instill surprise within the sensing subject. Other accounts of  atmosphere echo aspects 
of  Böhme’s account. 
	 Why sidestep phenomenological frameworks even as experience is an integral 
dimension of  atmospheres? The way that phenomenological accounts link sentience and 
atmospheres places too much emphasis on the effects that atmospheres have on humans. 
That important focus underplays how atmospheres may affect nonhumans and how 
humans and nonhumans affect each other therein. The ethics and politics of  atmospheres 
that I advance resists such anthropocentrism in order to better attend to the many lives 
and things that make up the atmospheres of  impasse. 
	 Phenomenological accounts can also miss the becomings of  atmospheres, due in 
part to an overemphasis on space. For now, let “becomings” denote the qualitative 
changes of  bodies in their affects and summon notions of  emergent causality, diffused 
agency, and distortion of  sensation and perception. Phenomenological accounts tend to 
describe atmosphere as a soft enclosure that immerses human subjects in a specific mood 
or feeling that they receive and sense. Böhme emphasizes how the atmospheres of  stage 
productions “are no longer something perceived at a distance, but something within 
which one is enclosed.”  Following Böhme and the phenomenologist Mikel Dufrenne, 51
Anderson maintains that atmospheres have a “characteristic spatial form—diffusion 
within a sphere” that denotes enclosure.  These account parse bodies that are in a 52
	 Böhme, “The Art of  the Stage Set as a Paradigm for an Aesthetics of  Atmospheres.”50
	 Ibid.51
	 Anderson, “Affective Atmospheres,” 80.52
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process of  becoming into subjects and objects. Sensation, perception, and sentience tend 
to be presumed as given rather than as unstable, emergent formations. 
	 Experiences of  impasse do not operate in the registers of  clear consciousness and 
feeling but at the limits of  perception and sensation. I locate the experience of  impasse in 
a range of  hauntings, from dream states to stunned silences. These experiences are akin to 
what Böhme calls an atmosphere’s “possession of  us like an alien power,” through I find 
that atmospheres don’t possess us as much as they become with us; they feed into us as we 
become atmospheric.  The dark atmospheres of  impasse intertwine affect and time in 53
becomings, which calls for grammars of  self-organization, emergent causality, and 
impersonal, diffuse agency. 
	 Deleuze and Guattari use “becoming” to describe exchanges of  affects between 
resonant bodies. Becoming takes place along the plane of  consistency. It is not captured 
by frameworks of  relations that posit organized bodies, such as imitation, correspondence, 
resemblance, derivation, or descent (ATP, 237). Becoming is not about one thing 
transforming into another; nor is it a process of  actualization, a meaning given by Alfred 
North Whitehead.  Becoming is what Deleuze and Guattari call “counter-actualization,” 54
which cracks open formed bodies unto a plateau of  energetic transfers, a plane of  
consistency.  Untapped capacities are switched on, new ones emerge. Bodies change. 55
They throw themselves into something that is not all there but nonetheless exerts a hold. 
	 Böhme, “The Art of  the Stage Set as a Paradigm for an Aesthetics of  Atmospheres.”53
	 Whitehead writes of  becoming as the concrescent process by which actual entities emerge from 54
undetermined potentiality (Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality [New York, NY: The Free Press, 
1978], 23-25).
	 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell 55
(New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1994), 159.
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	 Becomings are dark because where they go and what they amount to remain to be 
seen. They do not abide by the linear temporality of  efficient causation, which posits 
formed subjects and objects while centralizing agency in the former. Efficient causation is 
a technology of  explanation and prediction that straightens time into an arrow from 
precise causes to specific effects. Efficient causality ill describes haunted temporalities, 
swarms of  affect, the ongoing life of  events, and materialities strewn with concreteness 
and abstraction. It does not describe atmospheres and darkness due to its efforts to 
identify all compositional elements, its obsession with clarity, and its inability to grasp how 
time is irreversible because the undead past bleeds into the present. 
	 Becomings are better approximated through a model of  emergent causality, which 
William Connolly describes as the dawning of  new formations and capacities through the 
partial infusion of  disparates: 
Emergent causality is causal... in that a movement in one force-field helps 
to induce changes in others. But it is also emergent in that: first, some of  
the turbulence introduced into the second field is not always knowable in 
detail in itself  before it arrives darkly through the effects that emerge; 
second, the new forces may become infused to some degree into the very 
organization of  the emergent phenomenon...; third, some of  these forces 
also continue to impinge from the outside on the emerging formation; 
fourth, the new infusions and impingements may trigger novel capacities 
of  self-organization or autopoiesis...; and fifth, a series of  resonances may 
now roll back and forth across two partially separated and partially 
conjoined force-fields—sometimes generating a new stabilization and 
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sometimes intensifying disequilibrium.  56
I add that emergent causality summons the haunted temporalities described above: the 
reanimation of  the past as lived potency in the present, which obscures what counts as a 
cause and an effect, and how. Under this model, agency is diffuse, strewn through 
multiple things and multiple times. This atmospheric agency finds expression in 
becomings that simmer up as half-formed hauntings and consists of  the forces that gather 
a something that has yet to emerge.  57
	 Stewart expresses the becomings of  ordinary life by using a grammar of  
autopoiesis: the ordinary throws itself  together, gets caught up in something, snaps into 
place, comes together, picks up, surges, submerges, collects into, swirls around, bottoms 
out, amasses, pops up, pools up, flickers in or out, drifts into, aligns, sparks, proliferates 
around, shimmers up, buds up, settles into, fashions itself, holes up, bulks up, wraps itself  
up, gets sidetracked, skids, scores over, quickens, rinds up, lodges in, cocoons. These tropes 
elude categorization as entirely active or passive. They point to the emergent quality of  
becomings: something darkly this way comes… 
	 Atmospheres are full of  becomings. As Stewart writes,“Things have started to 
float. It’s as if  the solid ground has given way, leaving us hanging like tender cocoons 
suspended in a dream world. As if  the conditions and possibilities of  a life have 
themselves begun to float” (OA, 51). Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos emphasizes the 
centrality of  becoming to atmosphere in his observation that the etymology of  “sphere” is 
	 William E. Connolly, A World of  Becoming (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 171.56
	 While sharing Bennett's push to delocalize agency, I opt here to describe agency as “atmospheric” rather 57
than “distributive.” While the latter is appropriate when emphasizing assemblages as confederacies of  
things, it might be inadequate as a descriptor of  diffusion, ephemerality, and emergence. The hauntings 
that emerge amidst reanimated pasts also make “atmospheric” a more attractive descriptive of  agency to 
me when discussing impasses.
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a “missile or bullet,” which denotes a “pulsating velocity” or a “continuous yet 
imperceptible movement.”  Yet, he retreats from this understanding when he recommits 58
atmosphere to specific spatiotemporal coordinates and a phenomenological framework: 
“at any point in time and space, there can only be one atmosphere. Any development in 
the atmosphere, change of  affect, conflict or confluence will take place necessarily within 
the ever-changing atmosphere.”  By subordinating temporality to spatiality, 59
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos loses sight of  an atmosphere’s consistency that emerges, 
maintains itself, and dissipates amidst becomings underway. Moreover, there can never be 
one atmosphere in place because atmospheres are not identical to themselves, those of  
impasse especially so. Dark atmospheres are not identical to themselves because they are 
not things but force-fields of  affect—of  intensities, spatiotemporal dynamisms, markers of  
differential processes (DR, 222).  Because they are haunted. Because their consistency is 60
strewn with porosity. Atmospheres are ephemeral not only because they are incorporeal 
materialities, not only because they are felt darkly, but also because they are incipient 
processes of  becoming, replete with pluripotentialities. A dark atmosphere is a grab bag 
of  tendencies that pulsate with different speeds, resonate across many things, many of  
which are unknown. 
	 The dark atmospheres of  impasse register shifts in the conditions of  blockage and 
flow, constraint and possibility. Although becomings for Deleuze and Guattari elude 
	 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, “Atmospheres of  Law,” 41.58
	 Ibid.59
	 Brian Massumi elaborates affect/intensity as a placeholder for differentiation: “Intensity is not only 60
incipience. It is also the beginning of  a selection” (Parables for the Virtual, 30).
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experience, the becomings of  an impasse are palpable.  Dark atmospheres hover at the 61
shifting thresholds of  perception and sensation. What will happen remains unknown, not 
only because arrangements of  perception and sensation are breaking down but because 
something new might be emerging. Nothing confirms the end of  a world before it 
happens; one could be at an impasse or merely facing a minor setback, though 
sometimes, there are good reasons to suspect that it is one rather than the other. Even in 
the absence of  clear understanding, however, people cannot deny that something is afoot. 
They feel what’s happening, dimly. What kind of  sensibility is appropriate for this strange, 
dark experience? 
	 In an impasse, intuition becomes a dominant form of  thinking-feeling. Inspired by 
Bergson, Berlant writes that “intuition is where affect meets history, in all of  its chaos, 
normative ideology, and embodied practices of  discipline and invention.”  Intuition is 62
the means by which Berlant imports affect theory into a genealogy of  ideology to 
emphasize that the human body’s supposedly autonomic responses are disciplined by 
power. This productive riff  on Bergson, however, underemphasizes his point that intuition 
is “the sympathy by which one is transported into the interior of  an object in order to 
coincide with what there is unique and consequently inexpressible in it.”  For Bergson, 63
intuition bypasses preformed concepts to tap into the lifespan of  matter as exhibited in its 
duration—that is, in its preservation and metamorphoses. I recall this point to emphasize 
	 “Movements, becomings, in other words, pure relations of  speed and slowness, pure affects, are below 61
and above the threshold of  perception” (ATP, 281).
 	 Berlant, Cruel Optimism, 52.62
 	 Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Mabelle L. Andison (New York: 63
Dover Publications Inc., 2007), 135.
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that part of  what is grasped by intuition is ghostly matter and its impacts on affect and 
history. 
	 Brian Massumi also has recently modified Bergson’s notion of  intuition. Because 
no object is self-enclosed, Massumi finds it odd that Bergson would emphasize the 
distinctiveness of  an object through an appeal to the “interior” of  an object. He thus 
revises intuition so that it “transports us into the heart of  the event.”  Echoing Berlant’s 64
focus on affective atmospheres, Massumi views intuition as plugged into a self-organizing 
field of  potentialities that alters both selves and worlds.  He develops intuition in regard 65
to technologies of  preemption at conjunctures between neoliberalism and 
neoconservatism that, rather than normalizing bodies or regulating populations, strive to 
“prime” bodies for nonconscious action.  At stake in intuition, for Massumi, is the 66
connection between sense and time. Through intuition, one is tapped into the vague 
overlaps between the present and incipient futures. 
	 Within an impasse, intuition brings us not into histories of  ideology, objects, or 
events per se but into the intensities of  ordinary life. In an impasse, ordinary life is sensed 
to be at once strikingly fragile and remarkably resilient. We intuit the potential dissolution 
of  what has held together a world. We intuit a plenitude of  glimmering alternatives, more 
as affect than clear-eyed vision. We sense something else that may bear the first traces of  
cascading change without yet being pulled in a clear direction. But those fine lines might 
also be not much or nothing at all, at least for the time being. This form of  intuition also 
 	 Brian Massumi, What Animals Teach Us about Politics (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015), 32.64
 	 Brian Massumi, The Power at the End of  the Economy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015), 45.65
 	 Brian Massumi, Ontopower: War, Powers, and the State of  Perception (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 66
2015).
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senses the intransigence of  a situation. The inertia of  a world is not due to the supposedly 
brutish properties and organization of  matter, as Bergson believes. It is due to an affective 
atmosphere of  powerful resonances and diffuse potential. Despite Massumi’s correlation 
between potentiality and events, an impasse is no less a field of  potentiality for its lack of  
events. An impasse inhibits events from happening even as it opens the possibility that the 
present will swerve into new futures. In short, intuition in an impasse grasps the fragility 
and resilience of  a world in a moment when differences between the two are not at all 
clear. 
	 Intuition is a sensibility that lies at the cusp between a deteriorating sensorium and 
an emergent one. It is the sensibility appropriate to the experience of  perception and 
sensation confronting their limits. Deleuze and Guattari argue that the imperceptible 
becomes perceived in leaps between the planes of  consistency and organization.  These 67
leaps recall what Deleuze writes elsewhere about the encounter and its generation of  new 
sensibilities: “The object of  encounter... really gives rise to sensibility with regard to a 
given sense... It is not a sensible being but the being of  the sensible... Sensibility, in the 
presence of  that which can only be sensed (and is at the same time imperceptible) finds 
itself  before its own limit” (DR, 139-40). What happens in an encounter is sensed but not 
felt to be anything in particular (such as a mood). For it to be grasped, the senses must 
shake off  their prior arrangement and reorganize themselves around the intensities of  the 
encounter. In this respect, the encounter resonates with impasse as both involve an 
experience that is at once enigmatic and captivating. Humans feel out what they feel 
themselves becoming with. The sensorium of  impasse emerges in piecemeal fashion. As 
	 “It is in jumping from one plane to the other, or from the relative thresholds to the absolute threshold 67
that coexists with them, that the imperceptible becomes necessarily perceived” (ATP, 282).
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Stewart puts it, “The senses sharpen on the surface of  things taking form. They pick up 
texture and density as they move in and through bodies and spaces, rhythms and tempi, 
possibilities likely or not” (“AA,” 448). 
 	 How are impasses felt if  not through clear moods, emotions, or concepts? It is felt 
in mutations of  the senses. In hauntings and in reveries. In rhythms that are now so 
rickety. In moments of  a world slowed down or stunned amidst a sprawl of  becomings. In 
the mind adrift or caught in a web. In the flickering of  consciousness.  In palpitations of  68
the heart. In the sensation of  being dragged down by phantom hands. But also in 
glimpses of  other worlds that sparkle through the cracks of  this world. 
 Watching and Waiting at the End of  the World 
Politics is by no means an apodictic science. It 
proceeds by experimentation, groping in the dark, 
injection, withdrawal, advances, retreats.  69
—Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari 
The politics of  any surge depends on where it might 
go. What happens. How it plays itself  out and in 
whose hands.  70
—Kathleen Stewart 
Atmospheric darkness is a central feature of  impasses. Nothing confirms the end of  a 
	 Alfred North Whitehead writes “Consciousness flickers; and even at its brightest, there is a small focal 68
region of  clear illumination, and a large penumbral region of  experience which tells of  intense 




world before it happens. Nothing confirms whether one is facing a minor setback or on 
the verge of  drastic change. This uncertainty and indeterminacy scramble trajectories of  
the good life. They pull one into a rut. Or they spawn fanciful visions and lines of  frenetic 
flight. Stewart writes of  an impasse, of  a “story of  abjection mixed with vital hopes”: 
This is the daydream of  a subject whose only antidote to structural 
disenfranchisement is a literal surge of  vitality and mobility. A subject 
whose extreme vulnerability is rooted in the sad affect of  being out of  
place, out of  luck, or caught between a rock and a hard place, and who 
makes a passionate move to connect to a life when mainstream strategies 
like self-discipline or the gathering of  resources like a fortress around the 
frail body are not an option. (OA, 15) 
Strategies of  self-discipline and barricading oneself  may be thwarted in an impasse partly 
because its time is nonlinear, its rhythms staccato. Stewart writes of  the twisted timelines 
that register impasses in the American dream: “We lurch between ups and downs as 
overwrought dreams flop to earth, only to rise up again, inexplicably revitalized, like the 
monster in a horror movie or the fool who keeps coming back for more” (OA, 94). The 
experience of  impasses lie on tangent from flow. In times marked by perturbations, 
choppy feelings, deflated dreams, habits undone, and mixes of  blockage and surge. 
Atmospheres of  impasse are overfull. They are haunted, not familiar. Dark, not luminous. 
	 Atmospheric darkness may seem to be a liability to those who wield theory as a 
framework to neatly analyze a world and reduce politics to practical solutions and twelve-
step programs. I maintain that dark atmospheres lend value to ethics and politics in 
impasses. They lead politics away from demystifying the world and toward feeling its 
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rhythms, textures, and aura. They turn caution, speculation, and tentativeness into ethical 
virtues. They suspend judgment when a life is so hard to piece back together. They 
emphasize the value of  watching and waiting as calls to action ring loudly. They promote 
experimentation amidst uncertainty. 
	 How might politics and ethics in an impasse be oriented toward the darkness of  
atmosphere? What might such a politics and ethics look like? Choi provides an initial step 
by poeticizing how sidewalks, leaves, colors, storms, trains, and air help to compose a 
haunted atmosphere. How atmospheres are already rising up before humans arrive and 
can find a place and a rhythm therein. How the senses can be spotty and unreliable. How 
layers of  the human body can commune vaguely with ghostly traces. How reflection and 
writing are infused with nonhuman forces. How they can solicit a keener attunement to 
the intensities and shifts within dark atmospheres. “Notes on the Existence of  Ghosts” 
develops an aesthetic of  gestures through which what is undead but fleeting extends its 
life. Choi contributes to an ethics that cultivates sensory attunements to ghostly matter. To 
a politics that suspends sharp judgment to give breathing room to the lateral, the elusive, 
the spellbinding. 
	 Such a politics leans away from nameable phenomena and hardened structures 
and unfolds in the midst of  things. Big systems and big -isms are but shorthand for 
atmospheres wherein forces and trajectories receive their gravity, feel, and charge. Bodies 
matter for the forces they exert and the impacts they suffer. For the potency that sparks up 
119
or falls flat. For their generation of  what Deleuze calls an “atmospheric element,”  whose 71
life is only detectable by a politics that traffics in becomings, frictions, divergences, and 
generativity.  Such a politics is not concerned with channeling intensities toward 72
narrative closure. It tracks reanimated timelines, wayward affects, and dark becomings 
through the canals and dead ends of  a splintered, haunted ordinary in: the bodies that 
flow confidently or buckle under the weight of  power; the thickening of  anxiety as the 
paint peels and the walls rot and the water is shut off; the talk of  get-rich-quick schemes 
and desperate exits amongst heavy sighs and hollowed eyes; the shame that can 
accompany descent into old addictions and habits; the hesitation in casting a ballot to 
reelect a president who has certified mass deportations and slaughter but remains the least 
bad option; the jitters when you see their name on caller ID despite spots of  sweetness 
that make a relationship free of  abuse so palpable; the angry voice and liquored stench 
that turns a child’s gaze toward the stillness in some sad corner of  what is supposed to be 
“home”; the longing for home as you recognize that it was built on the backs of  the 
dispossessed; the feeling of  a world leaving the room when you close the door on an 
intimate for good. Politics might turn from seemingly fixed and final forms and toward 
the forces of  materialities that are at once concrete and abstract. Politics within impasses 
moves amongst temporalities, affects, and becomings that do not point to a single future, 
clear mood, or inhabitable world. It grasps about a dark atmosphere that is cramped with 
	 Deleuze writes that “We try to climb above the strata in order to each an outside, an atmospheric 71
element, a 'non-stratified substance'... 
	 	 The informal outside is a battle, a turbulent, stormy zone where particular points and the relations 
of  forces between these points are tossed about. Strata merely collected and solidified the visual dust and 
the sonic echo of  the battle raging above them. But, up above, the particular features have no form and 
are neither bodies nor speaking persons. We enter into the domain of  uncertain doubles and partial 
deaths, where things continually emerge and fade. This is a micropolitics” (Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, 
trans. Seán Hand [Minneapolis, MN: University of  Minnesota Press, 1988], 121).
	 OA, 128; ATP, 25.72
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a murky mix of  promise and threat. 
	 Impassivity has a special place in this politics. Impassivity is the enlivening of  the 
senses as habituated architectures of  action and reaction hang in suspense. It might seem 
strange to describe the senses as “enlivened” when one is impassive; after all, impassivity 
typically denotes numbness or unfeeling, those still states of  being stunned. We might hold 
instead that the senses are largely deadened when ordinary life unfolds in relatively 
smooth ways. The senses are jolted into life when one no longer has the support of  
reorganized sensibilities, as in the encounter as described by Deleuze. In this light, 
impassivity is the effect of  an abundance of  affect, of  too much going on, as when one 
freezes in the midst of  something overwhelming. An impasse, as the next chapter 
elaborates, brims with affects that pull in many directions at once without leading to 
anything in particular. In this manner, impassivity is, in Stewart’s words, a “watching and 
waiting, a living through, an attunement to what might rind up or snap in place. The 
subject finds itself  in a situation. Events and outcomes are immanent, unknown but 
pressing.”  As atmospheric darkness descends upon the usual repertoire of  concepts, 73
habits, and sensibilities, humans grow impassive. Neither active nor passive, impassivity is 
a mode in which the senses are being calibrated to swarming forces and emergent forms. 
It is a magical state that is keyed to happenings and hauntings, to potentialities that 
accompany the reanimated past. It sprouts the tendrils of  intuition. Impassivity could be 
coupled with an openness to being transformed by what is afoot. But it might bleed into 
violence and destruction when humans launch efforts to hold onto their worlds at all costs 
	 Kathleen Stewart, “Pockets,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 9, No. 4 (December 2012), 365. 73
Stewart is ventriloquizing Berlant, who writes of  a “wandering absorptive awareness and 
hypervigilance” that emerges in the enigmatic and captivating intensities of  impasses (Cruel Optimism, 4).
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or when it lapses into helplessness. 
	 I address these political issues in the final chapter. Here, I note that politics amidst 
dark atmospheres might connect impassivity to experiment rather than to judgment. If  an 
impasse is a situation without clear contours and a knowable composition, if  it trades in 
becomings that reconstitute people and worlds, then there is no clear answer about what 
is to be done. People don’t have a handle on impasse, let alone on themselves. Judgment 
carries great risk of  damage to oneself  and others. To move away from judgment, I 
pursue a politics that is more impassive, more experimental. 
	 Experimentation is the form of  politics most appropriate for agency when it 
diffuses throughout dark atmospheres. Whereas agency within political thought is 
typically defined by the will, consciousness, and intentionality, the becomings of  an 
impasse shift the conditions, enactment, and form of  agency. Action is slowed down or 
suspended as sensitivity to the potentialities and blockages is sharpened. Stewart writes 
that emergent situations calibrate agency “to the labors of  sentience and generativity. 
Nothing is simply intended or unintended. There is no pure agency of  marching forward, 
like a zombie going doggedly after what it wants. And people are not couch-potato-
passive either, not even close. They are busy balling up and unraveling states of  attending 
to what might be happening.”  In an impasse, human agency becomes an atmospheric 74
attunement, a presubjective mode of  sensing things, an intuitive grasping about. Politics 
turns this agency experimental. It works its magic on low-level registers before popping up 
in the regime of  consciousness, intentionality, and will, if  at all. It grafts itself  onto flows 
	 Stewart, “Pockets,” 368. Elsewhere, Stewart refracts agency through ordinary affects: “It's lived through 74
a series of  dilemmas: that action is always a reaction; that the potential to act always includes the 
potential to be acted on, or to submit; that the move to gather a self  to act is also a move to lose the self; 
that one choice precludes others; that actions can have unintended and disastrous consequences; and 
that all agency is frustrated and unstable and attracted to the potential in things” (OA, 86).
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and absorbs them into tendencies. Or it vetoes incipient surges before conscious decision-
making can sense their activity.  It proceeds uncertainly, inch-by-inch or in grand lurches. 75
	 The political projects of  Berlant, Stewart, and Deleuze and Guattari all carry an 
experimental ethos. People feel out the intensities of  the moment, intuit happenings 
underway, and let becomings carry them toward something—even if  that something turns 
out to be nothing. More than the others, Deleuze and Guattari elaborate steps in an 
experimental politics: “Lodge yourself  on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it 
offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of  deterritorialization, 
possible lines of  flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try 
out continuums of  intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of  new land at all 
times” (ATP, 161). The strata are sedimentations of  affect, thickenings of  materialities in 
their concreteness and abstraction. They become atmospheric when spilling into lines of  
flight that free their intensities and generate a feel of  something. Impasses are crisscrossed 
with strata and lines of  flight, rife with viscosities and volatilities. No one can know the 
precise combination of  bodies and affects that make up an impasse. 
	 So experiment. Feel about atmospheres. Gauge distributions of  fragility and 
resilience. Intuitively poke about strata to find their ticklish regions and pressure points. 
Maybe a body or norm will bend and buckle. Find a line of  flight unfolding at breakneck 
speed. Try to slow it down. Or let it carry you off. Either way, proceed cautiously: “How 
necessary caution is, the art of  dosages, since overdose is a danger. You don’t do it with a 
sledgehammer, you use a very fine file” (ATP, 160). Not quite the cheerleaders of  chaotic 
rhizomes and frenetic deterritorializations they are often portrayed to be, Deleuze and 
	 Massumi writes that bodily intensities actualize a single course of  action only by nullifying other 75
potential tendencies in the cramped half  second that eludes consciousness (Parables for the Virtual, 28-30).
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Guattari insist that “staying stratified—organized, signified, subjected—is not the worst 
that can happen” (ATP, 161). They warn that one might fail to create circuits of  
intensities or, worse, release large-than-life forces that destroy all in their path, including 
oneself.  Experimental politics draws upon the virtues of  impassivity and intuition: deep 76
sensitivity, sharp attentiveness, and fine adjustment to forces and flows that tug at the 
nerves. 
	 Deleuze and Guattari’s experimental politics is about disorganizing the habituated 
body and hooking it to a plane of  consistency.  In this manner, Deleuze and Guattari 77
posit a situation that is relatively stable. Their experimental politics needs to be adjusted 
since impasse already consists of  a deep connections to intensities that make ordinary life 
more jarring than smooth. Is the careful and meticulous nature of  experimentation so 
appropriate in the face of  an impasse’s haunted moments and fragile times? When would-
be experimenters find it so hard to cobble together the will to pass through a day? Is 
freeing intensities without going too far the only or most desirable aim? What of  sealing 
up those intensities up to preserve a few lifelines? 
	 The dark atmospheres of  impasse make Deleuze and Guattari’s brand of  
experimental politics seem overly cautious. At first blush Deleuze and Guattari seem to 
neglect, for example, the possibilities of  failure. Their project is experimental because it is 
	 “If  you free [the body-without-organs] with too violent an action, if  you blow apart the strata without 76
taking precautions, then instead of  drawing the plane [of  consistency] you will be killed, plunged into a 
black hole, or even dragged toward catastrophe. Staying stratified—organized, signified, subjected—is 
not the worst that can happen; the worst that can happen is if  you throw the strata into demented or 
suicidal collapse, which brings them back down on us heavier than ever” (ATP, 161). Deleuze and 
Guattari write of  Nazi fascism as following a line of  flight that became a suicidal line of  abolition, the 
freeing of  overwhelming intensities that had only “war as its object” (ATP, 229-231).
	 “Dismantling the organism has never meant killing yourself, but rather opening the body to connections 77
that presuppose an entire assemblage, circuits, conjunctions, levels and thresholds, passages and 
distributions of  intensity, and territories and deterritorializations measured with the craft of  a 
surveyor” (ATP, 160)
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conducted without a guarantee of  success, not because it explores the possibilities 
generated in the wake of  failure. They write of  how one can botch the generation of  a 
plateau of  intensities: “Either one fails to produce it, or one produces it more or less, but 
nothing is produced on it, intensities do not pass or are blocked” (ATP, 161). Deleuze and 
Guattari restrict the scope of  failure to the production of  nothing or, at worst, the 
connection of  a circuit of  violent destruction. Their experimental impulse perhaps is too 
careful, too meticulous, in the face of  impasse. They do acknowledge a greater place for 
failure when discussing the plane of  consistency: “It is a question of  elements and 
particles, which do or do not arrive fast enough to effect a passage, a becoming or jump... 
And if  there are in fact jumps, rifts between assemblages, it is not by virtue of  their 
essential irreducibility but rather because there are always elements that do not arrive on 
time, or arrive after everything is over... Even the failures are part of  the plane” (ATP, 255; 
emphasis mine). Atmospheres arise because some intensities show up early or late, 
recalling Choi’s poeticization of  how missed encounters are part of  the charge of  
ordinary life: “I understand the gravity of  a train from the empty space and afterbirth air 
I encounter when I run down to the platform twenty seconds too late. It is the same with 
all thing son such weight—to know them best when you have just missed them.”  The 78
unfinished quality of  ordinary life is full of  potential, as Stewart writes: “The vagueness 
or unfinished quality of  the ordinary is not so much a deficiency as a resource, like a fog 
of  immanent forces still moving even though so much has already happened and there 
seems to be plenty that's set in stone” (OA, 127). 
	 To give greater room to these leftovers, to the ghosts of  ordinary life in impasses, 
 	 Choi, “Notes on the Existence of  Ghosts,” 15.78
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and to fold failure even further into the heart of  experiment, I follow what Jack 
Halberstam calls a “queer art of  failure.” Although Halberstam writes specifically against 
the notion of  success propagated under heteronormative capitalism, the space he gives to 
the possibilities of  failure inspires my reconsideration of  Deleuze and Guattari: “Under 
certain circumstances failing, losing, forgetting, unmaking, undoing, unbecoming, not 
knowing may in fact offer more creative, more cooperative, more surprising ways of  being 
in the world.”  Hitting a block can open all sorts of  sparkling vistas and unplanned paths 79
that may, with some mix of  contingency and cultivation, lead to new solidarities. Deleuze 
and Guattari would agree. But whereas they are more concerned with the careful 
construction of  a plane of  consistency, Halberstam tarries longer with the possibilities of  
“rage, rudeness, anger, spite, impatience, intensity, mania, sincerity, earnestness, 
overinvestment, incivility, brutal honesty, and disappointment.”  I find Halberstam to 80
elaborate a more general art of  failure that adds to an experimental politics the practices 
of  finding possibilities within dark affects. Deleuze and Guattari’s politics is not impassive 
enough. In an impasse, political activity might involve watching and waiting to see how 
failure may be generative (or not) once the dust of  experiments settles. 
	 By giving wider space to failure, one attunes politics to the haunted temporalities 
of  an impasse. As Halberstam writes, “All losers are the heirs of  those who lost before 
them. Failure loves company.”  This point is unelaborated and thus invites reverie. 81
Halberstam gestures toward the generative possibilities of  failure within an accumulative, 
undead history. I refract this point through the haunted temporalities described above and 




the pluripotentialities within impasse. The politics that follows is sharply attuned to 
undead temporalities, to affects aswarm, to becomings underway. To dark atmospheres. 
	 When shaped by dark atmospheres, politics becomes experimental and impassive. 
Its experimentation is sometimes cautious, sometimes careless, sometimes oh so fanciful. 
Its impassive side involves a postponement of  experimental activity to dwell in dark 
atmospheres more—to watch and wait, to let oneself  be led here and there. Deleuze and 
Guattari note that “we can be thrown into a becoming by anything at all, by the most 
unexpected, most insignificant of  things” (ATP, 291). I amplify this sentiment to 
emphasize not only that experiment can proceed only through the help of  other 
intensities, but also that it is started by something other than one’s will or intended 
activity. So although Cvetkovich suggests that impasse is characterized by an inability to 
move forward “due to circumstance” because “the world is not designed to make it 
happen or there has been a failure of  imagination,” I aver that “the world” might initiate 
the process under fortuitous circumstances.  It is full of  ghostly matter that catch us in a 82
rut in some instances, get us flying in others. Impassivity is not simply doing nothing; it 
recasts what and where happenings may occur while affirming the capacity of  diffuse 
materialities to begin a chain reaction toward change—a change in which one may 
participate and inflect to some uncertain degree. 
	 Whatever forms it takes, a crucial part of  a politics in impasses is being electrified 
by the charge of  dark atmospheres: attending to disturbances, listening closely, dwelling in 
the bending of  perception, being haunted, not trying to get back on track to the good life, 
or trying to do much at all, coasting about, flying off  on tangents. These impassivities 
	 Cvetkovich, Depression, 20-1.82
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enrich experimenting, taking risks, and trying things out. Sometimes the riskiest move is to 
remain impassive. Doing so respects the life of  a pause. Undergoes the agonizing 
experience of  resisting calls to recenter oneself  and one’s influence. Admits of  the 
terrifying possibility of  losing one’s anchors. Looks into the heart of  an atmosphere that 





Something sucks the feeling out of  the world. Could be the cold. 
The gray, soggy sky. Hunger. 
As focus deflates and thought slows to a crawl, attention skids a-
cross a million surfaces. Things seem so still. Yet they whisper of  
imprints, connections, departures: an array of  impacts and avoid-
ances laced up by time. 
The faintest brush with someone carries the charge of  centuries. 
Every face is a kaleidoscope, every expression a constellation. A 
simple turn shimmers with possibility. 
A world is the lure of  the seance that is intimacy—at least when a 
life trembles with so much longing but hits dissatisfaction at so 
many turns.
3.     Without End 
Things pile up. Redundancies set in and snowball. The air thickens into stillness and 
stagnancy. Time stretches like taffy. It serves as a blanket that shields against the elements 
of  creativity. It becomes the walls of  a room with a hidden window clamped shut. It is 
both: when comfort is slow suffocation. 
	 This chapter advances a simple argument: that impasse is not a temporary setback 
on the way to the good life. This distinction calls for an elaboration of  the temporality 
that befits impasse and the ethical and political consequences that follow. I pursue these 
endeavors by drawing upon the works of  Immanuel Kant, Alfred North Whitehead, and 
Walt Whitman as they bear on themes of  time and creativity. Here, “creativity” denotes 
those modes of  activity that periodically result in novelty. Creativity entails that one’s 
footing in the world is liable to change; it clears the clutter of  the past and opens windows 
unto fresh futures. I argue that, on account of  creativity, time is not teleological. 
	 In this chapter, Kant exemplifies a model of  temporality that does not have 
impasses because it is teleological. Nonetheless, he might have complicated his account of  
time through his observation of  the self-organizing capacities of  nonhuman organisms. 
While Kant subsumes that creativity to postulate a moral teleology, Whitehead and 
Whitman develop notions of  time with creativity at its heart. For them, creativity entails 
novelty, and novelty, I argue, marks a break from the linear timeline needed to sustain a 
predetermined an image of  the good life. I surmise that there are impasses because there 
is time, and that part of  living in time entails learning how to live creatively in impasses. 
	 Why think about creativity when developing a concept of  impasse? Doesn’t 
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impasse typically mark a block to creativity? Ann Cvetkovich argues that impasses are 
more than blockage; they involve creative activity that reorganizes sensoria and generates 
new collectives. Importantly, she notes that “More space for ‘creativity’ also means a 
higher tolerance for ‘impasse,’ which is sometimes the only route to new thinking and to 
the creation of  stronger, more resilient communities that can do work in the world.”  1
While creativity in Cvetkovich’s account is centered in humans and their activities, this 
chapter develops creativity as an impersonal force. It extends the arguments of  its 
predecessors, which developed the materiality of  impasses through attachments and 
atmospheres. Here, the materiality of  impasse is approached through the creativity that 
emerges across humans and nonhumans. It aligns with speculative theories, such as those 
of  Nietzsche, Bergson, William James, Deleuze, and William Connolly, that hold 
creativity to be a feature of  the cosmos.  2
	 Impasse challenges those theories by exhibiting how novelty may be forestalled 
even when creativity is abundant. In an impasse, there is an abundance of  impacts, 
avoidances, ordinary happenings, fanciful desires, wild thoughts, self-experimentation, 
and vibrant social movements that do not yet amount to a dramatic shift in the reigning 
order of  identities, political economy, social fantasies, or cultural norms. No particular 
line of  flight has yet to pull eddies of  creativity into a moving current. One might say, 
borrowing Whitehead’s language, that an impasse is full of  processes that have yet to 
attain “satisfaction.” In this chapter, I show how impasse reveals that creativity can be 
dislodged from novelty. 
	 Ann Cvetkovich, Depression: A Public Feeling (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 22-3.1
 	 Not all of  these thinkers agree on how creativity is distributed. Bergson, for example, thought that only 2
life expressed creativity and that matter was inert.
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	 Why develop a notion of  time as creative and not merely contingent? There have 
been countless challenges to linear and teleological models of  time. Many scholars, 
inspired by Foucault’s histories of  the present, have unearthed the contingencies by which 
regimes of  truth have sought to erase alternative histories and knowledges. In The 
Intimacies of  Four Continents, for example, Lisa Lowe traces the rise of  Western liberalism 
from the late 18th to early 19th centuries. Reading across archives whose organization 
disentangles the histories of  Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Americas, Lowe finds the 
genealogy of  modern liberalism to be inseparable from settler colonialism, imperial trade, 
racial slavery, and indentured labor. These imbrications reveal that the rise of  liberalism 
involved shifts in economies of  colonialist and imperialist power rather than an 
ascendance of  man into greater freedom. 
	 What makes Lowe’s critique exemplary is that it does more than dispute the 
humanist teleology enforced by liberalism. Lowe gestures toward what she calls a “past 
conditional temporality,” which posits that “it is possible to conceive the past, not as fixed 
or settled, not as inaugurating the temporality into which our present falls, but as a 
configuration of  multiple contingent possibilities, all present, yet none inevitable.”  By 3
recuperating “what could have been,” Lowe accounts for alternatives that have been 
foreclosed by dominant orders but remain available as latent possibilities. Part of  what she 
strives to retrieve are what Lauren Berlant might call “minor intimacies” that were erased 
as the bourgeois home became the paradigm for intimacy under liberalism.  Lowe 4
gestures toward “the intimacies of  captured workers surviving together, the proximity and 
 	 Lisa Lowe, The Intimacies of  Four Continents (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015), 175.3
 	 Lauren Berlant, “Intimacy: A Special Issue,” Critical Inquiry 24, No. 2 (Winter 2998), 281-8.4
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affinity that gives rise to political, sexual, intellectual collaborations, subaltern revolts and 
uprisings.”  To recover these alternative intimacies is to bring deposits of  historical 5
potency to bear on projects of  living otherwise. 
	 I explore this idea in the next chapter but note for now that attention to past 
conditional temporalities allows one to view Lowe as beginning to write what Whitman 
calls a “history of  the future.” In addition to describing a given period as contingent, a 
history of  the future “outline[s] what is yet to be” from those pluripotentialities that buzz 
in the present.  Lowe begins this endeavor but does not develop creativity into a central 6
element of  time. One upshot of  viewing creativity to be a feature of  time is the 
discernment of  how futures are available in the present even if  they are indeterminate. 
Deleuze might call such an incipient future a “dark precursor,” or a force-field that 
gathers a system whose path of  actualization can only be seen after the fact.  7
	 My hope is that an account of  the creativity of  time can highlight the importance 
of  positive efforts to explore alternative futures that are presently blocked. As impasses in 
a United States defined by imbrications between neoliberal capitalism, racism, settler 
colonialism, and heteronormativity begin to intensify, major coordinates of  the good life 
fall under duress despite their continued hold. At the same time, a vibrant array of  
alternative worlds are working their magic even if  they have yet to gain traction. 
Maneuvering an impasse calls for greater sensitivity to those futures. Theory might 
describe what people could do politically to cultivate alternative futures. That those 
 	 Lowe, The Intimacies of  Four Continents, 35.5
	 Walt Whitman, Leaves of  Grass and Other Writings, ed. Michael Moon (New York: WW Norton & 6
Company, 2002), 5. Hereafter cited in text as LG.
	 Gilles Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 7
119.
133
futures are half-formed and cloudy means that such a politics should reserve a special 
place for intuition, speculation, tentativeness, and experimentation. 
	  
Good Times 
The development of  a politics that would loosen the hold of  attachments may take cues 
from Kant’s account of  freedom from inclinations. Kant seeks to develop in man “a 
power, unexpected even by himself, to tear himself  away from all sensible attachment 
insofar as this attachment wants to become dominant.”  He goes too far by locating 8
freedom in a realm entirely removed from sensibility. As the next chapter will elaborate, 
though political action in impasses might involve practices of  detachment, they are not 
based on reason shouting down the senses. 
	 Although Kant typically proceeds as though the influence of  reason as a 
“determining basis of  the will” is self-evident, he frets that it might not be. “It cannot be 
denied,” Kant admits, “that in order to bring either a still unmolded or a brutified mind 
onto the track of  the morally good in the first place, some preparatory guidance is needed to 
entice it with its own advantage or scare it with harm” (CPR 190; emphasis mine). The 
“pure moral motive” takes hold in the heart only after the capacity to judge by moral laws 
has become a well-honed habit (CPR 190). Reason needs quite a bit of  assistance despite 
all of  Kant’s talk of  how “the moral law is given as a fact, as it were, of  pure reason of  
which we are conscious a priori and which is apodeictically certain, even supposing that in 
experience no example could be hunted up where it is complied with exactly” (CPR 66). 
The frailty of  reason in its battle with sensual influences begs, in Kant’s eyes, for 
	 Immanuel Kant, Critique of  Practical Reason, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 8
Company, 2002), 190-1. Hereafter cited in text as CPR.
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pedagogical techniques not unlike the disciplinary forms of  power examined by Foucault. 
Moral cultivation is secured through a “culture of  discipline” that concerns “the 
liberation of  the will from the despotism of  desires.”  Because it is fragile, reason needs 9
the support of  a disciplinary relationship between freedom and morality—a relationship 
that has informed not only self-disciplined acts of  ethical generosity and artistic 
experimentation but also colonialist violences and imperialist expansion, both in Kant’s 
time and in ours.  10
	 Kant draws reason, freedom, and morality into a teleology. The end he sees 
includes governments based on civil constitutions, lasting global peace, and the 
attainment of  moral perfection. Kant calls this teleology “an idea for a universal history 
with a cosmopolitan intent,” which serves to clarify human affairs, to predict political 
changes, and to provide a “comforting view of  the future.”  He sometimes admits that 11
such an idea is unavailable but insists that the pursuit of  moral perfection should continue 
anyway. On other occasions, Kant believes that humans would fall into despair without 
such signs. Only on account of  “hope for better times” have humans gathered the 
courage to improve themselves and each other.  Kant’s idea of  teleology involves the 12
subjective necessity of  moral progress; that is, humans must postulate a teleology as a 
precondition for morality, towards which progress “may well be occasionally interrupted, 
	 Immanuel Kant, Critique of  Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 9
Company, 1987), 319. Hereafter cited in text as CJ.
 	 Regarding more positive forms of  discipline, see “Ethical Energetics” in Jane Bennett’s The Enchantment 10
of  Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press,  2001), 131-58.
	 Immanuel Kant, “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent” in Perpetual Peace and Other 11
Essays, trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), 39.
	 Immanuel Kant, “On the Proverb: That May be True in Theory But Is of  No Practical Use” in Perpetual 12
Peace and Other Essays, 86.
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but it will never be broken off.”  13
	 The teleological image of  time generated by Kant is anthropocentric, though it is 
not one in which the happiness of  humans is secure. “Nature,” Kant asserts, “is very far 
from having adopted [man] as its special darling and benefited him in preference to the 
other animals, but has in fact spared him no more than any other animal from its 
destructive workings: plague, famine, flood, frost, or attacks from other animals large or 
small, and so on” (CJ 318). Kant acknowledges better than other anthropocentrists how 
nature does not guarantee the well-being of  humans. If  there is something like a teleology 
of  the good life in Kant, it is one of  moral purpose. Kant’s teleology holds that the world 
is designed to enable and facilitate the moral perfection of  man. Kant’s anthropocentrism 
lies in grandiose statements like: “Man is indeed the only being on earth that has 
understanding and hence an ability to set himself  purposes of  his own choice, and in this 
respect he holds the title of  lord of  nature” (CJ 318). Not even God can escape 
subordination to Man in Kant’s world. It exists only insofar as Man requires the world to 
have a moral cause (CJ 340); as Deleuze puts it, “finality no longer has a theological 
principle, but rather, theology has a ‘final’ human foundation.”  14
	 For Kant, teleology is a wellspring of  motivation and the justification for austere 
discipline. Kant barricades optimism against a welter of  enemies: internal conflicts due to 
inclinations, pathological influences, and sensual indulgences; external conflicts of  states 
at war; the inability of  even the most righteous people to attain moral perfection within 
their lifetimes; and a world teeming with critters and organisms that threaten a unity of  
	 Ibid.13
	 Gilles Deleuze, Kant's Critical Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: 14
University of  Minnesota Press, 1984), 69.
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purpose that could be put in the service of  human culture. Rather than revising his 
concepts of  the human, freedom, and time in the face of  these disruptive forces, Kant 
postulates a teleological history, the immortality of  the soul, and an omnipotent, 
omniscient God and argues for pedagogical and disciplinary apparatuses that would 
normalize people along a developmental track of  reason. 
	 A teleological notion of  time thus has setbacks but not impasses. Whereas a 
setback has a predetermined, unalterable end, an impasse raises the horror that the loss 
of  an end could really happen. Impasses do not abide by a teleological notion of  time, 
which grounds a trust that progress will be made even if  times are hard. This trust is vital 
to Kant’s teleology. So too are enticement and fright. Despite his objections to the 
influence of  feelings upon moral action, Kant draws feelings into the service of  morality, 
reason, and teleology. He even affords a place to negative affects, so long they facilitate 
social improvement.  15
	 Kant draws together time, morality, and optimism such that threats to prefigured 
ends do not generate impasses. Instead, there are trials and tribulations that focus on 
individuals and their improvement. Humans are free to obey the legislation of  reason and 
to fall in line with a moralized time. In the face of  elaborate disciplinary apparatuses, they 
are hardly free to pursue alternative ends into other times—the times of  impasse in all 
their potential loss and novelty. 
	 Kant observes that man is afflicted with an antisocial side that “constantly threatens to sunder” the 15
society to which man is equally lured. This antisocial tendency toward discord provides a resistance, 
without which “man would live... in perfect concord, contentment, and mutual love, and all talents 
would lie eternally dormant in their seed.” Only on account of  his antisocial tendencies does man 
develop the willpower to overcome laziness and hardship. Those tendencies are, however, “in themselves 
quite unworthy of  being loved” (“Idea for a Universal History,” 32).
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Anomalous Creatures, or Nothing Is More Natural than a Defect 
Although he prizes the freedom of  humans, Kant also esteems the creative capacities of  
nonhuman organisms. While Kant believes that many nonhumans are mere components 
of  a mechanistic nature, some organisms exhibit “natural purposes” through powers of  
self-organization. Trees, for example, propagate their species, secure their own growth, 
and pursue self-preservation. Kant is most impressed with the second and third of  these 
powers. The capacity to grow is a demonstration of  purposiveness: a tree “processes” 
matter outside itself  to generate nutrition, or a “quality peculiar to the species, a quality 
that the natural mechanism outside the plant cannot supply” (CJ, 250). 
	 Kant is even more intrigued by the capacity of  organisms to preserve themselves, 
which he finds to be “among the most marvelous properties of  organized creatures” (CJ 
250). Organisms are internally complex, well-coordinated systems. For Kant, what 
distinguishes a tree from a watch is that the former can adapt creatively when its parts are 
damaged or destroyed. But the organism is not simply preserved as it was. As Kant writes, 
“If  such beings are injured, nature aids itself, and the loss of  a part that was needed to 
sustain adjoining ones is made up by the rest; if  birth defects occur, or deformities come 
about during growth, certain parts, on account of  their deficiencies or impediments, form 
in an entirely new way so as to preserve what is there, and so produce an anomalous 
creature” (CJ 250). 
	 Kant doesn’t pursue this feat of  natural creativity, though others have. Nietzsche, 
for example, describes the will to power as an entity’s capacity for creative alteration when 
it is not absorbed or destroyed by another force. It is in recognition of  the will to power 
that Nietzsche developed a conception of  the world as neither mechanistic nor finalist but 
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creative.  The creativity exhibited in the formation of  anomalous creatures also 16
resembles the powers of  “teleodynamism.” Drawing upon evolutionary biologist Terrence 
Deacon, William Connolly has described teleodynamism as an alternative to mechanism 
and finalism, both of  which strip organisms of  creativity.  Teleodynamism holds that the 17
outcomes of  a process are neither predetermined nor reducible to mere chance. 
Teleodynamic potency is a situated capacity to develop tentative aims on the fly.  
	 This nonhuman creative energy is at odds with Kant’s larger philosophy of  a 
morally ordered world in which natural purposes are designed to support human 
freedom. In what follows, I flip Kant’s prioritization of  human freedom over not-quite-
human creativity. Whereas Kant restricted creativity to organisms that exhibited life, I 
follow the insights of  new materialisms to locate creativity in matter as well. I further 
complicate this minor strain in Kant’s thought by depersonalizing creativity. It is not so 
much that humans and nonhumans are creative but that they participate collectively in a 
creativity that runs through them. Finally, I develop an account of  time with creativity at 
its heart to distinguish between impasse and setback. This account of  time informs a 
politics, as described in the previous chapter and further developed in the next, that would 
cultivate sensitivity to the creative energies sparked in specific collisions and circuits, 
discern a given period’s stumbling blocks, and strive to nudge something new and more 
livable into the world. 
	 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and RJ Hollingdale (New York: Vintage 16
Books, 1968), 549-50. 
	 William E. Connolly, “Freedom, Teleodynamism, Creativity,” Foucault Studies No. 17 (2014), 63-5.17
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Creative Time 
A thing is rocked out of  slumber by a rain of  forces. It is too groggy to process what has 
just happened. The outside world seeps under its skin. It gradually converts what was 
alien into what is familiar, finding itself  transformed in turn. Something begins to pull itself  
together. When the mist dissipates, a new being appears. Its presence cannot be denied. It 
nudges other things; they topple over or push back. Disturbances happen. Just a little at 
first. Then more. They intensify, they gain momentum, they tip something else over. The 
cosmos shimmers as the ribbon of  creativity spirals anew, then and evermore, from the 
brightest star to the tiniest leaf  of  grass. 
	 Whitehead and Whitman bear similar accounts of  creativity: for Whitehead, it is 
the cosmos’s “creative advance into novelty;”  for Whitman, it is the “procreant urge of  18
the world” (LG 26). The creativity of  the cosmos bends time away from predetermined 
ends and toward something new. 
	 Before proceeding, I note that my reading of  Whitman spans numerous poems 
and is selective. Whitman may intend his poems to be read this way: “I seek less to state 
or display any theme or thought, and more to bring you, reader, into the atmosphere of  
the theme or thought—there to pursue your own flight” (LG 480). This “suggestiveness” 
generates moods and prompts to make “his” poems the conjoint effort of  himself  and his 
readers (“you, whoever you are”). It would also be hard to generate an entirely coherent 
account of  Whitman since he is not quite consistent across the many poems in and 
editions of  Leaves of  Grass. As though anticipating accusations of  inconsistency, Whitman 
writes, “Do I contradict myself ? / Very well then I contradict myself, / (I am large, I 
	 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: The Free Press, 1978), 222. Hereafter cited in 18
text as PR.
140
contain multitudes)” (LG 77). 
	 I strive to develop what I admire in Whitman’s writings, which contain much that 
I find reprehensible: Whitman is not at all shy in celebrating American exceptionalism 
and manifest destiny; his descriptions of  the United States as full of  “vast, trackless 
spaces” that are unused for higher purposes reflect the doctrine of  discovery and justify 
colonial settlement (LG 5); his imagery of  Native Americans, Asians, and Africans is 
disparaging, as in his backhanded admiration that locates them behind modernity; and 
even as he professes the equality of  women and men, he reduces a wealth of  genders to 
the manly and the womanly. 
	 When Whitman babbles these offenses, I yearn for the dry, more neutral 
vocabulary of  Whitehead. I do not seek to excuse Whitman but pick up a few currents 
through his poems that, if  developed, might work against his explicit declarations and be 
used by minoritized groups as lifelines in impasses. For example, despite his verbose 
declarations of  the US as “destined for the leading parts” in the dramas of  “History and 
Humanity,” he did not wish for the US to “become a conqueror Nation” (overlooking, of  
course, that conquest is at the heart of  the US) “or to achieve the glory of  mere military, 
or diplomatic, or commercial superiority” (LG 648). He could also see “The perform’d 
America and Europe grow dim, retiring in shadow behind me, / The unperform’d, more 
gigantic than ever, advance, advance upon me” (LG 411). Unlike other American 
exceptionalists, Whitman discerns that the supposed heyday of  the US would be up. He 
foresees that people abandoned to the wings of  time would appear on the world’s stage 
and bend the arc of  its drama away from a predestined end. This nonteleological notion 
of  time emerges, I will argue, from the creativity that Whitman sees exhibited in the 
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equality and powers of  souls. But first, Whitehead. 
	 Whitehead defines the cosmos through process while insisting that there is nothing 
other than actual things. As he puts it, “the ultimate metaphysical truth is atomism” (PR 
35). The problem with which Whitehead deals is: how does a cosmos of  atomic things 
exhibit becoming? How might one account for strange and wonderful flashes of  
creativity? 
	 A view of  the cosmos as static might presume that actual things have an inner 
essence that either remains unchanged or waits to be realized. It also presumes that actual 
things reside in “simple location”—that is, in a single space and time. What if  the “real 
internal constitution” were not essential but emergent? What if  it were composed of  other 
things and other times? If  “actuality is incurably atomic” (PR 61), how might they not 
reside in simple location—or, as Whitman puts it, how am I “not contain’d between my 
hat and boots” (LG 31)? An actual thing would then be, as it is for Whitehead, “an 
incompletion in process of  production” (PR 214-5). 
	 Process involves the mutual constitution of  actual things through feeling. “There is 
nothing in the real world which is merely an inert fact,” Whitehead insists. “Every reality 
is there for feeling: it promotes feeling; and it is felt” (PR 310). Things feel for or 
“prehend” each other, sometimes as negligible and hence irrelevant, sometimes as 
relevant and impactful. Process is a set of  impacts and a series of  adaptations that 
culminate in a formed thing. Process is concretion; it deposits sediments of  a cosmic 
current through the decisive elimination of  indetermination, as in Whitman's belief  that 
in his time “the United States have emerg’d from nebulous vagueness and suspense, to full 
orbic, (though varied) decision” (LG 660). Neither essence nor mere effect, an actual thing 
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is an achievement of  feeling. 
	 Although Whitehead’s cosmos is composed of  actualities, it also has an important 
place for what is not physically present. Part of  process involves what Whitehead calls 
“conceptual” prehension, which is a cloudy feeling for something that is beyond available 
physicalities. Kant’s example of  a tree’s growth nicely illustrates the role of  conceptual 
prehensions. A tree sustains itself  by drawing nutrition from sunlight, water, air, and soil. 
But nutrition is not a given element of  any of  those things; it has to be produced. So while 
a tree’s physical prehensions involve the gathering of  sunlight, water, air, and soil, its 
conceptual prehensions concern the extraction of  nutrition from them. Nutrition is an 
example of  what Whitehead calls an “eternal object.” A vague notion that bears a family 
resemblance to Platonic forms, an eternal object is a pure potentiality “whose conceptual 
recognition does not involve a necessary reference to any definite actual entities of  the 
temporal world” (PR 44). So nutrition is not a thing that can be found in the world; it 
comes into the world only through specific interactions. Eternal objects “ingress” into 
actuality due to conceptual prehensions at an early stage of  process, as when a tree begins 
to draw nutrition from an array of  sources. Without the conceptual prehension of  an 
eternal object, “the grand patterns pervading the environment are passed on with the 
inherited modes of  adjustment.”  Tree, sunlight, air, water, and soil would remain just 19
that. 
	 In other words, it is through conceptual activity that actual entities demonstrate 
powers of  self-organization and that novelty emerges. Creativity for Whitehead is 
nonanthropocentric. The conceptual is not unique to human experience, nor is it defined 
	 Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of  Thought (New York: The Free Press, 1938), 167. Hereafter cited in text 19
as MT.
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through consciousness; it is an element of  all actualities, however inert or lifeless they may 
seem to be. What Kant called the “very great originality” of  anomalous creatures is 
exhibited in Whitehead’s cosmology by all things, human or not, living or not (CJ 250). 
Nor is self-organization peculiar to feats of  survival. An actual thing is self-organized 
insofar as it is not determined by the powers of  any other thing. It is also self-organized 
insofar as that “self ” is what emerges at the end of  a process rather than remaining the 
same throughout. A process does not follow mechanical causality insofar as it is not 
determined by physical causes that are distinct from effects. Moreover, eternal objects play 
a critical role in processes underway even if  they are not actual entities. Mechanism 
would be hard pressed to explain this strange efficacy of  eternal objects and the 
conceptual activities of  actual entities. Finalism is also inappropriate to processes since 
their results are not given in advance. 
	 The creativity demonstrated in self-organizing processes demands a different 
account of  time. Creativity for Whitehead shows that the past, the present, and the future 
are not so clearly demarcated. Process weaves them together: the past consists of  the 
antecedents to which a process must conform; the present is marked by self-organized 
aims that guide a process beyond reproduction of  the past; the future throws out lures of  
potentiality that a process strives to actualize. 
	 “How the past perishes,” Whitehead writes, “is how the future becomes.”  By 20
“perishing,” Whitehead means the manner in which an actual entity attains “objective 
immortality,” or a status that denotes the capacity to influence future processes. 
Whitehead conceives of  the past as both subject and object of  a process. It is a subject 
	 Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of  Ideas (New York: The Free Press, 1967), 238. Hereafter cited in 20
text as AI.
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insofar as it affects what could happen. It is an object when it has been adjusted to the 
aims of  a process. The past finds new life as it is carried through a self-organizing process 
to an indeterminate future.  
	 The future, in turn, is immanent to the present. Whitehead writes that “The 
future is merely real, without being actual” (PR 214). The future is not actual because it 
has yet to arrive. It is real, however, because the force of  the past and the aims of  the 
present lend some shape to what the future could be. The future is not predetermined, 
however, because “time is cumulative as well as reproductive” (PR 238). Multiple futures 
murmur within the present. 
	 It is on account of  creativity that, for Whitehead, “the temporal world is an 
essential incompleteness.”  Whitehead describes creativity as the process by which “the 21
many become one, and are increased by one” (PR 21). The increase by one, in turn, alters 
the many. The feedback loops between the many and the one spiral onward. The 
temporality of  creativity is not finalist because process is without end; it does not have an 
implicit aim to one final result. It is not mechanistic either because the outcomes of  a 
process cannot be known in advance, not only due to the shortcomings of  human 
foresight but also because novelty is a real feature of  the cosmos. In short, creativity 
entails that time swerves away from predetermined ends. 
	 I follow this theme in Whitman by elaborating that strange, magnetic force that he 
most often designates “soul” and sometimes “spirit.” My reading finds Whitman’s 
understanding of  temporality to arise from his articulations of  the soul. On rare 
occasions, time in Whitman follows a strong teleology that echoes Kant’s, as in his late 
	 Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the Making (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1926), 90. Hereafter cited in 21
text as RM.
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poem “Roaming in Thought (After Reading Hegel)”: “Roaming in thought over the 
Universe, I saw the little that is Good steadily hastening towards immortality, / And the 
vast all that is call’d Evil I saw hastening to merge itself  and become lost and dead” (LG 
230). More common is a view of  time as creative and nonlinear that emerges from 
Whitman's notions of  the soul, poetics, and America. 
	 I mentioned earlier that Kant postulates a soul to preserve his account of  moral 
reason. Because moral perfection cannot be attained in a human’s life span, and because 
perfection must be inherent to the notion of  morality, humans must assume that they have 
a soul that is immortal (CPR 155-7). The Kantian soul is immutable, autonomous from all 
sensual influences, and the source of  a teleology of  moral development. In short, it is 
immaterial, essential, anthropocentric, and moral. It never faces impasses because it can 
never be transformed, only improved. 
	 Whitman’s notion of  the soul is quite different, although he too cannot prove its 
existence. Whitman shares with Whitehead the belief  that there is no “getting behind” 
actual entities to a more fundamental reality: “I accept Reality and dare not question it, / 
Materialism first and last imbuing” (LG 45). So why might Whitman be drawn to the 
soul? “The soul is also real, it too is positive and direct, / No reasoning, no proof  has 
establish’d it, / Undeniable growth has establish’d it” (LG 188). Growth, transition, event, 
becoming, process cannot be reduced to matter because they are what happen to formed 
matter; they indicate matter in a phase other than full-blown actuality, what Foucault calls 
an “incorporeal materialism.” Whitman seems to postulate the soul as Kant did, but 
whereas Kant derives the soul from a supersensible realm of  moral reason, Whitman 
draws the soul from sense experience. And while Kant and Whitman postulate the soul in 
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relation to growth, the former does so within the confines of  a teleology of  moral 
perfection whereas the latter, as we shall see, does so within a time that is defined by 
creativity that exceeds Kant’s coordinates of  good and evil. 
	 Furthermore, though Kant reserves the soul for humans, in Whitman’s account, 
the soul does not belong to humans alone. Every entity, according to Whitman, has a soul: 
“I swear I think now that every thing without exception has an eternal soul! / The trees 
have, rooted in the ground! The weeds of  the sea have! The animals!” (LG 369). 
Whitman’s nonanthropocentric version of  the soul extends creativity beyond the human. 
	 For Whitman, soul expresses how matter is not brute, inert, or confined to 
mechanical laws. In his poems, materialism and spiritualism are indissociable, as exhibited 
in a meditation on time called “With Antecedents”: “As for me, (torn, stormy, amid these 
vehement days,) / I have the idea of  all, and am all and believe in all, / I believe 
materialism is true and spiritualism is true, I reject no part” (LG 202). Why is it in the 
middle of  a poem on time that Whitman professes to hold materialism and spiritualism 
equally true? Perhaps it is because in turbulent times, when one is unsettled, the concepts 
of  matter and soul become most indistinguishable; materiality is in a phase shift. Impasse 
may be one such type of  times, as its atmosphere is an incorporeal materiality. 
	 Whitman frequently sings of  the soul’s individuality. He does not mean an 
atomistic notion of  the individual; he insists that “I” is constituted with “you”: “I 
celebrate myself, and sing myself, / And what I assume you shall assume, / For every 
atom belonging to me as good belongs to you” (LG 26). I read the individuality of  the 
Whitmanian soul in two ways. First, it invokes a distinctiveness that is relative but real. 
Echoing Whitehead’s understanding of  actual entities as composed of  prehensions, 
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Whitman writes, “I find I incorporate gneiss, coal, long-threaded moss, fruits, grains, 
esculent roots, / and am stucco’d with quadrupeds and birds all over” (LG 52). But I am 
not reducible to these things, nor to you. Whitman, on my reading, does not develop a 
robust way to delineate between individualities as do other theorists, such as Deleuze and 
Guattari.  He instead discerns individuality as a somewhat distinct character, 22
momentum, or force that cannot be subsumed to laws, norms, or the will of  another: 
“The soul has that measureless pride which revolts from every lesson but its own” (LG 
316). 
	 And this pride evokes a second meaning of  individuality: undefeatability. The soul 
may be unable to attain its ends at a given moment but nonetheless exhibits an admirable 
stubbornness: 
What do you think is the grandeur of  storms and dismemberments and 
the deadliest battles and wrecks and the wildest fury of  the elements and 
the power of  the sea and the motion of  nature and of  the throes of  
human desires and dignity and hate and love? It is that something in the 
soul which says, Rage on, Whirl on, I tread master here and everywhere, 
Master of  the spasms of  the sky and of  the shatter of  the sea, Master of  
nature and passion and death, And of  all terror and all pain. (LG 625)  23
The soul endures adversity to carve its own path in the world: “All parts way for the 
	 Deleuze and Guattari shift away from “individuality” in their employment of  terms like “individuation” 22
and “haecceity,” which may be distinguished not by their properties but by their relative speeds and 
slownesses of  becoming and their situated capacities to affect and to be affected (A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi [Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota Press, 1987], 
253-65).
	 Whitman's notion of  the prideful soul that is shared by humans and nature recalls Nietzsche's notion of  23
the will. See Friedrich Nietzsche, “Will and Wave” in The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1974), 247-8.
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progress of  souls, / All religion, all solid things, arts, governments” (LG 133). Whitman’s 
notion of  pride is not unqualified mastery, however; it is “not inconsistent with obedience, 
humility, deference, and self-questioning” (LG 481). The soul wavers between pride and 
patience: it strives for its ends, which are not inflexible, while admitting that the 
circumstances have to be just right for any success to be had.  24
	 In short, the soul, as it emerges through time, exhibits powers of  self-organization. 
Whitehead shares this understanding when he writes that “The soul is nothing else than 
the succession of  my occasions of  experience, extending from birth to the present 
moment” (MT 163). For Whitman, though, the soul precedes one’s birth. It is the product 
of  many long histories: of  laws, societies, religions, arts, critters, blades of  grass, stardust. 
That product remains unfinished as it strives to connect with other things. It is 
“ceaselessly musing, venturing, throwing, seeking the spheres to connect them, / Till the 
bridge you will need be form’d, till the ductile anchor hold, / Till the gossamer thread 
you fling catch somewhere, O my soul” (LG 377). Here, the soul is not laid-back passive. 
Nor is it active in the sense of  requiring the will of  a conscious, centered “I.” The soul is 
impassive, tossing out lines that might pull new worlds into being or a web of  things that 
occasionally amounts to an impasse. Whatever it connects to, the soul is “Ever the dim 
beginning, / Ever the growth, the rounding of  the circle, / Ever the summit and the 
merge at last, (to surely start again)” (LG 7). Transformations of  the soul echo the spirals 
of  process described by Whitehead. 
	 Whitman’s writings on time facilitate a better understanding of  the relationship 
between the soul, creativity, and temporality. The past is not over and done with: 
	 Whitman's poem “To a Foil'd European Revolutionaire” describes the unquenchable thirst for liberty 24
and the patient anticipation of  revolters.
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The past—the infinite greatness of  the past! 
For what is the present after all but a growth out of  the past? 
(As a projectile form’d, impell’d, passing a certain line, still keeps on, 
So the present, utterly form’d, impell’d by the past.)” (LG 346) 
Marking a temporality that is neither entirely continuous nor discontinuous, the present is 
an outgrowth of  what preceded it. The “greatness” of  the past is “infinite” because it 
continues to play an influential role in processes to come: “This year! Sending itself  ahead 
countless years to come” (LG 202). 
	 Although the past, for Whitman, can exercise a strong, stifling hold on the present, 
it also makes new futures possible. “The past is the push of  you, me, all, precisely the 
same,” Whitman suggests, “And what is yet untried and afterward is for you, me, all, 
precisely the same” (LG 69). Although one could read Whitman as suggesting wrongly 
that the past affects everyone in the same manner, I think his point is that no one can 
avoid being pushed by the past. And though one might read him as saying that the future 
is the same for all, his point might be that no one is ever so complete such that there is no 
“yet untried and afterward”—that is, no future. Perhaps Whitehead formulated such a 
notion more explicitly than Whitman: “The creativity of  the world,” Whitehead writes, 
“is the throbbing emotion of  the past hurling itself  into a new transcendent fact” (AI 177). 
Whitehead echoes Whitman’s image of  the past as a projectile that cannot be contained 
by rigid separations between the past, present, and future. The past launches itself  
forward creatively. 
	 This ongoingness draws Whitman and Whitehead into an affinity with the notion 
of  immortality. Both discern a strange vitality or vibrancy that is not exhausted by the 
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transpiration of  a happening or by the event of  death. What Whitehead calls the 
“objective immortality” of  the past consists of  those sediments of  processes that may 
impact other processes in the future. For Whitman as well, the past is immortal in its 
capacity to affect and shape what succeeds it in novel ways: “Ages and ages returning at 
intervals, / Undestroy’d, wandering immortal” (LG 92). Death is not an end, nor is it a 
departure for an otherworldly life. It is a transition to another form in this world (LG 653). 
Death marks an ongoing, mutating efficacy that is neither predictable nor determined in 
advance. According to Whitman, the body “will elude the hands of  the corpse-cleaners 
and pass to fitting spheres, / Carrying what has accrued to it from the moment of  birth to 
the moment of  death” (LG 22). Those “fitting spheres” might be construed as futures in 
which the efficacy of  a thing will matter differently from the previous segments of  its 
lifetime: “O I see now that life cannot exhibit all to me, as the day cannot, / I see that I 
am to wait for what will be exhibited by death” (LG 379). 
	 The soul is immortal. Whitman imbricates soul and time when he writes: 
The soul is of  itself, 
All verges to it, all has reference to what ensues, 
All that a person does, says, thinks, is of  consequence, 
Not a move can a man or woman make, that affects him or her in a day, 
month, or any part of  the direct lifetime, or the hour of  death 
But the same affects him or her onward afterward through the indirect 
lifetime. (LG 314) 
The soul is not bound to the biological timeline of  a human. Its immortality follows a 
temporality of  the indirect, which is “always as great and real as the direct” (LG 314). 
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	 What can be said about a temporality that is real and even great but not direct? 
The indirect lifetime of  the soul does not abide by divisions between life and death, soul 
and matter, human and nonhuman. It recalls Bergson’s notion of  duration in that it 
cannot be parsed into discrete units and arranged in linear fashion. It points to past 
conditional temporalities, to lively traces of  pasts within the present. 
	 The indirect lifetime also involves futures that are folded into the present. Like 
Whitehead, Whitman understands that what may come to be exerts a palpable force in 
the present even if  it has yet to fully gather itself. Those futures are in some strange way 
here and now though they have yet to arrive. They may be felt not as actual things but as 
hazy atmospheres of  what could be. “The space ahead as I walk, as I vainly try to pierce 
it, is full of  phantoms, / Unborn deeds, things soon to be, project their shapes around 
me” (LG 411). One cannot discern the future to be, not only due to the limits of  one’s 
foresight but also because that future has yet to gather itself. Those bits of  futurity in the 
present that Whitman calls “unseen buds” exhibit both, as Karen Barad might put it, 
epistemological uncertainty and objective indeterminacy;  futures are “germinal, 25
exquisite, in delicate lace, microscopic, unborn,... / Urging slowly, surely forward, 
forming endless, / And waiting ever more, forever more behind” (LG 468). 
	 For Whitman, the undetermined nature of  the future reflects a relationship 
between creativity and time that defies a teleology of  finalism. Unlike Kant’s vision of  
perpetual peace, Whitman sees the many nations proceeding “toward some long-
prepared, most tremendous denouement. Not to conclude the infinite scenas of  the race’s 
life and toil and happiness and sorrow, but haply that the boards be cleared from oldest, 
	 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of  Matter and Meaning 25
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 115-8.
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worst incumbrances, accumulations, and Man resume the eternal play anew, and under 
happier, freer auspices” (LG 648). Perhaps Whitman exaggerates the world’s movement to 
“happier” and “freer” conditions in which creativity could express itself. Nonetheless, the 
important point is that time does not reach an end state. There is no end of  history 
because there is creativity. The soul defies finalist teleologies as it stretches across multiple 
lifetimes of  the direct and of  the indirect. Each moment of  the soul is overfull with time, 
of  ages past and ages to come: “On every step bunches of  ages, and larger bunches 
between the steps” (LG 70). Whitman discerns in the passage to a future “A world primal 
again, vistas of  glory incessant and branching” (LG 24). 
God or Poet? Divine Beauties, Poetic Powers 
In order to support his moral design of  the world, Kant must and does postulate an 
omniscient, omnipotent God. Whitehead and Whitman supply very different notions of  
God that are incompatible with a teleology of  moral perfection. They invoke divinity in 
their conceptions of  creativity and time, which I now explore. 
	 God is of  chief  importance to Whitehead’s theory of  creativity. “Apart from the 
intervention of  God,” Whitehead avers, “there could be nothing new in the world and no 
order in the world. The course of  creation would be a dead level of  ineffectiveness, with 
all balance and intensity progressively excluded by the cross currents of  
incompatibility” (PR 247). Whitehead presumes the world to be incapable of  gathering, 
on its own, its diversity into something new. 
	 It might seem that Whitehead’s God works its powers from a precipice above the 
messiness of  the world. But his God is strange. Unlike Kant’s God, it does not inhabit a 
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supersensible realm because the world affects it as much as it affects the world; “By feeling 
and so being felt,” Catherine Keller observes, “the divine invites the becoming of  the 
other; by feeling the becoming of  the other, the divine itself  becomes.”  In this regard, 26
God is not so different from other things: “God is an actual entity,” Whitehead writes, 
“and so is the most trivial puff  of  existence in far-off  empty space” (PR 18). The mutual, 
ongoing infusion of  God and world means that God, like other actual entities, is not static 
or eternal. Finally, Whitehead’s God does not enjoy special value over other beings. As 
Whitehead writes, “we find ourselves in a buzzing world, amid a democracy of  fellow 
creatures” (PR 50). 
	 Yet, Whitehead distinguishes God from other actual entities along two lines. First, 
God in its “primordial nature” is “the principle of  concretion; namely, he is that actual 
entity from which each temporal concrescence receives that initial aim from which its self-
causation starts” (PR 244). It is God who determines which eternal objects will ingress 
into actuality and spur the beginnings of  process. A little nudge called “God” supplies “an 
urge towards the future based on an appetite in the present” that leads actual entities to 
hunger for something more (PR 32). Process begins because God invokes a “principle of  
unrest, involving realization of  what is not and may be” (PR 32). In other words, God is 
that dissatisfaction with the present state of  things and supplies a propensity, if  not a 
desire, for an alternative future; it is the “eternal urge of  desire” (PR 344). Without God, 
there would be no aim, no self-organization, no continuation of  process.  27
	 Second, God in its “consequent nature” gathers together the results of  various 
 	 Catherine Keller, Face of  the Deep: A Theology of  Becoming (London: Routledge, 2003), 198.26
 	 This notion is contested by other theorists of  creativity, including Nietzsche and Deleuze.27
154
processes into harmony. This aspect of  God accounts for the “realization of  the actual 
world in the unity of  his nature” (PR 345). Whitehead supplies two images to capture this 
dimension. First, it is a “tender care that nothing be lost” (PR 346). Although a process 
perishes, its outcomes are immortal. The consequent nature of  God denotes the 
preservation of  the remains of  the creative advance. The second image is of  an “infinite 
patience” for the “ultimate unity of  the multiplicity of  actual fact with the primordial 
conceptual fact” (PR 346). It is God who draws the diverse outcomes of  multiple creative 
processes into a consistency. Patience accounts for a lag of  novelty behind creativity, with 
God closing the gap between the two. 
	 In short, God’s two functions—of  concrescence and preservation—form the 
bookends of  processes; in Catherine Keller’s words, “As the consequent nature enfolds all 
the becomes as its own becoming, so the primordial nature unfolds its possibilities in and 
as the multiple actualizations of  the world.”  Between God’s functions, entities do their 28
self-organizing work. Having “derive[d] from God its basic conceptual aim,” an actual 
entity proceeds to sift through “indeterminations awaiting its own decisions” (PR 225). 
God ensures that a process will reach a “satisfaction” that is carried back into the world to 
accord well with others. The world self-organizes; God harmonizes it. 
	 Importantly, Whitehead’s God is not in the service of  morality, as is Kant’s God. 
Curiously, Whitehead’s and Kant’s Gods are similar in that they are the agents 
responsible for setting and realizing purposes in the world. For Kant, God is the “moral 
cause of  the world” that allows us to “set ourselves a final purpose in conformity with the 
moral law” (CJ 240); for Whitehead, the consequent nature of  God “is the weaving of  
 	 Catherine Keller, Cloud of  the Impossible: Negative Theology and Planetary Entanglement (New York: Columbia 28
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God’s physical feelings upon his primordial concepts” (PR 345). But while the originary 
cause of  Kant’s God is morality, creativity is that of  Whitehead’s. The God of  Whitehead 
lends an initial aim to actual entities but ultimately accepts their self-organization into 
patterns of  contrasts. 
	 According to Whitehead, God is “the poet of  the world” (PR 346). What 
Whitehead means is not fully clear, though he suggests that God does not create the world 
but “saves” it with the care and patience described above. Whitehead does not, however, 
evoke a teleology in which time culminates in the grace and triumph of  God. Rather, 
God saves the world by supplying truth, beauty, and goodness. Whitehead invokes these 
tropes to resist mechanistic images of  the world that strip value and vibrancy from nature. 
Following the romantic poets, Whitehead suggests that “aesthetic attainment is 
interwoven in the texture of  realization” because all actual entities gather themselves into 
a consistency that is not predetermined, the result of  mere chance, or issued from on 
high.  29
	 If  the aesthetic is not a special realm of  (human) experience it is unclear why 
Whitehead’s God must have any privilege with regard to beauty, harmony, and goodness: 
why must poetic powers be consolidated into one actual entity even as that entity infuses 
and is infused by all other entities? That is, why have God at all? The answer, it seems, is 
that a cosmos teeming with discordant actual entities must periodically snap back into a 
harmonious state. “The universe exhibits a creativity with infinite freedom, and a realm 
of  forms with infinite possibilities,” Whitehead writes. But without God, “this creativity 
and these forms are together impotent to achieve actuality” (RM 115). Whitehead’s God 
	 Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: The Free Press, 1925), 94.29
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secures a relatively benign view of  process by which beauty is ultimately secured. 
Although Whitehead may not supply a teleology of  morality, he does supply one of  
beauty: “The teleology of  the Universe is directed toward the production of  Beauty” (AI 
265). It is important to note that this teleology is not a finalist one, as the beauty of  the 
cosmos could never be complete; the harmonies that arise “are various, and not of  
necessity compatible” (AI 266). In other words, an element of  discord is ever-present in a 
cosmos with a limited telos. 
	 Yet, perhaps Whitehead’s imagination of  time as aimed toward beauty isn’t 
entirely appropriate for impasses as it underplays other propensities of  creativity, such as 
those described in the next chapter as “negativity.” What if  beauty did not belong only to 
God? What if  discord were not the effect of  beauty but the result of  a propensity of  its 
own? What if, along with the democraticization of  creatures, there were a 
democraticization of  the poetic? 
	 “I hear and behold God in every object,” Whitman sings, “yet understand God 
not in the least” (LG 75). It is unclear whether Whitman means that everything bears a 
divine feel or is veering close to Whitehead’s immanent God. Whitman proffers a sense 
rather than a concept of  God. He thus diverges from Kant’s postulation of  a concept of  
God and Whitehead’s elaboration of  God as an actual entity. In Whitman’s world, God is 
an aura; it is at once intimate and abstract, a bit like the soul. Everything exudes a trace 
of  God, but God is still elusive. Rather than talking about God, he talks about divinity 
through the poetic; the poet is the “true son of  God” (LG 349). 
	 What are some aspects of  this poetic quality? First, it is a power of  foresight that is 
intuitive but not prophetic. The poet “Sees the solid and beautiful forms of  the future 
157
where there are now no solid forms” (LG 619). This poetic capacity is sensitive to unseen 
buds and discerns what is not but could be. The aura of  potential futures is sensed by the 
poet in “real objects today, symptoms of  the past and future” (LG 634-5). Through an 
exquisite attunement to matter—perhaps to the soul of  matter—poets grasp the limits of  
the present and vague possibilities for the future. In short, the poetic power of  foresight 
draws a line through matter, affect, and time in the direction of  creativity. 
	 Second, the poetic quality instigates a process of  striving for another future. “A 
great poem is no finish to a man or woman,” writes Whitman, “but rather a 
beginning” (LG 634). This poetic capacity disturbs, unsettles, sparks desire. The poetic 
qualities of  foresight and instigation accord with the primordial nature of  Whitehead’s 
God, which generates an appetite that cannot be satisfied within the present and supplies 
the initial aim of  a process of  becoming. 
	 Third, the poetic quality shapes a passage into a future from a reanimated past. 
This poetic quality is a power of  self-organization that translates the “objective 
immortality,” or ongoing efficacy, of  an actual thing into a component of  a process 
underway. According to Whitman, “the greatest poet forms the consistence of  what is to 
be from what has been and is. He drags the dead out of  their coffins and stands them 
again on their feet... He says to the past, Rise and walk before me that I may realize 
you” (LG 623). A passage beyond the present does not happen through the past as it was. 
Neither the life that had been, nor the dead that is, the past is undead, brought by the 
poet into a new phase of  immortality. As noted earlier, Whitman views the past as both 
constraint and possibility; what matters is not overcoming the past but turning it to a 
different use, as in Whitman’s exaggerated faith that America “initiates the true use of  
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precedents” (LG 288). 
	 Another aspect of  that power is a resuscitation of  the past that was not. This is 
different from the “what has been” of  the past; it denotes a past conditional temporality 
that is composed of  longings, propensities, and impacts that could not, at a particular 
time, be consolidated into an event, a thing, a self, a collective, a world. Whitman’s 
attention to the past that was not pales in comparison to thinkers like William Connolly in 
his discussion of  the tragic and the “powers of  the false,” which I explore in the next 
chapter. Whitehead too was more attentive when he writes that “A feeling bears on itself  
the scars of  its birth; it recollects as a subjective emotion its struggle for existence; it 
retains the impress of  what it might have been but is not” (PR 226-7). The past that 
happened retains the marks of  contingencies that may find new life within an incipient 
future. Whitehead has a tragic sensibility: “Each tragedy is the disclosure of  an ideal:—
What might have been, and was not: What can be. The tragedy was not in vain” (AI 286). 
Nonetheless, Whitman is attentive to this aspect of  the past even as he bracketed it: 
“(Have I forgotten any part? Any thing in the past? / Come to me whoever and whatever, 
till I give you recognition)” (LG 202). This statement might be emblematic of  the promises 
of  inclusion by liberalist orders that herald a teleology of  democraticization but ultimately 
safeguard majoritarian power. However, this poetic power, as I soon elaborate, is one of  
responsiveness rather than recognition; through it, the poet may be changed. And it might 
be through this poetic power that what was “forgotten” may be revivified: “If  [the 
greatest poet] breathes into any thing that was before thought small it dilates with the 
grandeur and life of  the universe” (LG 621). What had once been small and negligible in 
the past (perhaps due to “negative prehensions" that could exclude but not eliminate) is 
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summoned with a new force through the poetic power; it may, in the future, attain some 
solidity. 
	 This poetic power bears a resemblance to the consequent nature of  Whitehead’s 
God: the care that nothing be lost. Whitman believes that things do not fall out of  time 
(perhaps on account of  the soul’s undefeatability). “Nothing is ever really lost, or can be 
lost, / No birth, identity, form—no object of  the world. / Nor life, nor force, nor any 
visible thing” (LG 440). He does not invoke God, however; the past seems to preserve 
itself, and the poet taps into it as a resource. 
	 Fourth, the poetic is a power of  gathering a consistency. The poet is “the arbiter 
of  the diverse,” “the equalizer of  his age and land,” the one who “supplies what wants 
supplying and checks what wants checking” (LG 620). This power is akin to Whitehead’s 
description of  the consequent nature of  God as the power of  beauty. Although it might 
seem like this power is exercised from on high, Whitman’s poet, like Whitehead’s God, 
enters into that consistency as one element amongst others. Whitman emphasizes that the 
poet must have an exquisite responsiveness to things: “If  the Atlantic coast stretch or the 
Pacific coast stretch, he stretch[es] with them North or South, / … He liken[s] sides and 
peaks of  mountains, forests coated with northern transparent ice” (LG 289). In this way, 
poets are affected by that to which they would lend consistency. In order to form a 
consistence of  past and future, the poet must become sensitive to the potencies and 
intransigences of  things—not only as they exist in the present moment, but as they might 
open or close into the future, a future that is not ultimately determined by the poet: 
“Thou wonder world yet undefined, unform’d, neither do I define thee, / How can I 
pierce the impenetrable blank of  the future?” (LG 384). Poets enter into processes as 
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magnets and catalysts rather than as determining agents. 
	 It is through these powers that the poet can develop a different relationship to the 
strictures of  the present. Rather than beholden to attachments, the poet “shall master all 
attachment” (LG 622). The poet’s relationship with attachment differs from that of  the 
Kantian moralist, who strives to beat down sensual influences through the force of  
reason. As Whitman writes, “the greatest poet does not moralize or make application of  
morals... he knows the soul” (LG 623). While the moralist views the soul as static and in 
need of  moral cultivation, the poet views the soul as self-organizing and in need of  
breathing room to work its transformative magic. Perhaps the poet “masters” attachment 
by not being a master over the soul and by cultivating a keener sensitivity to the powers 
and propensities of  things; as I have argued, anthropocentric notions of  a strong, 
centralized agency are part of  what keeps humans under the sway of  cruel optimism. The 
poet facilitates the soul’s growth by gaining the “trust of  everything he touches” (LG 622). 
Because it does not follow a teleology, the soul is enriched by the touch of  other things. 
This intimate, affective relationship with a broad array of  things sparks a powerful, 
unshakable urge for other worlds: “Whom [the greatest poet] takes he takes with firm sure 
grasp into live regions previously unattained” (LG 634). 
	 Notably, the poet does not determine the shape of  those regions; the poet “leaves 
room ahead of  himself,” as though inciting a process while refraining from 
determinations of  its outcome (LG 622). The poet remains “indifferent to which chance 
happens and which possible contingency of  fortune or misfortune” (LG 622). One might 
read this statement as apolitical and too forgiving of  what happens, especially when 
coupled with Whitman’s insistence elsewhere “that all past days were what they must have 
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been, / And that they could no-how have been better than they were” (LG 202). This 
reading of  Whitman is supported by, for example, his mere lamentation of  the conquests 
that enabled the formation of  his America. But Whitman elsewhere decries an 
inattentiveness to the costs of  a future that is made present. While celebrating efforts to 
actualize a future, he also writes “damn that which spends itself  with no thought of  the 
stain, pains, dismay, feebleness, it is bequeathing” (LG 291). 
	 Poetic indifference might be elucidated through Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, who 
worries about the inflammation of  ressentiment in the face of  time. For Zarathustra, we 
are thrown into a world that is shaped by pasts over which we have no control. We have to 
live with the scars of  time. “This is what is terrible for my eyes,” Zarathustra divulges, 
“that I find man in ruins and scattered as over a battlefield or a butcher-field. And when 
my eyes flee from the now to the past, they always find the same: fragments and limbs and 
dreadful accidents—but no human beings.”  The will, so powerful in its strivings, is 30
utterly helpless before this past; it cannot overcome time. “Powerless against what has 
been done,” Zarathustra laments, “[the will] is an angry spectator of  all that is past. The 
will cannot will backwards, and that he cannot break time and time’s covetousness, that is 
the will’s loneliest melancholy” (139). In the face of  time, people fall into despair as the 
will is felt to be a cruel burden. They try to get rid of  the will while searching for agents to 
blame for their suffering. “This, indeed this alone, is what revenge is: the will’s ill will 
against time and its ‘it was.’ (140).” The corrective, for Zarathustra, is an affirmation of  
time, an earthy redemption that turns all “it was” into “thus I willed it.” Within 
redemption lies a bit of  poetic indifference that mitigates resentment against time, which 
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is irreversible, outside anyone’s control, and impartial to anyone’s flourishing. 
	 Read in this vein, Whitman’s poetic indifference is not apathy but an affirmation 
of  time and flexibility in the face of  futures that do not lead to the good life. Whitman’s 
poet doesn’t lay claim to the vicissitudes of  time but develops confidence in the face of  
whatever happens—perhaps because it knows that the powers of  the soul are 
undefeatable and can turn the past to its advantage. Writing of  his “old delicious 
burdens,” Whitman recalls Zarathustra’s brand of  redemption: “I swear it is impossible 
for me to get rid of  them, / I am fill’d with them, and I will fill them in turn” (LG 127). So 
“Let your soul stand cool and composed before a million universes,” Whitman advises (LG 
75); perhaps a little bit of  poetic indifference is needed to resist a finalist teleology, image 
of  sovereign agency, and anthropocentrism, as well as to acknowledge the creativity of  the 
cosmos into which people can tap to potentially endure hard times and to generate other 
worlds. This nonchalance is, of  course, insufficient to politics but it is vital to the 
dampening of  existential resentment that, as the next chapter argues, becomes a source 
of  violent responses to impasses. 
	 This openness to the future may also be evident in the fact that Whitman seemed 
to have doubted that anyone could fully exhibit the poetic powers. Writing of  the 
relationship between America and its greatest poet, Whitman maintains that “The proof  
of  a poet shall be sternly deferr’d till his country absorbs him as affectionately as he has 
absorb’d it” (LG 295). This process of  mutual absorption might recall Whitehead’s 
description of  God and the world as entering into each other’s constitution (PR 348). For 
Whitehead, creativity is inexhaustible because God and the world remain slightly ajar, 
their harmonies never entirely smooth or final. Is the process of  mutual absorption 
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between the Poet and America similar for Whitman? 
	 Whitman elaborates a rather lengthy list of  requirements for the poet, of  which 
the following is but a snippet: 
Who would be a poet? 
Have you studied out the land, its idioms and men? 
Have you learn’d the physiology, phrenology, politics, geography, pride, 
freedom, friendship of  the land? Its substratums and objects? 
… 
Are you faithful to things? Do you teach what the land and sea, the 
bodies of  men, womanhood, amativeness, heroic angers, teach? 
Have you sped through fleeting customs, popularities 
… 
Can you hold your hand against all seductions, follies, whirls, fierce 
contentions? Are you very strong? Are you really of  the whole People? 
… 
Are you done with reviews and criticisms of  life? animating now to life 
itself ? (LG 293-4; emphasis mine) 
Just who does Whitman think could do all this? This question might not be puzzling for those 
who, like Kant, could imagine a universal subject grounded in common sense, in which 
case the poet would be the “I” of  reason. It also would not be confusing for those who 
ascribe to America a root of  national identity, like those who hold the will of  the 
“Founding Fathers” to be originary and sacrosanct. 
	 The America inhabited by Whitman is far more complex. “Here is not merely a 
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nation,” Whitman insists, “but a teeming Nation of  nations” (LG 288). The grand, 
sweeping lists of  Leaves of  Grass register America as an abundance of  personae, postures, 
moods, gestures, actions, vegetation, nonhuman animals, landscapes. America “moves in 
magnificent masses careless of  particulars”—not because it has a universal character that 
makes particulars inconsequential but because no one particular has a strong enough pull 
to determine on its own the course of  the nation (LG 289). One might recall Foucault’s 
famous insistence that there is always resistance where there is power no matter how 
formidable the latter may be. So too with America: majoritarian groups, while powerful, 
do not ultimately determine what America is. America is an emergent average that “is 
ever constructive and ever keeps vista,” a consistency that is provisional and partly open 
(LG 291). Given that America is richly diverse and unfinished in time, it is hard to imagine 
any single poet being fully absorbed by the “whole People.” 
	 Although no one might prove to be the poet, the poetic quality still may be 
exercised through diverse assemblages in a range of  situations. For Whitman, a poet does 
not have any special claim to poetic powers. “The others are as good as he,” Whitman 
insists, “only he sees it and they do not” (LG 621). The distributed powers of  the poetic 
may be seen, according to Whitman, in “The passionate tenacity of  hunters, woodmen, 
early risers, cultivators of  gardens and orchards and fields, the love of  healthy women for 
the manly form, seafaring persons, drivers of  horses, the passion for light and the open 
air” (LG 621). Whitman highlights the “residence of  the poetic in outdoor people,” 
perhaps less to identify their special access to the poetic than to emphasize that the poetic 
is not in the hands of  indoor, bookish people alone: “the poetic quality is not marshalled 
in rhyme or uniformity or abstract addresses to things nor in melancholy complaints or 
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good precepts” (LG 621). According to Whitman, the poetic “is in the soul” (LG 621). A 
juxtaposition of  Whitman’s comments on the distributed nature of  the soul would see the 
poetic not as a faculty of  only certain humans, nor even belonging to humans alone. The 
poetic is a quality of  the world, an earthy vibrancy, as evident when Whitman addresses 
the rain: “And who art thou? said I to the soft-falling shower, / Which, strange to tell, 
gave me an answer, as here translated: / I am the Poem of  Earth” (LG 444). 
	 Importantly, the poetic is not a form of  agency that is centered within a human 
subject. Whitman describes the poetic as a strange force that works on bodily, affective 
registers. Through certain practices of  the self, a human’s body and body parts might 
themselves become poetic: 
Love the earth and sun and the animals, despise riches, give alms to every 
one that asks, stand up for the stupid and crazy, devote your income and 
labor to others, hate tyrants, argue not concerning God, have patience 
and indulgence toward the people,... read these leaves in the open air 
every season of  every year of  your life, re-examine all you have been told 
at school or church or in any book, dismiss whatever insults your soul, 
and your very flesh shall be a great poem and have the richest fluency not 
only in its words but in the silent lines of  its lips and face and between the 
lashes of  your eyes and in every motion and joint of  your body.” (LG 622) 
Whitman alludes to the poetic as something in which various entities, human and not, 
participate. He displaces the will, intentionality, and consciousness from the role of  key 
poetic powers. In doing so, cultivation of  the poetic powers enriches us in ways that we 
cannot fully discern, spreads us into a thousand lines of  potential, and leaves us more 
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open to being surprised by what happens to and through us. 
	 What dangers might emerge when this poetics, or what is in essence what others 
call “creativity,” is dammed up or denied? 
Dead Time 
I read Whitehead and Whitman as concerned with issues that are related to impasse (such 
as the hold of  the past), though neither develops a robust notion of  the term. Unlike 
Kant, who works tirelessly to construct a subject, a political order, and a world in which 
peace could exist without impasses, Whitehead and Whitman are attentive to impasses as 
problems of  temporality. What Whitman calls “accumulations,” or deposits of  the past (in 
the form of  social norms, laws, aesthetic forms, and so on), exert a continued hold despite 
their growing insufficiency to novel times. Life reaches an impasse that seems to be 
without end. Both Whitehead and Whitman warn that society would atrophy if  it tries to 
stamp out creativity. This concern does not grasp the dire costs of  impasses that have 
been elaborated by scholars such as Berlant and Cvetkovich. Perhaps Whitehead comes 
close when he notes “the paradox that... [the world] craves for novelty and yet is haunted 
by terror at the loss of  the past, with its familiarities and its loved ones” (PR 340). This 
formulation recalls Berlant’s notion of  cruel optimism: both Berlant and Whitehead 
identify the terror of  losing one’s anchors as an impediment to wholeheartedly pursuing a 
life that is otherwise. What makes Whitehead and Whitman particularly valuable for a 
theory of  impasse is their elaboration of  the torsion between the hold of  the past and the 
lure of  incipient futures, as well as the stagnancy and atrophy that arise as the present 
remains stuck. From them, I discern impasse as a problem and a promise for a society that 
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welcomes creativity. 
	 Whitman is averse to those piled-up pasts that constrain what the present could 
become. They make up a “stale cadaver that blocks up the passage” (LG 131). The 
cadaver has many parts: literature, art, philosophies, customs, traditions, behaviors, 
etiquette, bodily comportments, aesthetic tastes, “The accumulated folds, the 
superstitions, and all the long, tenacious and stifling anti-democratic authorities of  the 
Asiatic and European past” (LG 655). That cadaver is preserved through an array of  sites 
and mechanisms, such as laws, schools, periodicals, Congress, theaters, everyday 
conversation (LG 642). People discipline themselves too. They “accept with voracity 
whatever is presented [to] them,” maintain a constant vigilance for how others behave 
and act, and end up “doing the most ridiculous things for fear of  being called 
ridiculous,... continually taking off  their hats” (LG 643). “Not a man,” it seems, “faces 
round at the rest with terrible negative voice, refusing all terms to be brought off  from his 
own eye-sight, or from the soul that he is, or from friendship, or from the body that he is, 
or from the soil and sea” (LG 642). Until the soul asserts itself, “All waits or goes by 
default,” and the hold of  “old customs and phrases” will continue to inhibit all novelty 
(LG 160). 
	 In a public letter to Ralph Waldo Emerson, Whitman bemoaned that America 
was more committed to the past than to its future. Complaining about those whom he 
characterized as “helpless dandies,” Whitman wrote that “no one [is] behaving, dressing, 
writing, talking, loving, out of  any natural and manly tastes of  his own, but each one [is] 
looking cautiously to see how the rest behave, dress, write, talk, love” (LG 643). Those 
young lads did not exhibit the powers of  the soul; they were “dog-like danglers at the 
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heels of  the poets, philosophs, literats, of  enemies’ lands” (LG 643). Whitman alluded to 
this submissiveness as the reproduction of  a stale past; those “dandies” are “all second-
hand, or third, fourth, or fifth hand” (LG 643). As a result, “Democracy has been so 
retarded and jeopardized by powerful personalities, that its first instincts are fain to clip, 
conform, bring in stragglers, and reduce everything to a dead level” (LG 481). The past 
can block creativity; it can be soul-killing. 
	 For Whitman, the problems generated by blockage were merely of  refinement, 
tameness, stagnancy, staleness, and conformity. “Fear grace, elegance, civilization, 
delicatesse,” Whitman advised, “Fear the mellow sweet, the sucking of  honey-juice, /
Beware the advancing mortal ripening of  Nature, / Beware what precedes the decay of  
the ruggedness of  states and men” (LG 288). Whitman preferred the wild to the refined, 
perhaps because the former more closely bears the aura of  the soul: “Objects gross and 
the unseen soul are one” (LG 181). Whitman worried that blockage would diminish the 
creative powers of  the soul, the result of  which would be a stale society. 
	 Whitman was confident that America would someday bear the wild, manly spirit 
needed to push through its impasses by turning the past from a constraint into a resource. 
I say “manly” because Whitman disparaged the “dandies” and largely defined the soul 
through masculine attributes: “O the joy of  a manly self-hood! / To be servile to none, to 
defer to none, not to any tyrant known or unknown, / To walk with erect carriage, a step 
springy and elastic, / To look with calm gaze or with a flashing eye, / To speak with a full 
and sonorous voice out of  a broad chest” (LG 154). Without sharing this gendered view of  
the soul, I partly heed Whitman’s (exaggerated) faith that the powers of  souls could 
enable people to overcome the hold of  today: “The Present holds thee not—for such vast 
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growth as thine, / For such unparallel’d flight as thine, such brood as thine, / The 
FUTURE only holds thee and can hold thee” (LG 386). When the present is a holding 
station, as Berlant puts it, then souls have the power to move through impasses and into 
futures unformed. 
	 Given his unwavering faith in the soul, Whitman did not grasp the severity of  
impasse and the anxiety that what lies beyond an impasse may be worse than what lies 
within. His principal concern was that the soul would be tamed and smoothed, not the 
states of  abandonment, bodily attrition, and social death to which the minoritized and 
abjected are relegated. His belittlement of  “dandies” displays a lack of  sensitivity to the 
complexity of  attachments, the narrowness of  social worlds, and how the experience of  
impasse shatters the level of  confidence that Whitman oozed—all of  which suggests a 
lack of  acknowledgment of  impasse. I also find Whitman to be overly optimistic, given 
my doubts above as to whether the poets needed would ever be fully produced. While 
surely the hold of  impasse might be loosened through the development of  poetic powers, 
it would be a mistake to think that a stronger spirit alone could generate movement 
forward. 
	 Moreover, Whitman’s faith in the strength of  a manly spirit neglects the powers of  
things and atmospheres to take hold of  humans. In this manner, one wonders whether 
Whitman retreats, albeit momentarily, from the wonderful, terrible powers of  things that 
he discerned so acutely and expressed throughout his poems. His worry (which is a 
colonialist fantasy) that America would not grow if  the abundance of  rich materials gifted 
by the past went unused presumes that the materials themselves could not inhibit growth 
that he desired. Whitman’s focus on social conventions as a simple problem begs of  a 
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simple solution: if  regulations of  taste, behavior, bodily comportment, and action were 
solely responsible for the stultification of  growth, then people need only cultivate a little 
courage to overcome them; that courage is a natural quality of  the soul; hence, there are 
no real impasses, only unprepared spirits. But if  the powers of  nonhumans play a role in 
bringing growth to a halt, then all the spiritual muscle in the world would not necessarily 
throw off  the weight of  the past. Although in other areas Whitman calls for greater 
flexibility in the human, in this moment his optimism in the powers of  the soul veers 
dangerously close to fantasies of  sovereignty. It may not be human mastery, but manly 
mastery. 
	 Whitehead comes closer to impasse than Whitman by discerning how the 
creativity of  time does not entail a brighter future. Whitman’s celebration of  the 
movement of  souls does not acknowledge enough the terrible swerves of  time: “They go! 
They go! I know that they go, but I know not where they go, / but I know that they go 
toward the best—toward something great” (LG 133). Although process for Whitehead 
aims toward richer beauties, it does not always end in something “great” or even benign. 
In yet another passage that is apropos of  impasse, Whitehead writes, “It may be 
impossible to conceive a reorganization of  society adequate for the removal of  some 
admitted evil without destroying the social organization and the civilization which 
depends on it. An allied plea is that there is no known way of  removing the evil without 
the introduction of  worse evils of  some type” (AI 20). Whitehead grasps how efforts to 
address impasse may result in the production of  greater evils, as when impasses in 
national identity (as discussed in chapter one in regard to the war on terror) can be met 
with the intensification of  surveillance, detention, torture, and slaughter, as well as with 
171
novel forms of  racism, homophobia, and xenophobia.  31
	 Like Whitman, Whitehead is concerned with the hold of  the past. “Life 
degenerates,” Whitehead maintains, “when enclosed within the shackles of  mere 
conformation. Vague and disorderly elements of  experience are essential for the advance 
into novelty” (MT 74). This “conformation” is not social conformity, as it is in Whitman; 
it is the reproduction of  the past that crowds out novelty in particular sectors of  the 
cosmos. Whitehead locates disorder within the friction between the past and the future: 
“The objective life of  the past and the future in the present is an inevitable element of  
disturbance” (AI 266). When a society strives to minimize disturbances, it seals away 
alternative futures in an attempt to preserve its inheritance from the past. One might see 
that an impasse emerges when society strives too hard to eliminate novelty through the 
taming of  disturbances. 
	 A disturbances amplifies into a world-changing force when it issues in what 
Whitehead calls a “great idea.” A great idea is a low-level restlessness that usually hovers 
“just below the surface of  consciousness” (AI 16). It is an idea-imbued affect that is subtle 
and vague. It is “general” insofar as it embodies a “profound cosmological outlook” that is 
at odds with that of  dominant orders (AI 12); in other words, a great idea bears the charge 
of  another world. A great idea reflects creative powers that, if  cultivated, may result in the 
inception of  novelty; it is, as Whitehead writes, “like a phantom ocean beating upon the 
shores of  human life... A whole succession of  waves are as dreams slowly doing their work 
of  sapping the base of  some cliff  of  habit: But the seventh wave is revolution” (AI 19). 
 	 For two exemplary accounts of  these intensifications, see Jasbir K. Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: 31
Homonationalism in Queer Times (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007) and Brian Massumi, 
Ontopower: War, Powers, and the State of  Perception (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015).
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Although he does not say so, a great idea might be a part of  a past conditional 
temporality when it emerges from what had been diminished though not defeated. 
	 Great ideas glow with potential futures. Whitehead’s description of  it as dreamlike 
anticipates José Esteban Muñoz’s writings on queerness as utopian, which I explore in the 
next chapter. A disturbance might be pursued to bring a particular future closer into 
being; according to Whitehead, “the smouldering unhappiness of  mankind” may take up 
a great idea and “institute a period of  rapid change guided by the light of  its 
doctrines” (AI 15). Social change is the novelty that results when great ideas and negative 
affects are wired into a circuit that allows creativity to flow. Society risks its deepest 
securities through an exquisite sensitivity to the discontent and great ideas of  minoritized 
groups, even when they do not conform to entrenched standards of  clarity, 
persuasiveness, or adoptibility as a full-bodied alternative. “If  there is to be progress 
beyond limited ideals,” Whitehead writes, “the course of  history by way of  escape must 
venture along the borders of  chaos” (PR 111). This proximity to creativity risks a fall into 
what Whitman has called “quicksand years”: “Quicksand years that whirl me I know not 
whither, / Your schemes, politics, fail, lines give way, substances mock and elude me, / 
Only the theme I sing, the great and strong-possess'd soul, eludes not” (LG 376). As the 
foundations of  politics, society, and identity begin to sink, “what at last remains” is the 
soul—in its undefeatability, its power to gather together its own world that is often 
minimized under the strictures of  “precedents” (LG 641). Yet, again, Whitman exhibits a 
confidence that is not shared by Whitehead. 
	 Like Whitehead, Whitman wishes society to be richly textured. “America is to be 
kept coarse and broad,” he writes. He emphasizes more than Whitehead that the binding 
173
of  a social order is better rooted in an affective register; whereas Whitehead prefers 
philosophical persuasion,  Whitman proffers “adhesiveness” or “amativeness.” The 32
diverse things and times of  America do not share a common character. Nor is America 
held together by force or by social contract: “To hold men together by paper and seal or 
by compulsion is no account.” Instead, Whitman insists, “That only holds men together 
which aggregates all in a living principle, as the hold of  the limbs of  the body or the fibres 
of  plants” (LG 291). And it is by poetic powers, according to Whitman, that America can 
hold together in what he calls a “simple elastic scheme” (LG 290). As Whitman writes, 
“Always America will be agitated and turbulent” (LG 645). 
	 Whitehead does not merely acknowledge that impasses are real experiences. More 
than Whitman, he admits that they might be integral for the enrichment of  a social order: 
“A new actuality may appear in the wrong society, amid which its claims to efficacy act 
mainly as inhibitions... The novel fact may throw back, inhibit, and delay. But the 
advance, when it does arrive, will be richer in content, more fully conditioned, and more 
stable” (PR 223). One might consider perverse desires, unruly imaginations, and abjected 
groups (human and not) as examples of  what a society might treat as misfit actualities. 
Unlike Kant, Whitehead believes that the expression of  disturbances ought to be allowed 
and, at times, encouraged. It would be inaccurate to say that the foundations of  a society 
should be periodically unsettled, for a disturbance is not an aberration or a threat to be 
	 Whitehead prefers persuasion to force as a means of  addressing social discord. He never denigrates the 32
use of  force by those who are socially marginalized, however, calling attention to how the “recourse to 
force... is a disclosure of  the failure of  civilization” (AI, 83). One might add that the use of  force reveals 
the failure of  society to do justice to those forms of  politics that do not comport with liberalist, 
deliberative models and their typically white, masculinist, and westernized frames that prize abstract 
reason and rational argument over alternative modes of  expression. Whitehead's ideas of  persuasion 
and force are peculiar, as he places war, slavery, and governmental compulsion as examples of  the latter 
but commerce as an example of  the former. And one might wish to discard Whitehead's understanding 
of  social progress as the “gradual purification of  conduct” of  force so that persuasion could ultimately 
triumph (AI, 25).
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contained. Unrest is part of  those foundations as a positive, productive feature.  33
Disturbances for Whitehead are unsettling because they are creative. In an impasse, the 
creative advance begins to take hold again, as felt in rumblings below one’s footing in the 
world. 
	 Whitehead thus would like society to maintain a torsion between harmony and 
discord, order and freshness. For such a society, he selects the reprehensible name of  
“civilization,” which is based on a distinction between those who seem to be guided by 
“senseless,” “brute necessity” (“forces, floods, barbarians, and mechanical devices”) and 
those who transcend animalistic instincts through intellectual, moral, and aesthetic 
refinement (AI 7; 18; 11). Whitehead’s notion of  civilization is reminiscent of  Western 
imperialist notions of  civilization that have, throughout history, authorized violences 
against those held to be behind the times. It is, however, more complicated. Whitehead 
insists that civilization not be shaped by a “restless egotism,” which presumes a “central 
reality” to which all people must comport lest they face destruction (AI 285; 288). 
Whitehead may not tolerate a society that replicates the colonial and imperial violences 
of  civilizational endeavors. Still, it is hard to ignore the terms by which he defines 
civilization and the exclusions and hierarchies enforced by it. 
	 Without defending those criteria, and ultimately dispensing with the term 
“civilization” itself, I heed an aspect of  Whitehead’s civilization that is fruitful for 
developing the place of  creativity in impasse: peace. This is not a Kantian notion of  
perpetual peace between liberal governments that has, as many have argued, generated 
 	 For an elaboration of  the productivity of  disturbances, see Michael Serres, Genesis, trans. Genevieve 33
James and James Nielson (Minnesota: University of  Minnesota Press, 1995).
175
much violence and war.  For Whitehead, the peace that is a condition of  civilization is 34
produced through a strange form of  “self-control;” it involves an expansive, complicated 
notion of  the self  through a “broadening of  feeling” (AI 285). This aspect of  self-control 
is akin to the transformative effects of  sympathy elaborated by Whitman: “I do not ask 
the wounded person how he feels, I myself  become the wounded person” (LG 58). It is 
self-control because it tries to maintain creativity in a resistance to egotism, as when 
Whitman writes that the soul “has sympathy as measureless as its pride and the one 
balances the other and neither can stretch too far while it stretches in company with the 
other” (LG 624). This self-control bears a family resemblance to the positive valences of  
discipline identified by Kant, Foucault, and Bennett. It also recalls Whitman’s 
understanding of  the poetic power of  “mastering” attachment through sensitivity rather 
than sovereignty. Rather than a mode of  self-control that would align its practitioners 
with social or moral imperatives, it fosters connections and an openness to 
transformation. Whitehead’s society champions a version of  what Connolly has called 
“an ethos of  pluralization;” it actively resists a strong unitary image of  identity in its firm 
commitment to difference that is, difference to come, and processes of  differentiation. 
Without peace, society would lapse into staleness, its life would be drained; as Whitman 
writes, “whoever walks a furlong without sympathy walks to his own funeral drest in his 
shroud” (LG 75). Peace carries society into higher orders through the loss of  those ideas, 
values, and customs that had been most prized. 
	 Most importantly, peace entails a tragic sensibility. “The meaning of  Peace,” 
	 See for example Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, The Liberal Way of  War: Killing to Make Life Live (London: 34
Routledge, 2009); Mimi Thi Nguyen, The Gift of  Freedom: War, Debt, and Other Refugee Passages (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2012).
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writes Whitehead, “is most clearly understood by considering it in its relation to the tragic 
issues which are essential in the nature of  things. Peace is the understanding of  tragedy, 
and at the same time its preservation” (AI 286). A society organized around peace would 
heed the pasts that couldn’t be and would strive to generate the conditions of  their 
fruition—even if  that process entails the modification or loss of  its current infrastructure. 
“Decay, Transition, Loss, Displacement belong to the essence of  the Creative Advance;” 
they are tragic experiences that would have to be admitted by any society that would 
acknowledge impasse (AI 286). 
	 Peace demands an engagement with creative time. In Process and Reality, 
Whitehead writes, overoptimistically, that “It belongs to the goodness of  the world, that its 
settled order should deal tenderly with the faint discordant light of  the dawn of  another 
age” (PR 339) A page later, he writes that “Each new epoch enters upon its career by 
waging unrelenting war upon the aesthetic gods of  its immediate predecessor” (PR 340). 
In this contrast of  tenderness and force, Whitehead portrays the incoming future as a 
destructive creation that ought to be treated gently by the very order that it may end. 
That tenderness, for Whitehead, is in the hands of  God. For me, it is in the hands of  
humans and nonhumans alike. Peace might be the result of  poetic powers that prepare 
the conditions for incipient futures to be actualized. Within an impasse, peace is 
participation in a creativity that consists of  little impacts and happenings even as 
sweeping change may be blocked. 
	 “The essence of  life,” according to Whitehead, “is to be found in the frustrations 
of  established order. The universe refuses the deadening influence of  complete 
conformity” (MT 87-8). Although the emergence and resolution of  impasses might be a 
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feature of  the cosmos, politics entails an exquisite sensitivity to the potentialities and 
intransigencies afoot as well as an experimental participation with creativity to see if  and 
how alternatives might take hold in the world. Such entails an attunement to the 
immortality of  the past—its clutches and transformative possibilities—and to openings 
through which whisper so many… 
After the Future 
Of  men or States, few realize how much they live in 
the future. 
—Walt Whitman 
The future is a realm [that Native Hawaiians] have 
inhabited for thousand of  years. 
—Bryan Kamaoli Kuwada 
The latest episode of  the illegal occupation of  Hawaiʻi by the United States has pivoted 
on the assault of  Mauna Kea by efforts to construct the Thirty Meter Telescope (TMT) 
under a permit approved by the State of  Hawaiʻi’s Board of  Land and Natural Resources. 
Although the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court struck down the legality of  the permit on 2 
December 2015, the protection of  Mauna Kea from TMT is instructive on matters of  
impasse and temporality. 
	 Also known as Mauna a Wākea, Mauna Kea is the piko that connects Papa and 
Wākea, Earth Mother and Sky Father, whose union produced the Hawaiian islands. It is 
both a sacred place and an ancestor to Native Hawaiians. As Kealoha Pisciotta writes, 
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“Mauna Kea in every respect represents the zenith of  the Native Hawaiian people’s 
ancestral ties to Creation itself.”  To others, Mauna Kea has long been viewed as a prime 35
spot for astronomical observation; it is located in the middle of  the Pacific Ocean and 
boasts a summit that almost reaches 14000 feet above sea level. Thirteen telescopes 
already exist there, many of  them long abandoned to disuse and decay. According to its 
proponents, TMT would be a game-changer; described as “the most advanced and 
powerful optical telescope on Earth,” TMT would “enable astronomers to study objects 
in our own solar system and stars throughout our Milky Way and its neighboring galaxies, 
and forming galaxies at the very edge of  the observable Universe, near the beginning of  
time.”  36
	 Orbiting Mauna Kea are thus two conflicting narratives, two great ideas, that tie 
creation and time. One dominant framework of  this dispute has employed well-worn 
colonialist tropes by which Native Hawaiians are cast as wedded to the past for their 
preservation of  what is at once sacred place and kin. Many proponents of  TMT subscribe 
to a teleological notion of  time that holds Native Hawaiians to be barriers to scientific 
progress. They miss the impasse generated by Native Hawaiian protection of  Mauna 
Kea, an impasse that is not merely about the fate of  Mauna Kea, not merely about 
unresolved sovereignty claims of  Hawaiʻi in the face of  a settler United States, but also 
about colonialist modernities and decolonial futures. 
	 Although, as Whitman says, living in the future may be a puzzle to men and states, 
it has not been a mystery to Native Hawaiians. In “We Live in the Future. Come Join 
 	 Kealoha Pisciotta, “Meet the Mauna Kea Hui,” Kahea, 14 August 2011, http://kahea.org/blog/mk-35
vignette-kealoha-pisciotta. Accessed on 10 April 2015.
 	 “About TMT,” Thirty Meter Telescope, http://www.tmt.org/about-tmt. Accessed on 10 April 2015.36
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Us,” Kanaka Maoli scholar Bryan Kamaoli Kuwada observes how futures have long been 
operative in the present for Native Hawaiian life due to ties that are at once ecological 
and genealogical: “All of  our gathering practices and agricultural techniques, the 
patterned mat of  the loʻi kalo, the breath passing in and out of  the loko iʻa, the Kū and 
Hina of  picking plants are predicated on looking ahead. This ensures that the land is 
productive into the future, that the sea will still be abundant into the future, and that our 
people will still thrive into the future.”  These ties are at once about ecology and kinship 37
in ways that confound Western modernist, capitalist, and colonialist parsings of  humans 
and nonhumans and the confinement of  intimacies to domestic enclaves. Moreover, they 
indicate how Native Hawaiians “are operating in geological and genealogical time.” Not 
in the neoliberal capitalist time of  slow death nor in the modernist time of  scientific 
progress. It is not even only in the colonialist time of  conquest and genocide. To cede too 
much to these latter temporalities would be to diminish the resilience of  Native 
Hawaiians and to overlook how Native Hawaiian life is vibrant today in other times—
times that are already here as folds of  futures in the present. 
	 Part of  the power and beauty of  “We Live in the Future. Come Join Us” lies in its 
invitational endeavor. Kuwada writes of  a vigil atop Mauna Kea that he attended, where 
he witnessed speeches by Kahoʻokahi Kanuha and Lanakila Mangauil: “I stood at the 
edge of  the torchlight and wept as they spoke, struck by how the depths of  their aloha 
manifested in a fierce love not only for the ʻāina that they were protecting but for those 
who stood in opposition to them.” Kuwada discerns how Native Hawaiians and their 
 	 Bryan Kamaoli Kuwada, “We Live in the Future. Come Join Us,” Ke Kaʻupu Hehi ʻAle, 3 April 2015, 37
https://hehiale.wordpress.com/2015/04/03/we-live-in-the-future-come-join-us/. Accessed on 3 April 
2015.
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allies “are concerned with nothing more than the very future of  our world, our islands, 
and our people.” Kuwada is clearly not speaking about Native Hawaiians and Hawaiʻi in 
isolation from other peoples and the rest of  the world; he means a world and people in 
common. 
	 What might it mean to take up Native Hawaiian invitations to live in the future? 
What might it mean to see that people who are suffocating today already breathe in the 
future? What might living in the future entail for those whose longings, desires, and 
imaginations have been disallowed by the socially authorized good life? For those who 
have been targeted for harsh discipline and death? For those who live the phantom pains 
of  time? 
	 What might it mean to not only live in the future but to really live futures that 
have yet to emerge? When those futures are staved off  and surrounded by tripwires? How 
might we come to sense that the overbearing here and now is but a speck of  what we live? 
That we are already living otherwise and in other times, however fleeting and fragile those 
lives and times may be? 
	 Life at an impasse registers the past in its hold and frailty. It is stuck. And yet, it is 
already being carried abroad. Nothing guarantees that things will get better; tomorrow 
could be more constraining, more precarious, more painful than the present. And yet, we 
might sense in the aura of  so many lived futures some relief, motivation, and strength. 
After all, the creativity at the heart of  time denotes the ineradicability of  other times and 
other lives, especially when the powers that be have long projected their world to be the 
be-all, end-all of  things. A mere brush with time may be enough to embolden us to follow 
vague shapes and thin lifelines out from under the weight of  the past. The question then 
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becomes who we might join and what we might become, even as that process asks of  us to 
risk who we are with, who we are, and, quite oddly, when we are. 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[2] 
July (Chinese juniper) 
2011–2014 
Two years into her life, July met Chad, who named her after the writer, filmmaker, and 
performance artist Miranda July. She was the first thing that Chad ever named. July 
quickly inspired much affection in him through her quiet presence, prickly needles, and 
strong branches. But she was wary: How could this bumbling human take care of  me? He’s a grad 
student, for heaven’s sake. 
July’s favorite season was summer. She sleepily greeted each new day by the glorious tints 
of  dawn. She liked to spend her time atop the roof, soaking in an ocean of  sunlight, 
breathing in the humid air, daydreaming amongst the tweets of  birds. The occasional 
thunderstorm exhilarated her. 
July faced many dangers: overzealous waterings, invasions of  clover, bombs of  bird shit. 
She surpassed them while growing in size and beauty. She also grew in companionship; 
July learned to trust Chad. 
Then winter came. Chinese junipers hibernate cozily as long as the cold remains steady. 
July went to sleep with confidence in her natural fortifications. December and January 
passed without incident. 
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But then the February of  2014 happened. July woke during a few oddly warm days, ea-
ger for the sweet air of  spring. But February had tricked her. The cold returned and July 
withdrew into dormancy. The temperature shuttled back and forth wildly into April. July 
was confused and deprived of  rest. The long winter drained her last bits of  moisture. 
July wanted to live. Even when most of  her needles had browned, stiffened, and fallen off, 
she pushed out the tiniest green buds. They were her last breaths of  hope. Chad tried to 
save them but, in the end, his best efforts were not good enough. July quietly passed in the 
month of  her name. 
July’s short life is a testament to resilience in the face of  transience, to the beauty of  vul-
nerability, to the vibrancy that death does not end but carries to a new form, and to the 
lesson that, during these times of  great ecological fragility, nothing may be more impor-
tant than a life. July is survived by Chad, who may have lost something of  life but has 
learned something about love.  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4.     Tragic Affirmations, Queer Trajectories... 
Terrified, bewildered, frantic, covered with blood, 
quivering all over, Candide said to himself, “If  this is 
the best of  all possible worlds, what are the others 
like?”  1
—Voltaire, Candide 
The heart of  a fragile life trembles with dreams of  transcendence. 
	 Candide is shrouded by dark affects after he has been slammed by an earthquake, 
been flogged, seen two companions immolated, witnessed the hanging of  his teacher—
and then been hit by another earthquake. He feels drawn to worlds that had been 
previously unimaginable. Nonetheless, he remains committed to a Leibnizian optimism. It 
takes adventures, mishaps, and a whole lot of  suffering for Candide to turn his eyes down 
to the earth. He cultivates a tiny garden while acknowledging that his is neither the best 
of  all possible worlds nor one of  utter misery. He comes to affirm loss and the fragile 
nature of  attachments. Other worlds become palpable in dark affects; affirming them 
entails following change, even if  that change demands loss of  the desired good life and 
does not project a clear destination or even a single direction. 
	 This chapter culls an ethics and a politics from the dark affects of  impasses. By 
“ethics,” I mean practices of  self- and world-fashioning that arise between precepts and 
sensibilities and that, unlike the prescriptions of  moral codes, hold a place for sensitive 
	 Voltaire, Candide, trans. Lowell Bair (New York, NY: Bantam Classic, 1959), 29.1
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responses to the particularities of  an impasse. “Politics” concerns the unsettlement of  
systems of  power that support dominant regimes of  concepts and affects, discipline 
bodies, and distribute value unevenly across populations. This ethics and politics resist 
temptations to violently defend a world that is felt to be on the verge of  collapse. They 
seek to foster worlds that are more livable and more wild. 
	 This ethics and politics emerge between, on the one hand, the tragic visions of  
Friedrich Nietzsche and William Connolly and, on the other hand, the “antisocial turn” 
in queer theory. How does the tragic compare to queer perspectives that emphasize 
negativity and utopia? How might such a comparison be valuable to ethics and politics in 
impasses? I examine the antisocial turn to show how impasses produce an experience of  
“being queered.” This queerness resonates with the tragic insofar as both find value in 
nonsovereignty, impermanence, and an openness to loss and unpredictable change. 
Literature on queerness and the tragic differ on other issues: Nietzsche and Connolly 
develop the tragic in the direction of  joy and the sweetness of  life while some forms of  
queerness (that of  Lee Edelman and Heather Love) emphasize woe; while strands of  
queer negativity resist the positive elaboration of  attachments, utopian forms of  
queerness and the tragic undertake that problematic but important task. I sort through 
this thicket to develop an ethical and political response to impasses that welcomes the 
possibility of  loss, explores the detours that arise when change is impeded, and fashions 
attachments that are flexible and transient. 
	 I will use “tragic affirmation” to designate an orientation that dampens existential 
resentment toward features of  life that are intensely felt in impasses: the unavoidability of  
loss (if  you live long enough to have had); the constitutive nature of  loss for some in the 
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face of  an unsustaining world; the lack of  guaranteed flourishing; limits to human agency; 
and whispers of  pluripotentiality that upset teleological notions of  time and their 
comforts of  coherence, continuity, and predicability. By “queer trajectories,” I mean the 
wayward paths that follow the undoing of  lives and worlds in impasses and that do not 
unfold toward the good life. People stumble, grasp about, and experiment between the 
potential end of  a world and the possibility that new ones may arise. In short, tragic 
affirmations in an impasse open unto queer trajectories and form an ethics and politics 
that strive to fashion something from the potentialities that arise when the good life might 
be lost. 
Identity\Difference(/Abjection) 
In an impasse, a world disintegrates while another has yet to emerge. Just what do you do 
when what is dearest to you teeters on the brink of  collapse? When what had grounded 
you is felt to be threatened and there seem to be no other supports to hold you up? What 
could help you to face that unbearable experience? Willful blindness? Hardened resolve? 
A scramble to patch things up, no matter what the ugly cost? 
	 The experience of  impasse breeds responses of  self-harm and other forms of  
violence. It is, in Lauren Berlant's words, “unbelievable and unbearable, while being 
borne.”  When impasses are treated as glitches in a predetermined timeline, cruel 2
optimist and dogmatic reactions arise. Berlant describes “cruel optimism” as a relation to 
fantasies that impede the very flourishing that they promise.  Struggles to hold onto an 3
	 Lauren Berlant, “On Her Book Cruel Optimism,” Rorotoko, 5 June 2012, http://rorotoko.com/2
interview/20120605_berlant_lauren_on_cruel_optimism/
	 Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 24-5.3
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ailing dream incur exhaustion, frustration, and depression. 
	 Impasses also provoke dogmatic reactions to secure a world by containing, 
disciplining, or eradicating what is thought to be the source of  a threat. I draw upon 
William Connolly’s critiques of  reactionary dogmatism in his writings on political 
paradox—a notion that resonates with but does not name an “impasse” at the level of  
faith, belief, and creed. Connolly locates identity in a paradoxical relationship with 
difference: while identity requires difference to define itself, efforts to consolidate identity 
court violence if  they cast difference as abject and evil.  In a later writing on the “cul-de-4
sac” posed by the contemporary condition, Connolly writes that 
the planetary fragility of  things is increasingly sensed, as many protest 
against acknowledgment of  that very sense to remain loyal to traditions of  
belonging woven into their bodies, role performances, and institutions. 
Festering there, such anxieties could morph into concerted experiments to 
modify established patterns of  attachment and belonging. But they can 
also become transposed into bellicose political movements of  denial and 
deferral, movements joined to virulent attacks on any constituency that 
challenges the complementary modes of  cosmic and civilizational 
assurance already in place.  5
In Connolly’s subtle formulation, the experience of  a cul-de-sac, or what I call an 
“impasse,” both opens attachments to revision and solicits efforts to defend them to the 
grave. The ethics and politics detailed in this chapter aim for the former because 
	 William E. Connolly, Identity\Difference: Democratic Negotiations of  Political Paradox (Minneapolis, MN: 4
University of  Minnesota Press, 2002), 67. Cited in this chapter hereafter as ID.
	 William E. Connolly, The Fragility of  Things: Self-Organizing Processes, Neoliberal Fantasies, and Democratic 5
Activism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013), 172-3. Cited hereafter in this chapter as FT.
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temptations to violence against others become particularly inflamed in impasses. “When 
the bottom falls out of  your world,” writes Connolly, “you are apt to become flooded with 
the desire to find parties to accuse of  pure evil.”  In an impasse, cruel optimisms and 6
dogmatisms are violences against oneself  and others, especially when disturbances to 
attachments are located in specific peoples or desires that are cast as evil. 
	 Better to treat disturbances in attachment as an impasse rather than as a setback 
on the way to better times. Doing so would affirm impasse as a possibility that always 
dogs attachments. Such a politics might be inspired by Connolly's politics of  identity
\difference. Unlike individualist and communitarian traditions of  liberal political theory 
that, despite their differences, neglect or dismiss the paradox of  identity\difference, 
Connolly develops a politics that affirms it (ID, 64-94). He views identity as problematic 
but indispensable and affirms the torsion between pluralism and process of  pluralization. 
It initiates a series of  ethical practices: experiments that stretch and alter socially defined 
roles; cultivation of  one’s historical self  into something worthy of  affirmation; and a 
“critical responsiveness” that loosens some entrenched aspects of  one’s identity, affirms 
others, and nourishes a generous though agonistic disposition toward others (ID, xvi-xiv). 
Connolly connects these ethical practices with a “politics of  becoming,” which welcomes 
the surprising generation of  a new identity, right, or public even as it shakes one’s footing 
in the world (P, 121-2). In an impasse, an ethics of  self-cultivation and critical 
responsiveness could combine with a politics of  becoming to affirm disturbances in 
attachments. They work against cruel optimism and dogmatism by presuming that 
impasses are not just trials and tribulations. 
	 William E. Connolly, Pluralism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 21. Cited hereafter in this 6
chapter as P.
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	 Is Connolly’s noble, big-hearted ethics and politics adequate to the experience of  
impasse? How might role experimentation, self-cultivation, and a politics of  becoming 
relate to the politics of  detachment espoused by Berlant? Recall that for Berlant, “The 
political question is how to understand the difficulty of  detaching from lives and worlds 
that wear out life, rather than sustain it... The hardest acts of  changing are acts of  
breaking, even when desire is on the side of  a break: they require being optimistic about 
loss and about the undoing of  an affect world.”  Detachment for Berlant entails the loss 7
of  anchors but it does not aim for a vacuum; connections and a sense of  connectedness 
remain important for her, both to avoid the slide into cruel optimism and to develop 
solidarity from within struggles to survive. In an impasse, detachment might be an end 
alongside self-cultivation and role experimentation, with these three practices informing 
each other in valuable though not always harmonious ways. People who aim toward 
detachment would not only acknowledge the contestability of  their identity but also aspire 
to undo their attachments in favor of  other worlds, to find possibility in loss. 
	 To better describe the value of  pursuing detachment in impasses, I call attention 
to the political value of  generating impasses in dominant systems of  power. Such a politics 
stalls movement forward by defamiliarizing what tends to go without saying and by 
unsettling habituated sensoria.  It puts severe pressure upon subjects to unlearn 8
attachments to majoritarian orders, composed of  fantasies, social relations, modes of  
	 Lauren Berlant, The Female Complaint: The Unfinished Business of  Sentimentality in American Culture (Durham, 7
NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 266.
 	 I hear echoes of  Foucault's method of  problematization and of  Rancière's politics of  aesthetics in 8
Berlant’s description of  impasse as a method that “dedramatiz[es] the performance of  critical and 
political judgment so as to slow down the encounter with the objects of  knowledge that are really scenes 
we can barely get our eyes around... [T]his perspective turns the object x into an impasse, a singular 
place... that can only be approached awkwardly, described around, shifted” (Lauren Berlant, “Starved,” 
South Atlantic Quarterly 106, no. 3 [2007], 434). These different methods align as an alternative to knee-
jerk moral judgments and calls for quick action. 
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time, constructs of  sensibilities, normalized structures of  feeling, among many other 
things.  The generation of  impasse adds detachment to the ethical practices described by 9
Connolly. 
	 By example, I gesture to the impasses generated by afro-pessimist, decolonial, and 
queer criticism. Viewing rubrics of  “minoritization” to be inadequate to the experience 
of  black, indigenous, and queer lives, these critiques have long elaborated how abjection 
is longstanding and pervasive. Whereas minoritization presumes a derivation from 
majorities along some common standard, abjection is a constitutive exclusion that 
underpins an system of  power. Abjection is what Connolly describes as the “otherness” 
into which difference is converted under dogmatic identity regimes. Abjection can 
underlie plays of  identity\difference. 
	 Here, abjection is more an aspiration of  antiblack, colonialist, and homophobic 
systems of  power than a definitive fact. It does not necessarily imply that dominant 
systems are so overbearing to be tightly-knit structures of  power. Nor does it necessarily 
suggest that the lives of  the abjected are determined by those systems, as though their 
own efforts to live otherwise were meaningless. Rather, abjection can signal how power 
views the extermination of  some peoples as necessary for its continuation. Here, it also 
denotes the relative solidity and durability of  power that make incidents of  violence and 
destruction, even as they take new forms, sadly not surprising. The framework of  
abjection leads me to view antiblack racism, settler colonialism, and homophobia as 
powerful force-fields that persist through long stretches of  time and whose loose character 
is based on the devaluation of  black, native, and queer life.  
	 On the relationship between identity and affect, see José Esteban Muñoz, “Feeling Brown: Ethnicity and 9
Affect in Ricardo Bracho's The Sweetest Hangover (and Other STDs),” Theatre Journal Vol. 52 (2000), 67-79.
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	 Afro-pessimism describes the abjection of  blackness as an issue that cannot be 
resolved by a politics of  identity\difference. According to Frank Wilderson, blackness is 
not an identity marker of  a racial minority. Blackness is distinct because it is “predicated 
on modalities of  accumulation and fungibility, not exploitation and alienation.”  Jared 10
Sexton elaborates how this abjection functions as a “political ontology.” An outcome of  
politics but not reducible to a political status, blackness “functions as if  it were a 
metaphysical property” due to a lifespan that runs from the inception of  racial slavery 
through its afterlife.  The social life of  blackness is social death, such that “black life is 11
not lived in the world that the world lives in.”  The abjection of  blackness places 12
whiteness and non-black racialized identities on a shared axis of  identity. This singular 
condition is overlooked by the concept of  “people of  color,” which, although sometimes 
useful in shifting the politics of  identity, can draw non-white racial minorities into 
“greater alliance with an antiblack civil society and further capitulation to the 
magnification of  state power.”  The afterlife of  slavery forecloses humanist appeals just 13
as it “precludes the generation of  a proper political demand directed at a definable object 
or objective.” Blackness, instead, generates what Sexton calls an “abstract political 
insistence”—abstract, I think, because it does not issue from a position within existing 
grids of  identity and an insistence because it draws attention to abjection as a problem 
	 Frank Wilderson III, Red, White, & Black: Cinema and the Structure of  US Antagonisms (Durham, NC: Duke 10
University Press, 2010), 59.
	 Jared Sexton, “People-of-Color-Blindness: Notes on the Afterlife of  Slavery,”Social Text Vol. 28, No. 2 11
(Summer 2010), 37.
	 Jared Sexton, “The Social Life of  Social Death: On Afro-Pessimism and Black Optimism,” InTensions 12
Issue 5 (Fall/Winter 2011), 28.
	 Sexton, “People-of-Color-Blindness,” 48.13
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that cannot be resolved by the powers that be.  By challenging the antiblackness that 14
underlies identity, afro-pessimist critique generates an impasse in antiblack worlds. 
	 Similarly, indigenous scholars describe how efforts to include indigeneity into 
frameworks of  identity further solidify colonial settlement. J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, for 
example, argues that the US legal definition of  “native Hawaiian” uses blood quantum to 
reduce Kanaka Maoli “to a racial minority rather than an indigenous people with 
national sovereignty claims.”  This and other conditional inclusions of  indigenous groups 15
by US liberal multiculturalism occlude the state’s colonial underpinnings; as Jodi Byrd 
argues, a “cacophony of  moral claims often coerces struggles for social justice for queers, 
racial minorities, and immigrants into complicity with settler colonialism.”  Exemplifying 16
this point, Scott Morgenson argues that non-Native queer efforts to attain the perks of  
citizenship often support a white settler project that primitivizes and exploits indigenous 
sexualities.  Even critical race theory, Kauanui argues, can comport with settler logics if  17
it considers whiteness to be solely about privilege than about dispossession and 
genocide.  The tendency of  critical race theory to map the politics of  race by white 18
supremacy also overlooks how, for instance, Asians are the principal beneficiaries of  
settler colonialism in Hawaiʻi.  These criticisms reveal the abjection of  indigeneity by 19
	 Sexton, “People-of-Color-Blindness,” 46-7.14
	 J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, Hawaiian Blood: Colonialism and the Politics of  Sovereignty and Indigeneity (Durham, NC: 15
Duke University Press, 2008), 10.
	 Jodi A. Byrd, The Transit of  Empire: Indigenous Critiques of  Colonialism (Minneapolis, MN: University of  16
Minnesota Press, 2011), xvii.
	 Scott Lauria Morgensen, Spaces between Us: Queer Settler Colonialism and Indigenous Decolonization 17
(Minneapolis, MN: University of  Minnesota Press, 2011).
	 Kauanui, Hawaiian Blood, 10-1.18
	 Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Y. Okamura (eds.), Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the 19
Habits of  Everyday Life in Hawaiʻi (Honolulu, HI: University of  Hawaiʻi Press, 2008).
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settler frameworks of  identity in the US. The language of  minoritization misses the 
genocidal bent of  settler societies and, at worst, becomes another vector of  abjection even 
when it operates through seemingly beneficial acts like the expansion of  rights. Unless 
decolonization is taken to be a viable future, indigenous lives will be, in Byrd’s words, 
“lamentable but not grievable.”  The fight for decolonization, however impractical it 20
may presently seem, generates an impasse in settler societies, their teleologies of  
nationhood, and their ongoing genocidal effects. 
	 Antiblackness, coloniality, and homophobia are relatively distinct vectors of  power 
that, at times, overlap, inform, and amplify each other. Kara Keeling examines their 
imbrications by bringing together Lee Edelman and Frantz Fanon, each of  whom depicts 
a figure (the queer and the black native) that is abjected to secure a (straight, colonial) 
future. Keeling argues that “present institutions and logics dissemble fear of  a black 
future. From within the logics of  reproductive futurity and colonial reality, a black future 
looks like no future at all.”  Against the temporality of  a straight, colonial, antiblack 21
world, Keeling holds up “poetry of  the future.” This poetry generates an affective 
experience of  foreclosed potentiality that “threatens to unsettle, if  not destroy, the 
common senses” that undergird a racist, misogynist, homophobic, and transphobic 
reality.  Poetry from the future “interrupts the habitual formation of  bodies” and indexes 22
	 Byrd, The Transit of  Empire, 38.20
	 Kara Keeling, “Looking for M—: Queer Temporality, Black Political Possibility, and Poetry from the 21
Future,” GLQ Vol. 15, No. 4 (2009), 578. Keeling explores the poetry of  the future that is enacted by M
—, an “aggressive” in Daniel Peddle's 2005 documentary The Aggressives. “Aggressive” bears a family 
resemblance to transgender, butch, dyke, and lesbian but emerges specifically between black popular 
culture and the US prison industry. The film tracks M—'s enlistment in the military and disappearance 
following the 2003 US invasion of  Iraq. Asking where M— might be would, according to Keeling, 
comport with the surveillance logics of  the prison and military industries that align visibility, discipline, 
and control. M—'s disappearance, according to Keeling, disrupts the film's expectations of  narrative 
closure and invites us to ask when M— is.
	 Ibid., 566-7.22
194
“a time to come in which what today exists potently—even if  not (yet) effectively—but 
escapes us will find its time.”  As potency that exerts an effect in the present, poetry from 23
the future resonates with the utopianism that is described below. The insistence of  black 
queer transgender desire may generate an impasse in an antiblack, heteronormative, 
transphobic, colonial world. 
	 In their different though resonant ways, these afro-pessimist, indigenous, and 
queer critiques generate impasses in US liberal multiculturalism and in Connolly’s politics 
of  deep pluralism. In the US, blackness, indigeneity, and queerness, on the one hand, 
resist a politics of  recognition and inclusion and, on the other, are inadequately addressed 
by changes to grids of  identity. Afro-pessimist, decolonial, and queer politics do not 
merely denaturalize a dominant identitarian order; they render palpable the loss of  a 
world that presently seems intractable if  not inevitable. They compel majorities and 
minorities to undo those attachments that are predicated upon abjection. That is why 
hostility arises. Violent responses do not issue from mere disturbances to identity; they 
happen because the magnitude of  potential loss is felt to be unbearable. 
	 Can the impasses generated by afro-pessimist, decolonial, and queer politics be 
adequately addressed when subjects only denaturalize their identities, experiment with 
roles, and tend generously though agonistically to difference? These practices might 
indeed loosen a majoritarian world enough for other worlds to gain some traction, but 
they do not foreground enough what might need to be lost when tackling the abjection 
that arises from antiblack racism, settler colonialism, and homophobia. On this point, 
critical responsiveness needs to be amplified. In Connolly’s rendition, critical 
	 Ibid., 567.23
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responsiveness asks that we “absorb a degree of  self-suffering to come to terms with an 
unfamiliar call to change what you already are” (FT, 135). Impasses exact more than a 
degree of  self-suffering. They deliver an experience that is felt to be unbearable, for at 
stake are not only aspects of  lives or institutions but entire worlds.  Countering the 24
bionecropolitics of  abjection calls for change so widespread that it borders on the 
impractical, the unimaginable, the utopian, if  not the impossible. It requires detachment 
and loss. 
	 Connolly might affirm the value of  detachment while suggesting that pursuits of  it 
ought to be taken in piecemeal fashion. He advocates processes of  “experimental 
defamiliarization” that loosen and revise lodged aspects of  one’s identity (ID, 8-9). 
Certainly, no one and no world could change overnight, especially where longstanding, 
important attachments are concerned. And, as Connolly points out, striving for 
detachment too quickly without positive alternatives in place could instill a passive 
nihilism that inflames tendencies to violence; this, in fact, is the danger of  impasse, in 
	 Connolly is attentive to the pervasiveness of  shifts that occur in the midst of  becomings. In an earlier 24
work, he writes, “Critical responsiveness to the claims of  difference often calls forth a partial and 
comparative denaturalization of  the respondents themselves; it thereby opens up other possible lines of  
mobility in what the respondents are. These effects are possible because every effective movement of  
difference modifies the institutional constellation of  identities through which it has been differentiated. 
And if  these changes are to be consolidated, a corollary set of  changes will be required in such 
institutions as family life, marriage law, military rules, church membership, tax practices, medical 
benefits, and curriculum organization” (William E. Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist [Minneapolis, 
MN: University of  Minnesota Press, 1999], 63). Later, Connolly elaborates that critical responsiveness 
also demands work on affective, sensorial, and conceptual registers as well (Connolly, Pluralism, 126-7). 
My question, then, is whether the sweeping nature of  these changes better approximates loss rather than 
modifications. 
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which attachments are falling apart.  Yet Connolly’s politics here seems to presume that 25
people either have attachments or alternatives in place, which overlooks how abjected 
subjects haven’t enjoyed either in a robust way. And while I share Connolly’s reservations 
over the capacity to “imagine constructively beyond an interim horizon” in a world of  
becoming, perhaps there is value to taking more imaginative leaps in impasses, especially 
where the present has been so damaging to select populations for so long.  The need to 26
be cautious and careful hits a deep skepticism regarding the capacity of  what Connolly 
calls “interim agendas” to adequately address abjection. Tensions between interim and 
utopian endeavors, between avoiding passive nihilism and pushing for an end to the 
violences of  abjection—these tensions are part of  the impasses in worlds largely 
organized by antiblack racism, settler colonialism, and homophobia. They are not 
adequately addressed by any prescribed course of  action, drives to effect change at 
breakneck speed, expansions of  liberal multiculturalism, or periodic turns of  the axes of  
identity through a process of  pluralization. 
	 The sense of  urgency in addressing abjection may be illustrated through 
Edelman’s project on queer negativity. Edelman argues that society aims to protect the 
figure of  the Child, which emblematizes lost wholeness and future promise. Under this 
	 William E. Connolly, A World of  Becoming (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 63 (cited 25
hereafter in this chapter as WB). Connolly writes of  the importance but insufficiency of  negative 
critique, which must be supplemented with the positive cultivation of  attachments to the world. 
Similarly, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, throughout A Thousand Plateaus, warn against the dangers 
of  deterritorializing or destratifying too quickly. They observe how people implode (“you will be killed, 
plunged into a black hole, or even dragged toward catastrophe”)  or become swept up in a fascist line of  
uncontrollable destruction rather than a line of  experimental creation (A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi [Minneapolis, MN: University of  Minnesota Press, 1987], 161; 
229-31).
	 William E. Connolly, Capitalism and Christianity, American Style (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 26
2008), 94. Although this remark occurs in a discussion of  the possibility of  eco-egalitarian capitalism, it 
is part of  a larger critique of  predictive and imaginative capacities in a world of  becoming, whereby 
unpredictable events issue in surprise and alter the coordinates of  political imaginations and actions.
197
fantasy of  “reproductive futurism,” a straight world persists by abjecting the queerness 
that threatens the Child. Edelman suggests that queers might, rather than normalizing 
themselves (which Edelman insists only passes the burden of  abjection to others ), accede 27
to the place of  negativity, the smudge that marks the inability of  society to unambiguously 
consolidate itself. The embrace of  negativity might unleash world-destroying energies. I 
hear in Edelman’s call for a stop to the future a fierce and admirable drive to counter 
homophobic violence, which is merely displaced by changes in identity with the rise of  
homonormativity.  28
	 Many aspects of  Edelman’s account of  queer negativity contribute to the ethics 
and politics I seek in impasses even as it is in need of  modification. I clarify those 
modifications later; here, I identify what I find to be valuable in Edelman’s notion of  
queerness. Edelman delivers a fiery criticism of  queer politics that are comfortable with 
an increasingly normalized state and its attendant dangers. His antisocial notion of  
queerness opens “an impasse in the passage to the future” by unsettling the regime of  
straight time that organizes a heteronormative society (NF, 33). His separation of  the 
ethical from reproductive futurism is important as humans rework ethics in the face of  the 
Anthropocene; in the face of  human species extinction, ethics is under increasing pressure 
	 “Those of  us inhabiting the place of  the queer may be able to cast off  that queerness and enter the 27
properly political sphere, but only by shifting the figural burden of  queerness to someone 
else” (Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive [Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004], 
27. Cited hereafter in this chapter as NF). 
	 “The political regime of  futurism, unable to escape what it abjects, negates it as the negation of  28
meaning, of  the Child, and of  the future the Child portends. Attempting to evade the insistent Real 
always surging in its blood, it lovingly rocks the cradle of  life to the drumbeat of  the endless blows it 
aims at sinthomosexuals. Somewhere, someone else will be savagely beaten and left to die—sacrificed to a 
future whose beat goes on, like a pulse or a heart—and another corpse will be left like a mangled 
scarecrow to frighten the birds who are gathering now, who are beating their wings, and who, like the 
drive, keep on coming” (NF, 153-4).
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to rethink the centrality of  the human and its survival.  Finally, Edelman’s work strangely 29
resonates with that of  Connolly despite vast differences between them, including an 
ontology of  lack versus one of  abundance. I see Edelman and Connolly agreeing that 
identity reflects the management of  difference by power, that a social order is 
consolidated through violence and abjection, that a wild energy (the death drive in 
Edelman’s account or pluripotentialities in Connolly’s) informs ethical and political 
activity, and that efforts to build a world remain dogged by disturbances that are either 
constant or periodic. 
	 Altogether, these points raise the question of  “what survives” the encounter with 
the negativity of  queerness, with the unbearable blow to a world.  The force of  30
negativity is unbearable because it, accordingly to Edelman, “cannot be borne by the 
subjects we think we are. We build our worlds in the face of  it so as to keep ourselves from 
facing it.”  Although worlds are not built solely as barricades against the unbearable, 31
Edelman rightly calls attention to the violences that arise in efforts to ward off  the 
unbearable. To quell those violences, we might ask: If  we do not scramble to protect our 
anchors at all costs, what might we do? What sorts of  ethical and political practices could 
mitigate temptations to violence and build worlds without guarantees of  the good life? 
 	 One might think of  Roy Scranton’s call for humans to learn to die as a civilization in the face of  the 29
Anthropocene. See “Learning How to Die in the Anthropocene,” The New York Times, 10 November 
2013, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/10/learning-how-to-die-in-the-anthropocene/
	 Lee Edelman, “Against Survival: Queerness in a Time That's Out of  Joint,” Shakespeare Quarterly Vol. 62, 30
No. 2 (Summer 2011), 148-61; Lauren Berlant and Lee Edelman, “What Survives” in Sex, or the 
Unbearable (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014), 35-61.
	 Berlant and Edelman, Sex, or the Unbearable, 121-2.31
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Queer or Be Queered 
Connolly holds ethics and identity to be in a paradoxical relationship: “To be ethical is 
often to put parts of  your entrenched identity at risk, but to place too much at risk at one 
time would be to lose the ground from which ethical action proceeds” (ID, xix). I agree 
that ethical activity involves risking parts of  one’s identity, yet I think the relationship 
between the ethical and identity needs to be rethought in light of  impasse. For if  
Connolly is right, then those with little stake in available identities would lack the ground 
for ethical action. Connolly also tethers ethics too tightly to action at the expense of  other 
states of  being, such as the impassivity that I described in chapter two. Finally, impasse 
shows that the loss of  the “ground” of  ethical action can be a plus, as ethics could be 
remade anew in light of  shifts in the world. Connolly does, in later works, discuss a form 
of  ethics that may be more adequate to impasses; it involves the exploration of  role 
experiments and the intensification of  democratic activism to meet novel shifts between 
neoliberalization, bellicose religious movements, climate change, and species extinctions 
(FT, 11). Nonetheless, I want to relocate the starting point of  ethics from identity roles 
and action to dark affects—those that exert a force without having a clear form, that can 
tug us toward loss without alternative attachments in place. How might ethics in impasses 
entail a greater sensitivity to disturbances, incipiences, desires, and longings? How might 
impasses compel ethics to have a more intimate relationship with loss? 
	  Following Connolly while reworking the connection between identity and ethics, 
José Muñoz describes “disidentification” as a practice that neither identifies with available 
social roles nor assumes an oppositional stance. According to Muñoz, disidentification 
uses the blood and bones of  majoritarian worlds as “raw material for representing a 
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disempowered politics or positionality that has been rendered unthinkable by the 
dominant culture.”  Notably, this ethics does not start from identity; it is a minor ethics 32
since it originates in the friction between systems of  power and minoritized lives. 
	 Disidentification is a partly critical, partly creative practice of  self-fashioning that 
recalls Foucault’s notion of  the care of  the self. Following George Yúdice’s criticism of  
Foucault for deriving the care of  the self  from the practices of  social elites (Greek freemen 
and modernist art), Muñoz elaborates how queer Latino/a disidentifications concern how 
to survive and thrive in the face of  abjection (D, 145-6). Disidentification is a process by 
which subjects queer the objects, images, and media of  a dominant culture to refashion 
themselves and to endure a world that is hostile and deadly to them. What Eve Sedgwick 
writes of  “reparative reading” is apropos of  disidentification: “What we can best learn 
from such practices are, perhaps, the many ways selves and communities succeed in 
extracting sustenance from the objects of  a culture—even of  a culture whose avowed 
desire has often been not to sustain them.”  33
	 Because it aims beyond a present that is captive to the tyranny of  pragmatic 
purposes, disidentification has utopian ambitions.  For Muñoz, queerness is utopian 34
because it “is essentially about a rejection of  a here and now and an insistence on 
potentiality or concrete possibility for another world” (CU, 1). Although Muñoz may 
appear to parse the present and future and to invest potentiality solely in the latter, he 
	 José Esteban Muñoz, Disidentifications: Queers of  Color and the Performance of  Politics (Minneapolis, MN: 32
University of  Minnesota Press, 1999), 31. Cited hereafter in this chapter as D.
 	 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity (Durham, NC: Duke University 33
Press, 2003), 150-1.
	 D, 25; José Esteban Muñoz, Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of  Queer Futurity (New York, NY: New York 34
University Press, 2009), 169. Cited hereafter in this chapter as CU.
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notes that the future is folded into the present. Queerness draws upon those pockets of  
potential to push beyond what Muñoz calls the “impasses” of  an LGBT politics that is 
largely content with the legalization of  same-sex marriage, which principally benefits gay 
and lesbian subjects who have economic and racial capital while abjecting queers of  color 
who don’t make the homonormative cut (CU, 19-21).  The utopianism of  queerness 35
aspires for a world in which sexuality is not an identity and intimacy isn’t validated by the 
state based on how well it comports with aspects of  heteronormativity: the couple-form, 
domesticity, longevity, and sentimentality. Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner describe a 
similar utopianism when they write that “heterosexuality involves so many practices that 
are not sex that a world in which this hegemonic cluster would not be dominant is, at this 
point, unimaginable. We are trying to bring that world into being.”  36
	 Muñoz’s queer utopianism and Edelman’s queer negativity are often seen as 
polarized ends of  debates within queer theory around the so-called “antisocial turn,” 
which is named primarily after Leo Bersani's and Edelman's respective projects.  This 37
debate has elaborated relationships between queerness and the social, negativity, 
antinormativity, the past, futurity, utopia, paranoia, and reparativity. Bersani’s and 
Edelman’s antisocial projects are often characterized as “antirelational,” but that 
overlooks how Bersani seeks an antiassimilationist, “anticommunal mode of  
connectedness.”  That characterization also misses remarks by Edelman that might 38
	 See also J. Jack Halberstam, Gaga Feminism: Sex, Gender, and the End of  Normal (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 35
2012), 95-129; Michael Warner, The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of  Queer Life (New York, 
NY: The Free Press, 1999), 81-147.
	 Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner, “Sex in Public,” Critical Inquiry 24, No. 2 (Winter 1998), 557.36
	 See Roberto L. Cesario, Lee Edelman, Judith Halberstam, José Esteban Muñoz, and Tim Dean, “The 37
Antisocial Thesis in Queer Theory,” PMLA Vol. 121, No. 3 (2006), 819-28.
	 Leo Bersani, Homos (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 10.38
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surprise those who are familiar with his work. For example, preceding his famous litany of  
“fucks” in No Future is an assertion that queers must “insist on our equal right to the social 
order’s prerogative” and “avow our capacity to promote that order's coherence and 
integrity” (NF, 29).  And it might seem odd that a diehard cheerleader of  the death drive 39
would say “I too cast my vote for flourishing.”  In what sense, then, might queerness 40
register as antisocial, and how might antisociality and negativity fare with utopia and 
futurity as coordinates for ethics in impasses? To what extent are negativity and utopia so 
opposed and how might drawing them together be ethically and politically productive for 
impasse? 
	 Although he values Bersani’s and Edelman’s theories for their criticism of  the 
normalization of  gay and lesbian studies, Muñoz is wary of  romanticizations of  queer 
negativity. In Muñoz’s eyes, Edelman isolates queerness from intersectional particulars 
and denies all investment in futurity to the result of  an elevated white-gay-middle-
classness. This is partly because, as Jack Halberstam observes, Edelman’s archive consists 
of  only of  gay men at the expense of  “dyke anger, anticolonial despair, racial rage, 
counter-hegemonic violence, punk pugilism.”  It is also unclear why Edelman believes 41
	 The litany: “Fuck the social order and the Child in whose name we're collectively terrorized; fuck Annie; 39
fuck the waif  from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net; fuck Laws both with capital ls and 
with small; fuck the whole network of  Symbolic relations and the future that serves as its prop.”
	 Berlant and Edelman, Sex, or the Unbearable, 11.40
	  Judith Halberstam, The Queer Art of  Failure (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 110. 41
Halberstam notes that a different archive of  antisociality might include “Valerie Solanas, Jamaica 
Kincaid, Patricia Highsmith, Wallace and Gromit, Johnny Rotten, Nicole Eiseman, Eileen Myles, June 
Jordan, Linda Besemer, Hothead Paisan, Finding Nemo, Lesbians on Ecstasy, Deborah Cass, SpongeBob, 
Shulamith Firestone, Marga Gomez, Toni Morrison, and Patti Smith” (ibid., 109). In a footnote, 
Edelman does acknowledge that “The overwhelming presence of  male sinthomosexuals in culture 
representation reflects, no doubt, a gender bias that continues to view women as 'naturally' bound more 
closely to sociality, reproduction, and domesticating emotion” (NF, 165 n. 10). It is unclear, however, why 
Edelman elects to side with representability when the sinthomosexual is supposed to defy representation. 
And his choice to not take up female or trans sinthomosexuals does not dissipate Halberstam's compelling 
push for a more expansive, more complicated, less gay-male-centered archive of  queer antisociality.
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the queer “in particular” to be “stigmatized as threatening an end to the future itself ” 
when similar figures of  abjection have been figured as doing the same, such as the 
terrorist, the native, and the negro (NF, 113).  42
	 Muñoz instead unhinges futurity from white straight time to seek futures in which 
queers of  color can survive and thrive (CU, 95-6). For queerness to explore this potential 
of  futurity, it must resist a “binary logic of  opposition,” which Muñoz believes the 
antisocial queer theorists to follow (CU, 13). But this resistance is precisely how Edelman 
describes queer negativity: “Where the political interventions of  identitarian minorities... 
may properly take shape as oppositional… queer theory’s opposition is precisely to any 
such logic of  opposition” (NF, 24). Simple opposition to reproductive futurism would 
situate queerness in a political field that is largely shaped by abjection. For Edelman, 
queer negativity instead signals the inability of  a social order to unambiguously 
consolidate itself. For me, it is a point where utopian futures become possible, where the 
paradox of  identity\difference plays out, where impasses open. 
	 I note this oversight by Muñoz to elaborate a greater role for queer negativity in 
considerations of  futurity in impasses. I agree with Muñoz that queerness must not be 
defined by the here and now; it is partly about futurity, partly about what is “no-longer-
conscious.” Following Ernst Bloch, Muñoz’s notion of  utopia is concrete because it is 
connected to historical struggles against dominant orders of  the present. In Bloch’s 
thought, “a turn to the no-longer-conscious enabled a critical hermeneutics attuned to 
	 Viewing queerness as the threat to reproductive futurism overlooks anxieties around miscegenation and 42
the threat it was held to pose to the future through heterosexual reproduction. Edelman's Lacanian 
account of  the social and the death drive, while productively suggestive, needs to be adjusted to account 
for historical arrangements of  power. Chandan Reddy makes a similar argument with “racial aliens, 
alien citizens, black citizens, tribal citizens, the undocumented” in mind (Freedom with Violence: Race, 
Sexuality, and the US State [Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011], 175-8). 
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comprehending the not-yet-here” (CU, 12). Recalling Deleuzean notions of  virtuality, 
Muñoz describes the no-longer-conscious as potentialities that crackle within the present. 
The past plays a role in generating queer futures. 
	 But Muñoz sometimes bends the past too easily toward the important task of  
imagining queer futures. His grammar wavers between figuring the past being lively in 
itself  and turning it into a resource that is mined for disidentification with pragmatic 
LGBT politics: “It is important to call upon the past, to animate it, understanding that the 
past has a performative nature, which is to say that rather than being static and fixed, the 
past does things” (CU, 27-8). I am more intrigued by Muñoz’s description of  the past as 
animate in itself, which suggests that the past can and does resist efforts to tame it. The 
past provides friction, and I turn to Heather Love to develop the place of  queer negativity 
in this notion. 
	 Love’s version of  queer negativity shifts from the psychoanalytic to the historical in 
a maneuver that loosens the structural hold of  homophobia and allows pockets of  
potentiality to have real efficacy. Like Muñoz, Love describes how queer turns to the past 
undercut brands of  LGBT politics that value positive affects at the expense of  negative 
ones. A turn backward attends to shame in its own life rather than as a state to be 
overcome by gay pride, as has been prevalent in gay and lesbian circles post-Stonewall.  43
Those who turn to the past might, however, find the past turning from them (FB, 43). 
Love thus ascribes value but not utility in turns toward the past and, in doing so, describes 
the past in its negativity. “We have to risk the turn backward,” Love writes, “even if  it 
means opening ourselves to social and psychic realities we would rather forget” (FB, 29). 
	 Heather Love, Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics of  Queer History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 43
Press, 2007), 28. Cited hereafter in this chapter as FB.
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The past is less a resource to be animated toward specific ends but an animate force in 
itself, a wildness that can undo us. It can cloud our visions of  the future. And because it 
does not bend to our will, the past in its liveliness marks limits to human agency. In short, 
one risks being carried into an impasse by turning to the past. 
	 This queerness is not about the intentional deployment of  the past to queer a 
political present (though when it is, its results are never predetermined or predictable). It 
resonates with recent work in queer theory which have emphasized queerness less as an 
identity or an activity but as an experience or ontology. This brand of  negativity does not 
follow an oppositional logic; it is at once destructive and potentially productive, though 
not immediately so. Berlant, Bersani, Edelman, Halberstam, Jasbir Puar, and Mel Chen 
have, in very different ways and in vastly different contexts, gestured toward a queer 
experience that is different from the important activity of  queering: being queered, 
nonsovereign, failing, shattered, unmoored, undone.  Not quite disidentification with, as 44
in Muñoz's account, but disidentification from. Disintegration. Queerness concerns the 
insinuation of  dark, undead pasts into our lives, especially when we seek to heal, recover, 
or head toward a bright future. 
	 The experience of  being queered registers, in Love’s words, “the gap between 
aspiration and the actual” in the aura of  pasts that never were—that is, of  desires, 
tendencies, and incipiences that were not actualized in a past moment due to dominant 
	 Mel Chen describes the relationship between toxicity and queerness as one of  unworlding: “[Toxic 44
affect] is already here, it is not a matter of  queer political agency so much as a queered political state of  
the present” (Mel Y. Chen, Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect [Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2012], 220; Jasbir Puar argues that a shift from intersectionality to assemblage theory is 
compelled by a queerness that moves through affects, textures, and matter: “There is no entity, no 
identity, no queer subject or subject to queer, rather queerness coming forth at us from all directions, 
screaming its defiance” (Jasbir K. Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times [Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2007], 211).
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arrangements of  power (FB, 4). Traces of  the past can be brought to new life in another 
time. Love’s description of  the negativity of  queerness resonates with what Connolly, 
following Deleuze, calls the “powers of  the false.” The false, according to Connolly, is 
more than an untruth; it is an incipient pluripotentiality that “falls below clean 
recollection because it was not consolidated enough at its inception to assume the shape 
of  a conscious image. It carries power if  at a later date it becomes a trigger below or on 
the edge of  sensory awareness that makes a difference to thought and action” (WB, 117). 
While sharing Muñoz’s attention to the potentiality of  the no-longer-conscious past, 
Connolly heeds the past in itself—which may never have been conscious—like Bergson 
and Deleuze did before him. This notion of  the past includes the latent though potential 
efficacy of  nonhumans and humans alike, which I elaborated in previous chapters. And 
unlike Love, who describes queerness purely as negativity, Connolly highlights the positive 
capacity of  the false to generate new thoughts, identities, or attachments. 
	 Queerness can sometimes be generative in this manner, but not always. The 
pluripotential power of  queerness, of  the false, can also issue in negative energies that can 
open impasses by unmaking lives and worlds. Nonetheless, I find that the negativity of  
queerness can be strangely utopian; it carries the aura of  what Peter Coviello calls 
“broken-off, uncreated futures, futures that would not come to be.”  Those futures need 45
not have been consciously or clearly envisioned; as I will elaborate below, their early 
beginnings lie in dark affects. Those affects might sometimes push queerness into more 
habitable futures, as Muñoz believes. They might sometimes issue in a novel identity or 
public, as Connolly believes. Or they might forestall such futures, even as they mark tiny 
	 Peter Coviello, Tomorrow's Parties: Sex and the Untimely in Nineteenth-Century America (New York, NY: New 45
York University Press, 2013), 20.
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differences from what has been. 
	 Queer trajectories emerge in an impasse’s disjunctures between dark affects and 
inhabitable worlds, between negativity and utopia, between pluripotential pasts and 
incipient futures. If  queer negativity sparks with powers of  the false, then it does not arise 
only in a human subject’s textual encounters, as Love’s readings go. Queer trajectories 
arise in dark atmospheres of  ordinary life.  Queerness circulates at the fringe of  46
consciousness, buzzing with undead pasts and occasionally flashing up in the simplest of  
happenings.  Entire landscapes can be queer; we become queered as we saunter through 47
them, being pulled awry and apart, merging with things that begin to float. Queer 
negativity rises up in dark atmospheres, throwing itself  together out of  lodged potentials 
and jagged textures. 
	 Queer trajectories reshape ethics in impasses. They are composed of  a broad 
array of  propensities and energies that includes more than jouissance and the social 
order’s death drive. As a result, an ethics that follows queer trajectories is more open to 
futurity than Edelman is while nonetheless sharing his critique of  reproductive futurism. 
It also departs from Edelman’s reduction of  politics to signification in order to cultivate 
better sensitivity to circuits between vibrant matter, cultural meaning, social relations, and 
political practices. It allows for more positive elaborations of  what flourishing might look 
like in the face of  the unbearable. 
	 This argument is a couplet of  chapter two and José Muñoz's reading of  Ana Mendieta's siluetas. 46
Composed of  markings and indentations in the earth, the siluetas create a locus of  encounter with 
historical violences and lived struggles. See José Esteban Muñoz, “Vitalism's After-Burn: The Sense of  
Ana Mendieta,” Women & Performance Vol. 21, No. 2 (July 2011), 191-8.
	 Like tripping. Connolly writes: “Consider when Proust's narrator slips on a couple of  uneven stones and 47
is hurtled back to another moment when a similar thing had happened, barely perceptible at the time 
under the pressure of  another course of  action. Now those two moments enter into a new pattern of  
resonance, opening up a possibility of  feeling, thought, or action unavailable until that moment” (WB, 
116-7).
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	 What might ethics in impasses involve when informed by queer trajectories? First, 
it is a queer inhumanist ethics that does not begin with action per se, at least not that of  
an intentional, conscious human subject.  Queer trajectories do not begin and end with 48
the human; their ethics arises through affects that undo lives and worlds. Second, this 
ethics is not tethered to supposedly universal principles nor does it barrel forward to a 
predefined good life. It values impassivity, a watching and waiting for what might emerge; 
it follows wayward, wild movements that spring from impacts suffered, impulses, and gut 
feelings. As such, this ethics is not about restoring a self  or collective and making it last, 
though the impasses faced by abjected peoples may call for greater persistence and 
resilience. It aims to accept, perhaps begrudgingly though without existential resentment, 
the possible loss of  attachments even though things might remain the same after all. An 
ethics inflected by queer trajectories cultivates an openness to becoming, to becoming 
undone, to striving to end one timeline even if  another is not clearly available, to allowing 
the intensities of  impasse to work their magic before seeking a foothold in an emergent 
world. In short, this ethics mitigates temptations to violence by resisting calls to control, 
sovereignty, or mastery and by welcoming the potential end of  a world. 
Queerly Tragic, Tragically Queer 
Is it enough for politics in impasses to merely follow queer trajectories? Might queerness 
contribute more to politics in impasses than blows to the pressure points of  attachments? 
What is entailed by affirming queerness in relation to futures that could be—whether they 
are futures that we want, whether they are futures that change what we want? 
 	 See the “Queer Inhumanisms” issue of  GLQ: A Journal of  Lesbian and Gay Studies 21, No. 2-3 (June 2015), 48
edited by Mel Y. Chen and Dana Luciano.
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	 By advocating a politics with elements of  affirmation, I depart from queer 
theorists who view the affirmative per se as foolishly utopian, or conservative, or 
oppressively normative, or uncritically optimistic. Edelman is one of  them. Love is 
another. She criticizes the “affirmative turn” in queer studies for attempting to secure “a 
more stable and positive identity in the present” by immunizing queers from the bad 
affects of  the past (FB, 34). That effort, she continues, blots out shame, loneliness, and 
melancholy by the radiance of  gay pride that lights the way for a politics of  visibility and 
inclusion. By doing so, the affirmative endeavors of  gays and lesbians values positive over 
negative affects, prop up fantasies of  sovereignty, lay out a path of  progress, and fold into 
liberal multiculturalism. 
	 Love might be amenable to a notion of  affirmation that, in Connolly’s words, 
“problematize[s] the present by recourse to the past without promising a perfect time in 
the past to return to” (ID, 182). Connolly recalls Love’s turn backwards to the past while 
elaborating that a genealogical element makes the contingency of  identity worthy of  
affirmation (ID, 183). This form of  genealogy differs from the one that is criticized by 
Love for “looking for high points of  pride, gender flexibility, and resistance” (FB, 127). On 
my reading, the problem lies not with affirmation itself  but what is affirmed, the manner 
in which affirmation proceeds, and the openness that it has to negativity. And, as 
Connolly emphasizes, dismissing affirmation entirely may be politically dangerous; it 
generates a passive nihilism that inflames existential resentment. 
	 To elaborate a tragic form of  affirmation, I first turn to Nietzsche via Sara 
Ahmed. Like Love, Ahmed criticizes the amalgamation of  positive affects, activity, and 
ethics into a teleology of  happiness that, among other things, dismisses negative affects 
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and overlooks how seemingly passive subjects are buzzing with creativity. Nietzsche and 
Deleuze are the primary culprits of  what she calls the “affirmative turn.” Ahmed believes 
that Nietzsche problematically divides the happy and the unhappy by activity and 
passivity and by affirmation and negation. Insofar as the happy, noble, self-affirming ones 
are “well-bred,” Nietzsche’s notion of  happiness is based on “the exclusion of  the 
empirical and the contingent.”  What results is a “fantasy of  self-control” that leads one 49
to secure positive feelings, good encounters, and affirmative activity alone, all of  which 
are held to be ethical goods.   50
	 Ahmed’s important critique of  the promise of  happiness—its normative 
framework, its teleological temporality, its lines of  difference by race, class, gender, 
sexuality, and nation—is more applicable to cultural regimes of  positive thinking  than to 51
Nietzsche’s tragic notion of  joy. Ahmed neglects the place of  suffering, impermanence, 
and the tragic in Nietzsche’s accounts of  joy, nobility, and affirmation. Moreover, Ahmed 
folds her critique of  joy into a larger critique of  the “promise of  happiness” and thus 
misses how joy and happiness produce different effects.  52
	 I read Nietzsche as concerned with impasse though he does not use the term. He 
addresses the loss or insufficiency of  God, truth, morality, human nature, and politics as 
anchors for living. He writes much of  struggles to thrive in the face of  impermanence, 
suffering, and mortality. A number of  Nietzsche’s aphorisms dramatize impasse, such as 
	 Sara Ahmed, The Promise of  Happiness (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 207.49
	 Ibid., 208.50
	 Barbara Ehrenreich makes mincemeat of  US cultures of  positive thinking in Bright-Sided: How Positive 51
Thinking Is Undermining America (New York, NY: Picador, 2009).
	 Ahmed does note that joy and happiness emerge from different genealogies but ultimately believes that 52
they produce similar effects insofar as thinkers like Deleuze, Brian Massumi, and Rosi Braidotti enshrine 
joy as the goal for which we should aim (The Promise of  Happiness, 214).
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his famous aphorism on the death of  God, which includes thick descriptions of  existential 
free-fall, rituals of  coping, and inventions of  new values to come.  Or take his aphorism 53
on the double-bind of  habits, those attachments that initially promise eternal satisfaction 
but eventually dissolve, soliciting both nausea and gratitude.  Or those aphorisms in Thus 54
Spoke Zarathustra on the redemption of  broken lives in the face of  the irreversibility of  
time,  on the dark period between the destruction of  old tablets of  morality and filling 55
out new ones,  or the many moments in which Zarathustra is shocked into solitude, 56
meditation, and reverie. Nietzsche provides conceptual, ethical, and political resources for 
tending to impasse even if  he largely steered clear of  politics. I turn to his writings on joy 
and the tragic to elaborate a political engagement with impasse. 
	 For Nietzsche, the most cherished sources of  joy can be shattered when others are 
unavailable. The suffering induced by impermanence generates a horrifying thought: our 
flourishing is contingent rather than guaranteed; it is not in the soft hands of  a god, a 
natural purpose, or fate. Not even all the muscle and smarts of  the world can save us from 
	 “What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither 53
are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in 
all directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we 
not feel the breath of  empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night continually closing in on 
us?... 
	 	 “How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of  all murderers? What was holiest and mightiest 
of  all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood off  us? 
What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of  atonement, what sacred games shall we 
have to invent?” (Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann [New York, NY: Vintage 
Books, 1974], 181). Cited hereafter in this chapter as GS.
	 “I always believe that here is something that will give me lasting satisfaction... And now it nourishes me 54
at noon and in the evening and spreads a deep contentment all around itself  and deep into me so that I 
desire nothing else... But one day its time is up; the good thing parts from me, not as something that has 
come to nauseate me but peacefully and sated with me as I am with it... Even then something new is 
waiting at the door...” (GS, 236-7.)
	 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Redemption” in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York, 55
NY: The Modern Library, 1995), 137-42. Cited hereafter in this chapter as TSZ.
	 “On Old and New Tablets” in TSZ, 196.56
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the terror of  time. Sooner or later we will face the unbearable, and for what? The answer 
would make even the mightiest of  us tremble... 
	 How, then, to cultivate joy? Zarathustra struggles before eventually proclaiming: 
“The world is deep. / Deeper than day had been aware. / Deep is its woe; / Joy—deeper 
yet than agony: / Woe implores: Go! / But all joy wants eternity— / Wants deep, wants 
deep eternity” (TSZ, 324). Although suffering and those who are hellbent on holding 
others responsible for their woes are belched up by the world, Zarathustra realizes that 
the world itself  doesn’t deserve to be denigrated.  The world is deep. It is rich. It secretes 57
all sorts of  ugly, lovely things that it later consumes as nutrition for the production of  
something worthy of  love. This process, by which the world becomes something else, 
continues without end. Zarathustra, as does Whitehead, Whitman, and Connolly, 
professes a “world of  becoming” that periodically throws itself  into new configurations.  58
A range of  affects flows from this condition: woe, which invokes the desire for change; joy, 
in moments that desire eternity. For Zarathustra, joy bespeaks an attachment to this 
world: 
Have you ever said Yes to a single joy? O my friends, then you said Yes 
too to all woe. All things are entangled, ensnared, enamored; if  ever you 
wanted one thing twice, if  ever you said, 'You please me, happiness! 
Abide, moment!' then you wanted all back. All anew, all eternally, all 
entangled, ensnared, enamored—oh, then you loved the world. (TSZ, 323) 
Joy arises because of  all that preceded it—all suffering, all weakness. Even existential 
	 “There is much filth in the world; that much is true. But that does not make the world itself  a filthy 57
monster” (TSZ, 205).
	 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1968), 58
549-550; WB.
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resentment is part of  the world that is affirmed in joy. Because all things, according to 
Zarathustra, are so connected that a moment of  joy could not occur otherwise, anyone 
who would affirm joy must affirm a world that also issues in woe, suffering, and existential 
resentment—even if  these are not worthy of  affirmation. Zarathustra’s notion of  
affirmation does not locate joy in any particular source; joy lies in intensity, ephemerality, 
and contingency. 
	 This form of  affirmation includes the possibility of  oneself  being dismantled and 
changed. Joy shapes an affirmative orientation that operates even when feelings are bad. 
Connolly builds an ethics and politics from connections between the sweetness of  life and 
tragic possibility that he, following Deleuze, calls “belief  in this world.”  According to 59
Connolly, people no longer sense belonging to be automatic or secure. Akin to what I call 
“attachment,” “belonging” entails “the feeling of  comfort that comes with the image of  a 
close, layered fit between self  and world and between collectivity and world.”  Belonging 60
also involves what Deleuze calls a “sensory-motor schema” that allows action and reaction 
to flow smoothly. When belonging is jeopardized, people find their sensorium upset, teeter 
on the edge of  despair, and feel the rising tide of  ressentiment. The potential loss of  belief  
in this world is an impasse matter that is productively addressed by, in Connolly’s words, 
“translat[ing] the fantasy of  either automatically belonging to the world or exerting 
consummate mastery over it into existential belief  in a world replete with powers of  
	 Deleuze develops this idea in light of  the desolation of  European landscapes in World War II. Neo-59
realist films depicted ruptures in sensory-motor schema through pure optical and sound situations in 
which characters, no longer able to act and react, become seers. The task of  restoring belief  in this 
world was, according to Deleuze, taken up by Carl Theodore Dreyer, Roberto Rossellini, and Jean-Luc 
Godard. See Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of  Minnesota Press, 1989).
	 William E. Connolly, “Freedom, Teleodynamism, Creativity,” Foucault Studies No. 17 (April 2014), 72.60
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metamorphosis and uncanny shocks that periodically jolt us from stupor.”  In other 61
words, belief  in this world acknowledges impasse to be an inevitable feature of  life in a 
world of  becoming. Cultivation of  belief  in this world involves the development of  a 
tragic vision. 
	 According to Connolly, humans guided by a tragic vision strive to attune to forces 
beyond their control and understanding, to the vicissitudes of  time that periodically issue 
surprising events, and to the development of  attachments that are vitalizing yet flexible 
and open to abandonment.  It recalls what Ahmed calls a “politics of  the hap,” which 62
affords greater latitude to chance happenings that pull subjects into queer trajectories and 
make possible alternative worlds.  More than a politics of  the hap, a tragic vision affirms 63
the real creativity of  a world of  becoming by acknowledging the powers and propensities 
of  nonhumans. In short, a tragic vision disputes providence, human sovereignty, and 
teleological models of  time while striving to positively cultivate joy and flourishing from 
amidst rather than at the expense of  woe and suffering. 
	 A tragic vision mitigates temptations to violence in response to the experience of  
impasses. (1) It affirms that humans act without sovereignty as the world rolls on despite 
our wishes that it stay, as it braces itself  despite our wishes that it change. (2) It affirms 
suffering as an unavoidable feature of  human life rather than as the result of  subjects who 
can be punished as responsible agents. (3) It affirms nonetheless that we aren’t condemned 
	 Ibid., 73.61
	 “You approach a tragic vision if  you doubt the providential image of  time, reject the compensatory idea 62
that humans can master all the forces that impinge upon life, strive to cultivate wisdom about a world 
that is neither designed for our benefit nor plastic enough to be putty in our hands, and cultivate 
temporal sensitivity to how this or that concatenation of  events could issue in the worst” (Connolly, 
Capitalism and Christianity, American Style, 121).
	 Ahmed, The Promise of  Happiness, 223.63
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to misery and despair. (4) It encourages positive attachments to the world from joy, 
however momentary and fleeting it may be. In these ways, a tragic vision centers joy as an 
important resource for a politics that would dampen the cruel optimisms and dogmatisms 
that arise due to existential resentment in the face of  impasse. 
	 (5) A politics informed by a tragic vision engages the paradox of  identity
\difference by affirming the fragmentation and incompleteness of  identity rather than 
denigrating them as the effects of  disturbances that ought to be contained. Love and 
Muñoz provide resonant accounts of  how that paradox might be engaged. While 
acknowledging the importance of  anti-identitarian work in queer theory, Love notes that 
identity itself  can be queered: “negative or ambivalent identifications with the past can 
serve to disrupt the present” (FB, 45). Love ends up criticizing the “affirmative bias” of  
identity, not identity itself. But affirmation, as described above, need not have a stabilizing 
effect. Nietzsche, Zarathustra, and Connolly provide alternatives. Muñoz provides 
another when he writes that “identity practices such as queerness and hybridity are… 
spaces of  productivity where identity’s fragmentary nature is accepted and 
negotiated” (D, 79). While recalling the paradox of  difference at the heart of  identity, 
Muñoz emphasizes that identity can be transformed into a political space by minoritarian 
subjects. And while echoing Love’s account of  queerness and contestation, Muñoz more 
positively describes how minoritarian practices of  disidentification orbit identity even as 
its subjects become undone. In this manner, identity is neither fixed nor dispensable. 
Identities can be cultivated but never finalized. They may attain a dominant character but 
never one that is fully smoothed and shined. A tragic politics holds the jagged, conflictual 
nature of  identity as worthy of  affirmation. And it posits that affirmation of  those 
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fractures do not suture up identity but carry it on queer trajectories. 
	 (6) A politics guided by a tragic vision keeps futurity open. Futures loom in the 
present impasse. The impermanence of  attachments means that life is periodically drawn 
into real impasses and not just minor setbacks. Like Muñoz’s utopian orientation, this 
tragic vision strives to push toward an open future beyond the constraints of  pragmatic 
endeavors. It dissents from Edelman’s call for an end to the future as such and heeds 
instead Love’s vision of  “a future apart from the reproductive imperative, optimism, and 
the promise of  redemption” (FB, 147). Love observes that the lure of  the future is 
troubling but finds it to be important nonetheless (FB, 162). A queer politics seeks to 
neither brighten the future nor abandon it to darkness; it strives “to make a future 
backward enough that even the most reluctant among us might want to live there” (FB, 
163). The affirmative practices generated by a tragic vision respond to Love's invitation to 
imagine a backwards future, which carries a small utopian wish. A tragic vision 
understands that such a task originates in impasses, wherein futures rise up like smoke 
from the embers of  a dying present. A tragic vision finds such possibility in a world of  
becoming, a cosmos of  multiple actants, human and not, that pull us into queer 
trajectories. It keeps the future open by rendering it backwards—that is, by twisting it 
away from any settled notion of  the good life. 
	 Queerness and the tragic both affirm the value of  periodically becoming undone, 
of  developing a sensitivity to queer trajectories, of  reckoning with a lack of  sovereignty, 
and of  finding ways to survive and thrive in a world that don’t guarantee one’s flourishing. 
Some strands of  queerness, however, compel a politics of  tragic affirmation to allow a 
broader role for woe in impasses. Whereas Connolly advises the cultivation of  
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attachments from the sweetness of  life from within the tragic possibilities of  a world of  
becoming, queerness delivers an experience of  becoming undone through dark affects. 
	 The dangers of  woe are many. Nietzsche and Connolly are rightly concerned that 
woe might furnish existential resentment; it leads one into “otherworldly” fantasies that 
denigrate this world, concoct a salvational God, and target others as responsible for one’s 
suffering. Reminiscent of  these concerns, Berlant criticizes the genre of  sentimentality for 
generating fantasies of  a life without suffering.  She describes the appropriation of  these 64
fantasies, which originated in the politics of  racial, sexual, and gender minorities, by 
Reaganite conservatives who exaggerated disturbances to their privilege as social and 
existential suffering to be alleviated through the heteronormalization and privatization of  
politics.  Differences aside, Nietzsche, Connolly, and Berlant remain wary of  the political 65
capital of  pain, suffering, and woe, which can disconnect politics from down-to-earth 
struggles and take a violent turn. 
	 On my reading, Nietzsche, Connolly, and Berlant issue hesitations but not 
dismissals. Nietzsche observes that suffering can be “the sign of  a crucial and most 
essential growth, of  the transition to new conditions of  existence.”  More than a sign, 66
however, dark affects might motivate political action. As Connolly notes, “resentment is 
often a needed impetus to action, even if  it carries the danger of  becoming transfigured 
into ressentiment. It is existential resentment we worry about most, the kind that is apparent 
today in practices of  capitalist greed, religious exclusivity, media bellicosity, authoritarian 
	 Lauren Berlant, “The Subject of  True Feeling: Pain, Privacy, Politics” in Cultural Studies & Political 64
Theory, ed. Jodi Dean (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 42-62.
	 Lauren Berlant, The Queen of  America Goes to Washington City: Essays on Sex and Citizenship (Durham, NC: 65
Duke University Press, 1997), 2.
	 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 69.66
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strategies, sexual narrowness, and military aggression” (WB, 66). Finally, Berlant also finds 
some political potential in sentimentality. She admits that sentimental works of  art bear 
witness to another world that is presently unlivable but nonetheless accessible as a 
feeling.  67
	 The problem is not dark affects themselves but where they might land. The 
political question is how the possibilities for other worlds that are found in woe, pain, 
resentment, and other dark affects might be pursued without furnishing dogmatism or 
cruel optimism. 
	 Dark affects in an impasse express utopian longings that could lead politics to 
detachment from a world. I read woe as potentially utopian because, according to 
Zarathustra, woe wants the moment to end, wants the here and now to pass; it was in 
pain that Candide’s Leibnizian view of  the world fell into crisis and in which other worlds 
and other futures became palpable. If  the present feels like a step on a fated path, then 
woe opens futures that are not predetermined. 
	 The political import of  this point becomes evident in a turn to Berlant’s comments 
on the relationship between history, affect, and politics. Berlant implies that dark affects 
flag something wrong in a world. When guided by a historical sensibility, one might find 
in dark affects the motivation for political rather than personal change.  “History hurts,” 68
Berlant writes, “but not only. It also engenders optimism in response to the oppressive 
	 “For many people, sentimentality and the fantasy of  a better proximate world so close that one can 67
experience it affectively without being able to live it objectively produces art that does, that transports 
people somewhere into a situation for a minute” (Berlant, The Female Complaint, 31).
	 “To think of  the world as organized around the impersonality of  structures and practices that 68
conventionalize desire, intimacy, and even one's own personhood was to realize how uninevitable the 
experience of  being personal, of  having personality, is. Out of  this happy thought came an orientation 
toward fidelity to inclinations of  all sorts, including those intellectual and political” (Berlant, Cruel 
Optimism, 125).
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presence of  what dominates or is taken for granted.”  History reveals that dominant 69
orders of  power are neither natural nor unavoidable—a powerful lesson, especially when 
other worlds fail to gain traction and a dominant one appears to be set in stone. In the 
face of  long-standing systems of  power, dark affects bloom through tiny disturbances, 
unhinged moments, wayward experiences, perverse desires, wild imaginations, radical 
politics. They unfold queer trajectories, away from the world that is and toward worlds 
that could be. 
	 Berlant describes the political importance of  tarrying with queer trajectories: 
“Political emotions are responses to prospects for change: fidelity to those responses is 
optimistic, even if  the affects are dark.”  This echo of  Nietzsche’s existential affirmation 70
of  becoming resounds on a political register. What one could call Berlant’s tragic 
sensibility is an understanding of  political fidelities to dark affects rather than solely to joy 
or the sweetness of  life. This sensibility might be sensed further when Berlant flags the 
risks of  “having to survive, once again, disappointment or depression, the protracted 
sense that nothing will change and that no-one, especially oneself, is teachable after all.”  71
In an impasse, to be teachable is to allow oneself  to be queered, to be hit by the 
unbearable and ferried away or disintegrated, to resist the urge to readily gather oneself  
and one’s world back together, especially when it demands trouncing lives and happenings 
that seem awry in order to protect the good life. 
	 Impasse poses a tough question: how might one live and live on when the very 





mere fantasy, or turn out to exact dire costs from us and from others? This is the question 
of  cruel optimism which asks, as Berlant phrases it, “To what life, after all, is one 
recommitting, once the thing that stood in for a life worth attaching to no longer 
obtains?”  Impasse surely does not threaten all our attachments at once, not all 72
attachments are equally valuable or grounding, and the unbearable does not destroy us 
when it threatens our anchors. I am also not saying that the minoritized, the abjected, or 
those who are otherwise caught up in exhaustion, decay, ordinary suffering, and everyday 
aggression do not have attachments to this world or reasons to persist; as Sexton notes, 
black exhaustion does not foreclose “the labor of  critical reflection, the hope of  organized 
political action, or, for that matter, the enjoyment of  a vibrant and sustaining cultural 
life.”  For abjected groups, the question of  persistence has been of  the utmost 73
importance.  My point is that the sweetness of  life, joy, and belief  in this world are 74
imperiled in impasses and no longer anchor politics as they might in other predicaments. 
It is also that the possibilities of  political change may be felt more acutely in dark affects, 
which are no less worthy of  affirmation even if  joy seems far removed, even if  change is 
not guaranteed to come, even if  change might amount to worlds that are more 
constraining, more coercive, more deadly. Such an orientation is, of  course, insufficient. It 
nonetheless remains invaluable as part of  a broader array of  politics within impasse. 
	 Impasse compels a politics of  tragic affirmation to draw greater sustenance from 
dark affects. This politics does not rely on sweetness to compensate for suffering, as 
	 Berlant and Edelman, Sex, or the Unbearable, 38.72
	 Sexton, “People-of-Color-Blindness,” 45.73
	 Berlant notes the importance of  persistence in José Esteban Muñoz's thought in “On Persistence,” Social 74
Text Vol. 32, No. 4 (Winter 2014), 33-7.
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Nietzsche seems to wish for when writing that the Dionysian element in the tragic means 
“Saying yes to life, even in its strangest and hardest problems,”  or as Connolly seems to 75
do when he writes “Even a contingent identity is worth living. Even a life that ends in 
oblivion is sweet. Even suffering, up to some undefinable point, is worth the living that 
brings it” (ID, 171; emphasis mine).  While I appreciate Nietzsche’s and Connolly’s 76
efforts to mitigate the reduction of  lives to misery, those “evens” leave me pause. They 
parse positive and negative affect, such that problems, contingency, oblivion, and suffering 
are viewed as apart from and antithetical to joy and life. Following Ahmed, Ann 
Cvetkovich, Jack Halberstam, and other feminist and queer scholars working around the 
rubric of  “Public Feelings,” I suspend prioritizations of  positive affects over negative ones 
so to explore the ethical and political possibilities that arise within the darkness of  
impasse.  As Ahmed writes, “We might need to attend to bad feelings not in order to 77
overcome them but to learn by [sic] how we are affected by what comes near, which 
means achieving a different relationship to all our wanted and unwanted feelings as an 
ethical resource.”  Ahmed describes how the ethical does not need to be tethered to a 78
notion of  identity or action, as Connolly puts it. Nor does it issue from joy. Instead, this 
side of  ethics involves the suspension of  activity in favor of  a sharper attunement to what 
undoes us in impasse. 
	 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of  the Idols, trans. Duncan Large (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 75
1998), 80; emphasis mine.
	 Connolly, of  course, does not mean belief  in this world to excuse suffering under regimes of  power (WB, 76
66). My hesitation lies whether attachments to the sweetness of  life and belief  in this world too easily 
brush aside woe, agony, and suffering.
	 Ann Cvetkovich, Depression: A Public Feeling (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012); Halberstam, 77
The Queer Art of  Failure.
	 Ahmed, The Promise of  Happiness, 216.78
222
	 Furthermore, the notion of  affirmation that Zarathustra locates in redemption is 
insensitive to political abjection. While suspicious of  outsourcing redemption to a God 
who would reward those who suffer in this life, Zarathustra maintains that redemption is 
important because it prevents humans from slipping into nihilism and succumbing to 
ressentiment. This earthy redemption confronts the inability of  the will to either undo the 
vicissitudes of  time or to overcome the condition of  living in a world that one neither 
created nor can act sovereignly within. “Powerless against what has been done,” 
Zarathustra speaks, “he is an angry spectator of  all that is past” (TSZ, 139). Here, 
Zarathustra resonates with Love regarding an image of  the past that escapes human 
control. While Love acknowledges the negative force of  the past, Zarathustra strives to 
channel it through creative acts; one might, according to Zarathustra aspire to “redeem 
those who lived in the past and to create all ‘it was’ into a ‘thus I willed it’” (TSZ, 139). 
Zarathustra does not mean that one should take responsibility for one’s lot; rather, he 
means that working upon oneself  and one’s world is an integral component of  affirmation 
even if  the outcomes of  doing so may not be controlled or even anticipated. This noble 
form of  redemption affirms the irreversibility of  time and the lack of  sovereign agency 
while also affirming that differences can be made. Oriented thus, one strives to become 
worthy to time. Without redemption, time would be experienced as “the greatest 
weight” (GS, 273-4). 
	 While important for a politics of  tragic affirmation in impasses, this form of  
redemption might cede too much to what appears to be fated at the present moment. 
Zarathustra’s framework runs the risk of  presenting the abjected as “powerless,” “angry 
spectators” because the past is held to be settled. Although I agree with Zarathustra that 
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affirming this world as complex and susceptible to change may quell the flames of  
ressentiment, my stomach turns at the broad scope of  his understanding of  redemption. 
The line between affirming this world and affirming the powers that be in it is quite thin 
where the weight of  the past is held to be fated, as though systems of  power have been 
successfully consolidated. It is worth sharpening this subtle line to modify affirmation in 
light of  impasse. Can we acknowledge the powerful force of  dominant regimes and their 
incompleteness, which attests to both their inability to become a an airtight structure and 
to the potency of  alternatives that are already available? Can we be creative and 
redemptive without having to affirm the past as over and done with? 
	 Riffing on Zarathustra, one might shift from affirming the “it was” to affirming “it 
could have been otherwise.” By this, I do not mean that the past is merely what anyone 
says it is. This affirmation acknowledges the past that happened and that amounted to 
longstanding systems of  abjection while raising the volume of  the powers of  the false. In 
short, this tragic affirmation tends to the pasts that were not. These pasts are the strange 
temporalities that lie between the pasts that did happen and the lives and worlds that 
could not be at a given moment. They bear the potentialities sparked of  friction between 
different pasts. A version of  the pasts that were not is found in Peter Coviello’s work on 
mid- to late-nineteenth century American writers who explored “the experience of  
sexuality as something in the crosshairs of  a number of  forms of  knowledge and 
regulation but not yet wholly captivated or made coordinate by them.”  Writers such as 79
Henry David Thoreau, Walt Whitman, and Emily Dickinson sensed the imminent 
solidification of  publicly policed sexual identity (which would emerge around the Oscar 
	 Coviello, Tomorrow's Parties, 7.79
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Wilde trials) and expressed pluripotential longings, desires, and intimacies that to us are 
early, to them were untimely. Coviello finds, in words apt for the politics of  impasse that 
I’m developing, 
a yearning without a viable path toward its own fulfillment; a politics not 
resigned but forestalled; an unwillingness to cede to the terms of  a given 
social world, even in the absence of  usable alternatives to it; or a multiply-
inflected cathexis of  the bare possibility of  an arrived future that might, if  
not redeem, at least alter the intractable terms of  the present tense.  80
	 A tragic affirmation that follows the pluripotentiality of  the past might be seen as 
hopelessly utopian. Precisely! It is hopeless because it finds hope to cede too much to 
dominant systems of  power and their temporalities, which project the past as settled and 
the future as determined. It is utopian insofar as it rejects that temporality in favor of  the 
potency that arises between undead pasts and incipient futures. This tragic affirmation 
emerges where the untimely and the utopian meet. It explores the pluripotentialities that 
linger in an impasse as the ghosts of  pasts that could not have been, of  futures unrealized, 
of  potencies that are alive and yet cannot quite be lived. 
	 This tragic affirmation would, furthermore, draw upon a different image of  time 
than the one posited by Zarathustra. The inability to undo time presumes that an event 
has lapsed into the past and attained the status of  “fate.” But politics in impasses does not 
only have to face the immovable weight of  the past. It also faces a backwards, pluripotent 
past that continues to shape-shift through its ongoing life. In short, this tragic affirmation 
concerns not events but impasses. 
	 Ibid., 20-1.80
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	 Queerness draws the tragic into a political register that affirms the 
pluripotentiality of  an undead past to contest dominant systems of  power. From this 
position, Nietzsche’s notion of  joy seems to be caught up in an all-or-nothing bind: “If  we 
affirm one single moment, we thus affirm not only ourselves but all existence. For nothing 
is self-sufficient, neither in us ourselves nor in things.”  Are individual self-sufficiency or a 81
tightly-knit whole the only options? Writing against individualism and holism, Connolly 
opts for a “connectionism” that he derives from William James. In James’s pluriverse, 
things are neither self-contained nor mere parts of  a larger whole. It is full of  
“connections [that] are typically loose, incomplete, and themselves susceptible to potential 
change... The connections are punctuated by ‘litter' circulating in, between, and around 
them” (WB, 35). This connectionism accounts for a world of  becoming while avoiding the 
holistic eternality that is posited by Nietzsche in his later works.  It allows Connolly to 82
develop a notion of  affirmation that does not affirm those systems of  power that “make 
people suffer too much” (WB, 66). In this light, tragic affirmation does not affirm this 
world simply because it can issue in joy or only to mitigate existential resentment. It casts 
a critical eye on attachments to this world to gauge whether and how they bear the ghosts 
	 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 532.81
	 Further developing his earlier insights into the eternal return, Nietzsche writes that the world might be 82
parsed into a “calculable number of  combinations” that would be realized and repeated eternally if  
time were infinite “If  the world may be thought of  as a certain definite quantity of  force and as a certain 
definite number of  centers of  force... it follows that, in the great dice game of  existence, it must pass 
through a calculable number of  combinations. In infinite time, every possible combination would at 
some time or another be realized; more: it would be realized an infinite number of  times. And since 
between very combination and its next recurrence all other possible combinations would have to take 
place, and each of  these combinations conditions the entire sequence of  combinations in the same 
series, a circular movement of  absolutely identical series is thus demonstrated: the world as a circular 
movement that has already repeated itself  infinitely often and plays its game ad infinitum” (Will to Power, 
549). It is worth noting that Nietzsche writes conjecturally here. Rather than long cycles of  time, 
“eternal return” could designate instead the periodic recurrence of  intensive moments, of  bifurcations 
in time, that issue in novelty. I would prefer to read Nietzsche this way, as does Connolly (WB, 110-1; 
FT, 217 n. 3) and Gilles Deleuze (Difference & Repetition, trans. Paul Patton [New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1994], 298-9).
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of  abjection. It also strives to become willing to be pulled into impasses and changed by 
them, even as the experience of  impasse threatens what matters. 
	 In short, the tragic affirmation that I support is queered. It does not find joy to be 
“deeper” than woe. It does not only use attachments to the sweetness of  life as the 
resource for politics in the impasse. Instead, it risks a lot, perhaps too much at times. It 
affirms what is unknown and indeterminate. What troubles confidence and optimism. 
What dispels fantasies of  sovereignty. It affirms what, because of  these dark aspects, can 
deliver a utopian sense if  not a belief  in worlds that are palpable even if  they are 
unimaginable. 
You’re Gonna Carry that Weight… 
The uncertainties and indeterminacies of  impasse entail that queerness and the tragic are 
not so tightly woven to form a straightforward program of  ethical and political activity. 
First, the negativity of  queerness is insufficient to detachment in impasses and does not in 
itself  resist temptations to violence. The experiences of  becoming undone can provoke 
violent reactions. Queerness must be connected to a tragic affirmation that resists holding 
others responsible for one’s suffering even as systems of  power must continue to be 
challenged. 
	 Second, the negativity of  queerness does not in itself  engage the positive task of  
cultivating new attachments. Restricting queerness to an ethics of  inhabiting negativity, as 
Edelman’s, is too risky at a time when, as Connolly puts it, the conservative right in the 
US pursues an aggressive neoliberal agenda by depicting politics to be a lost cause (FT, 
192). I also agree with Muñoz that there is an urgent need to pursue habitable futures for 
227
queerness, blackness, indigeneity, the crossings between, and much more besides. Queer 
negativity splinters open a timeline that seems fated but does not in itself  seek a fleshed-
out future. At some undefined point, queer negativity needs to be connected with 
activities like self-cultivation, role experimentation, and world-making, utopian 
disidentifications. Reworked through queer negativity, these affirmative political practices 
are not socially conservative. They cultivate the utopian longings of  dark affects into a 
breathing space for refiguring living. 
	 Finally, queerness needs tragic affirmation because one might not be successful in 
detaching from or dismantling dominant systems of  power. Attachments carry the weight 
of  time. If  the past accumulates and doesn’t bend to our will, we may never lose 
attachments which have been constitutive for us and our worlds. Attachments have 
formed out of  our control and cannot be willfully unmade. We may only ever adjust 
them, recalibrate them, disidentify with them to an unknown extent so that their hold is 
diminished as they nonetheless continue to hum in the background of  our lives.  83
	 If  we are unable to leave attachments behind, then we are unable to leave 
impasses behind. I question Berlant’s suggestion that we know later that a situation was an 
impasse since it presumes that we can know when we’ve moved beyond an impasse.  But 84
impasses can return in newer forms when you think they’re over. Their arrival raises 
questions that hadn’t been considered, induces new affects and relations, changes one’s 
attachments along the way. Or maybe they had been lurking about all along. Perhaps 
	 Ahmed asks “How do we know whether we are holding on to something that has gone, or letting go of  83
something that is present?” (The Promise of  Happiness, 189).
	 “An impasse is decompositional—in the unbound temporality of  the lag one hopes to have been 84
experiencing all along (otherwise it's the end), it marks a delay. Because you can only know later that this 
was an impasse” (Berlant, “Starved,” 434).
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impasses are undead, and nothing can ensure that what haunts us and tears us apart will 
stay entombed once the waters calm down.  85
	 Attempts to resolve these questions philosophically render one insensate to the 
potentialities of  specific impasses. It might, as Nietzsche says, disable participation in this 
world by elevating one to a merely spectatorial position (GS, 241-2). Impasses deny such a 
position by unsettling our confidence in what we know and how. From within an impasse, 
something new might emerge. Or business might roll on as usual. 
	 Ethics and politics should keep queerness and the tragic in torsion and be adjusted 
to the potentialities of  the different moments of  impasses. We strive to avoid barricading 
ourselves against the force of  negativity and barreling forward toward a predetermined 
end. We cultivate openness to loss even if  what comes may leave us lost. We strive to find 
in dark affects resources, tools, and lifelines that are so many alternatives however frail 
they may be. We strive for worlds that are unimaginable though real—even if  those 
worlds turn out to be ones that we cannot control, that do not facilitate our access to the 
good life, and that do not erase the possibility that someday, when we least expect it, we 
will be undone, again and again, as an impasse returns, if  it ever left at all…  
	 Along these lines, “impasse” bears a family resemblance to what Connolly describes as a “rift in being.” 85
Reading Zarathustra's aphorism “On the Vision and the Riddle,” Connolly describes intensive moments 
caught up between the irreversibility of  the past and the openness of  the future. “This disjunctive 
conjunction of  chance and fate,” Connolly writes, “is the rift in being” (William E. Connolly, The 




Sometimes you manage to gather enough of  a self  to stumble through the day. The cha-
rade convinces other people and sometimes it even convinces you. You've moved on. 
You’ve grown. You’re okay. 
But then it happens. It rises in the wake of  just about anything, such as a scent or an aim-
less walk. A time of  year. A swarm of  things nameable and not. 
From the ashes of  torched dreams rises the past with a terrible force. It sprouts new ten-
drils. Grabs what it encounters. Feeds upon their life and shape-shifts. You get dragged in-
to its powerful hold, a hold that could have been there all along. 
You’re supported only by your bed. Your will is a puddle on the floor. Everything feels so 
still, every surface so slippery. It’s raining. Thousands of  painful memories plink all a-
round. It’s dim, and then it’s dark. 
Weeks pass. Then months. Years. The outbreaks are rare but they recur. They puncture 
gains made. Turn your strengths against you. Make you distrust yourself  and your world. 
Once again you are caught up in the hard labor of  letting go. But someday the realization 
may hit: it was never here. And now the illusion that it had been is gone too… 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Afterthought 
An afterthought is a little something that steps on the scene belatedly. It is an addition 
born of  a pause in which intensities work their quiet magic. A deepening of  that happy, 
awkward space between ending, shifting, stumbling, bumbling. An offshoot of  the past 
that reaches toward new destinies. A time for pause and flight. 
	 Writing this dissertation has been frustrating. It has proceeded through fits and 
starts, mad outbursts and many, many pauses. After bolting through a paragraph or 
agonizing over a phrase, I often found myself  silent and stunned, unable to pull together a 
thought. My mind drifted amongst all sorts of  half-formed feelings and inconsequentials. 
Details wouldn’t latch on. Time evaporated. The room felt so still. I forced myself  to 
dwell in those moments, to allow them to unwind their quiet life and to maybe—
hopefully—teach me something. They would derail a day, a week. Meanwhile, anxiety 
thickened amongst the urgency of  finishing and a sad job market. The piles of  books and 
articles grew overwhelming, too much. My capacity to juggle so many things without 
enough hands was tested. I felt bad. Sometimes those feelings summoned an ecology of  
memories. Old wounds reopened. Were they ever closed? Had I ever been over them, 
only to find myself  relapsing now? Or had those impasses ensnared me all these years? 
	 Can the dark, strange, sometimes wonderful experience of  impasses be adequately 
addressed through the usual tools of  political inquiry, such as argumentation, justification, 
and prescription? The difficulties of  developing a concept of  impasse from within one are 
many: it is uncertain whether one is at an impasse at all; what the situation will have 
become remains to be seen; one’s usual means of  understanding the world are troubled 
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and hence unreliable. These difficulties may be virtues for political inquiry, though 
theorists who are committed to a clear, well-argued image of  the world would disagree. 
Although no one has yet determined what political inquiry could do, the discipline of  
political theory sanctions certain methods and objects of  knowledge at the expense of  
others. It often develops concepts that would be merely applied to situations. It tends to 
privilege rigorous argumentation, deploy prescriptions, and remain overly enamored of  
clarity. Becomings are evacuated in favor of  snapshots that are made to fit disciplinary 
frames and to respect coveted jargon of  big systems and big -isms. The traffic in 
disciplinary knowledge doesn’t begin to approach worlds as live wires of  forces that 
electrify life or shock it into suspense. In this mode, political inquiry is outpaced by the 
world it describes and tries to intervene in. 
	 I have had to improvise ways of  remaining faithful to the experiences of  impasse 
while working around the genres of  political theory and the dissertation form. Because 
impasses are dense with uncertainty and indeterminacy, they, in Berlant’s words, “can 
only be approached awkwardly, described around, shifted.”  To write impasse is to sustain 1
a bit of  its awkwardness and messiness. 
	 This afterthought performs a political theory of  impasse by taking up an impasse 
between settlement and decolonization in Hawaiʻi. Rather than focusing on the well-
documented historical details of  coloniality, it expresses one way in which settler 
colonialism manages to persist despite federal acknowledgement of  the illegality of  the 
overthrow, evidence of  the continued legal existence of  the Kingdom of  Hawaiʻi, and the 
 	 Lauren Berlant, “Starved,” South Atlantic Quarterly 106, no. 3 (2007), 435.1
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vibrancy of  Native Hawaiian sovereignty movements.  I find that persistence to be due to 2
affective attachments to Hawaiʻi as home. Most critical scholarship on Asian settler 
colonialism in Hawaiʻi demonstrates that imaginations of  local Asian identity are framed 
by a fantasy of  multicultural, liberal democracy that obscures and continues the 
dispossession of  Native Hawaiians. These criticisms employ the important practice of  
demystification, or of  the unveiling of  Hawaiʻi as a settler colony, which could facilitate 
the decolonization of  settler subjectivities when the proper affective sensibility is in place.  3
Without that sensibility, however, local Asians may continue to embrace settler life. Here, I 
seek to align critique and affect in the service of  decolonization. 
	 The use of  “Asian settler colonialism” has been criticized for dividing settlers and 
	 In 1893, a group of  white businessmen with the help of  the United States Military forced Queen 2
Liliʻuokalani to surrender her throne. An investigation by Congressman James Blount and confirmed by 
then-President Grover Cleveland concluded that the overthrow was illegal. Nonetheless, an oligarchy of  
white plantation owners ruled Hawaiʻi until it was annexed by the US in 1898 despite widespread 
opposition by Native Hawaiians. In 1959, Hawaiʻi became the fiftieth state through a ballot that erased 
independence as an option by restricting voter choice to remaining a territory or becoming a state. On 
the one hundredth anniversary of  the overthrow, the US Congress acknowledged that Native Hawaiians 
never relinquished their claims to sovereignty. The so-called “Apology Resolution” has not, however, 
amounted to any substantive legal claims to 1.8 million acres of  ceded lands. Meanwhile, what few 
institutions there are to protect Native interests have been susceptible to legal attacks on the grounds that 
Native Hawaiians are a race rather than a nation. At the same time, efforts for Native sovereignty have 
pursued many avenues, from federal recognition to international law. 
	 	 For a sample of  readings that trace these dynamics, see Jodi A. Byrd, “Satisfied with Stones: Native 
Hawaiian Government Reorganization and the Discourses of  Resistance” in The Transit of  Empire: 
Indigenous Critiques of  Colonialism (Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota Press, 2011), 147-83; Noelani 
Goodyear-Kaʻōpua, Ikaika Hussey, and Erin Kahunawaikaʻala Wright (eds.), A Nation Rising: Hawaiian 
Movements for Life, Land, and Sovereignty (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014); J. Kēhaulani 
Kauanui, “Diasporic Deracinations and 'Off-Island' Hawaiians,” The Contemporary Pacific Vol. 19, No. 1 
(2007), 137-60, and Hawaiian Blood: Colonialism and the Politics of  Sovereignty and Indigeneity (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2008); Noenoe K. Silva, Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004); and Haunani-Kay Trask, From a Native Daughter: Colonialism 
and Sovereignty in Hawaiʻi (Honolulu: University of  Hawaiʻi Press, 1999).
	 I am inspired by Jane Bennett, who writes that “There will be no greening of  the economy, no 3
redistribution of  wealth, no enforcement or extension of  rights without human dispositions, moods, and 
cultural ensembles hospitable to these effects” (Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of  Things [Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2010], xii). 
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Native Hawaiians in ways that run counter to political progress.  The term also seems to 4
presume that all Asians, regardless of  ethnicity, are equally implicated in and benefiting 
from settler colonialism. While acknowledging these points, I use “Asian settler 
colonialism” because it rightly emphasizes that Native Hawaiians are not a racial minority 
that seek civil rights but a nation with unique claims to land and sovereignty—claims that 
are not shared by Asians in Hawaiʻi regardless of  differences in socioeconomic and 
political status. The term also emphasizes that while Native Hawaiians can be local, non-
Natives who subscribe to local identity cannot claim indigeneity. Finally, I deploy the term 
as an exercise in self-critique: as a person of  Okinawan and Japanese descent, I am one of  
the principal beneficiaries of  dispossession. Other Asian settler scholars have performed 
similar self-critiques. I join them while foregrounding affect, attachment, and materiality 
as productive inroads into Asian settler colonialism and decolonization. 
	 I adopt myself  as a case study for a brief  autoethnographic exploration of  the 
complicated relationships between settler attachments to home and the afterlife of  
dispossession as found in homelessness. My autoethnography refracts Asian settler 
colonialism through my own impasse in my attachment to Hawaiʻi as home, which 
became apparent only after I moved to Baltimore—after growing up and living in Oʻahu 
for twenty-five years. This attachment spans from Hawaiʻi to the East Coast of  the United 
States. Its temporality is strange, as it is twisted with reanimated pasts and incipient 
futures. I compose scenes of  ordinary life to “forge a link between self  and world, the 
	 For an overview of  and a sharp rejoinder to criticisms of  the term “Asian Settler Colonialism,” see Dean 4
Itsuji Saranillio, “Why Asian Settler Colonialism Matters: A Thought Piece on Critiques, Debates, and 
Indigenous Difference,” Settler Colonial Studies Vol. 3, Nos. 3-4 (2013), 280-94
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abstract and the concrete, the massive and minute, the fuzzy or smudged yet precise.”  In 5
this way, the social, the economic, and the political are registered in ordinary life as forces, 
textures, rhythms, viscosities, flows, ruts. Ordinary life is both dense and unfinished, full 
of  patternings that take hold and live wires that lead elsewhere.  Attachments to home 6
that underlie Asian settler colonialism ball up, gather momentum, and fall flat in the 
affective interstices of  ordinary life in Hawaiʻi and abroad. Asian settler colonialism is at 
an impasse that calls for the recalibration of  the genres of  political theory. This 
afterthought responds to this political and theoretical predicament. 
Writing Affect 
How might one write from attachments that are foreclosed or in crisis? From atmospheres 
that are dark and brimming with becomings that recompose the senses? From within 
times that are strange, haunting, and magical? How to write about something that is 
enigmatic and that changes, however slightly, during and through the process of  writing? 
	 These questions can be situated within broader problems that dog scholarship on 
affect. What Brian Massumi has called the “autonomy” of  affect has generated much 
suspicion and criticism.  As Gregory J. Seigworth and Melissa Gregg put it, scholarship 7
that treats affect as transpersonal, preconscious, and asignifying is often demeaned as 
“chasing tiny firefly intensities that flicker faintly in the night, registering those resonances 
that vibrate, subtle to seismic, under the flat wash of  broad daylight, dramatizing (indeed, 
	 Kathleen Stewart, “An Autoethnography of  What Happens.” in Handbook of  Autoethnography, eds. Stacy 5
Holman Jones, Tony E. Adams, and Carolyn Ellis (Walnut Creek: Left Coast Press, 2013), 667.
	 Kathleen Stewart, Ordinary Affects (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007).6
	 For an especially vicious critique, see Ruth Leys, “The Turn to Affect: A Critique,” Critical Inquiry Vol. 7
37, No. 3 (Spring 2011), 434-472.
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for the unconvinced, over-dramatizing) what so often passes beneath mention.”  I find 8
that exercise to be alluring and important, though others certainly do not. The latter 
assert models of  clear and sharp criticism instead of  turning observation to what is sensed 
vaguely, extending inquiry beyond what they feel to be empirically or textually secure, 
situating the value and scope of  clarity and hard-edged arguments, and fashioning forms 
of  writing that are at times less self-assured, more tentative, and more experimental, that 
take loose ends as sometimes virtuous, and that inspire readers to follow their own lines of  
thought rather than kneel before an author, archive, or discipline. The latter aesthetic is 
purposed by Seigworth and Gregg’s beautiful and compelling rejoinder, which connects 
curiosity to a poetics of  investigation. 
	 The affects of  impasse may inspire more evocative, tentative forms of  writing. The 
task is not to explain impasses from a safe distance (as though such could be done!). It is to 
write in the midst of  forces, propensities, and becomings that impact a writer and unfurl a 
barrage of  wild styles. It is to get stuck and stay stuck. It is to heed the potentiality of  the 
moment even if  it feels bad. It pursues a form of  critique that “burrow[s] into the 
generativity of  what takes form, hits the senses, shimmers.”  Theory becomes dislodged 9
from prior disciplinary commitments as it is pulled by nascent forms.  It emerges in a 10
hazy sentience that lies not in brains but in the midst of  things. 
	 Many of  the authors gathered in this dissertation have fashioned writerly styles 
from sensitivity to affects murmuring in the world. Even the academics don’t only argue. 
	 Gregory J. Seigworth and Melissa Gregg, “An Inventory of  Shimmers” in The Affect Theory Reader, 8
Gregory J. Seigworth and Melissa Gregg, eds. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 4.
	  Kathleen Stewart, “Afterword: Worlding Refrains” in The Affect Theory Reader, 339.9
	  Kathleen Stewart, “Weak Theory in an Unfinished World,” Journal of  Folklore Research Vol. 45, No. 1 10
(2008), 72.
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They generate an atmospherics. They give expression to affects that pool together as a 
place or a moment, ball up into worlds, or disperse into latency. The open consistency of  
ordinary life becomes an inspiration and an energy to be transmitted. Their different 
projects cull a poetics of  attunement from the worlds through which they move. 
	 For example, Lauren Berlant and Jane Bennett cultivate more expressive forms of  
writing that, across their differences, appeal to the auditory and the sonorous. Seigworth, 
with his ever keen ear, picks up on how Berlant’s writings hum with “extra-human, extra-
ordinary belongings and un-belongings together (as extruded through the resonating 
background of  a shared ‘something else’: traffic, treading water, heaven, bees, labor, 
desire, electric wires).”  A hum is the ambience of  friction between materialities that are 11
at once abstract and concrete. On my reading, Berlant does not describe the hum of  
impasse; rather, impasse expresses itself  in Berlant’s writings as a hum. 
	 This hum sounds like the nonhuman vitality to which Bennett would like us to be 
attuned. Bennett enlists hearing and sounding, to which I add listening.  Bennett 12
confesses that Vibrant Matter replies not only to other books but also “to a call from matter 
that had organized into things.”  The noise of  things does not communicate a message; 13
it buzzes, murmurs. One might hear this sound and ignore it. Or one might listen to it, 
	 Gregory J. Seigworth, “Reading Lauren Berlant Writing,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies Vol. 11
9, No. 4 (December 2012), 348.
	 Although Bennett does not privilege the auditory as the primary sensorial channel for receiving vibrant 12
matter, sonorous images crackle throughout her writings, occasionally becoming a topic of  discussion. 
See the chapters “Ethical Energetics” and “Attachments and Refrains” in The Enchantment of  Modern Life: 
Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 131-74.
	 Jane Bennett, “Powers of  the Hoard: Further Notes on Material Agency,” in Animal, Vegetable, Mineral: 13
Ethics and Objects, ed. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen (Brooklyn, New York: punctum books, 2012), 238.
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sauntering over along a path shaped by vague, alluring noise.  Listening is an impassivity, 14
a mode of  attunement that hovers between activity and passivity and that leaves humans 
suspended in the hum of  diverse materialities. It registers more than a call to utility, 
understanding, or action.  It spreads out the senses, opening one to disturbances from 15
without and tremors from within.  16
	 What kind of  writing styles might induce listening? Bennett invokes what an 
interviewer calls a “conversational tone” that, in Bennett’s own words, “invite[s] readers 
into a collective project” of  living experimentally with vibrant matter.  This invitational 17
endeavor compels the use of  arguments that are rendered simply so as to feel strangely 
familiar.  Bennett also seeks to affect readers on a sub-evaluative register—in “a tingle of  18
skin, a frown of  face, a restlessness of  the gaze, a vague or unnameable mood.”  This 19
	 Jean-Luc Nancy, for one, distinguishes hearing and listening, noting that the latter involves “straining 14
toward a possible meaning, and consequently one that is not immediately accessible” (Listening, trans. 
Charlotte Mandell [New York: Fordham University Press, 2007], 6). While I appreciate Nancy’s casting 
of  listening as a mode of  attending to the elusive, my vital materialist sensibilities consider listening to be 
more a matter of  noise than of  meaning, even if  the latter is, to Nancy, less about semiotics than an 
infinitely displaced sense.
	 Following Henri Bergson, Bennett notes that perception tends to screen materiality for a handle to 15
action: “Sensory attention is continually directed pragmatically toward the potential utility of  external 
bodies, rather than toward their noninstrumentalizable aspects or thing-powers” (“Powers of  the 
Hoard,” 263).
	 Bennett suggests that there may be an ethical value in listening to “subintentional forces within the self  16
(e.g., side perceptions, wayward thoughts, the voice of  'stress,' the urge to play or to categorize)” (The 
Enchantment of  Modern Life, 155). The ethical practice of  listening may attune one to “multiple sites and 
degrees of  micro- and macro-agency” swirling in and about humans, lateralizing their sensibilities along 
the lines of  a material vitality (ibid.). I discuss Bennett's account of  distributive agency below.
	 Jane Bennett and Klaus K. Loenhart, “Vibrant Matter, Zero Landscape: An Interview with Jane 17
Bennett,” Eurozine, 19 October 2011, http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2011-10-19-loenhart-en.html. 
Accessed on 19 October 2011.
	 Bennett and Loenhart, “Vibrant Matter, Zero Landscape.” Bennett also notes the familiarity of  vital 18
materialism in a variant sensibility that had enlivened “childhood experiences in a world populated by 
animate things rather than passive object” (VM, vii.)
	 Bennett and Leonhart, “Vibrant Matter, Zero Landscape.” These affective reverberations could of  19
course be the expression of  evaluation on a non-cognitive register; my point is that they do not need to 
be evocative of  judgment.
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inductive approach supports and enriches the invitational one, as when a compelling idea 
begins to bolt through the bloodstream. To this end,  Bennett channels the “material force 
of  words-sounds” to make her arguments more alluring and effective, but not only; she 
also aims to “tun[e] the human body,” to cultivate its susceptibility to “the frequencies of  
the material agencies inside and around it.”  For this task, Bennett raises the volume on 20
the sonority of  words and writes in a merry-go-round manner: “I will turn the figures of  
‘life’ and ‘matter’ around and around, worrying them until they start to seem strange, in 
something like the way a common word when repeated can become a foreign, nonsense 
sound” (VM, vii). Familiar, yet estranging: Bennett’s writings crackle with nonhuman 
shocks to the human. They channel a nimbus of  affects wherein distinctions between 
human and nonhuman, life and death, momentum and inertia grow hazy, drawing us to 
listen closely to the hums of  ordinary life. 
	 More poetic, evocative forms of  writing have affected me. They have inclined me 
to seek and develop a keener attunement to the dark experiences of  impasse to better 
channel their intensities in writing. Before pursuing one form through autoethnography, I 
detail the conceptual and political contours of  an impasse in settler Hawaiʻi. I begin with 
an incorporation of  new materialisms into Asian American studies and then engage 
criticisms of  local identity in Hawaiʻi. 
A Machinic Geography of  Asian Settler Colonialism 
Kandice Chuh observes that Asian American studies, since its origins in 1960s and 1970s 
activism, has tended to equate justice with the attainment of  subjectivity. This is 
	 Bennett, “Powers of  the Hoard,” 242.20
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understandable, Chuh continues, because citizenship in the United States has been 
predicated upon the exclusion of  Asian Americans from national identity. The field, 
however, needs to refigure its “desire for subjectivity” into a “critique of  subjectification” 
due to ongoing racism under liberal multiculturalism, the globalization of  capital, and the 
rise of  postcolonial criticisms.  This deconstructive approach would treat “Asian 21
American” as a “subjectless discourse” and inflect the pursuit of  justice away from both 
the closure of  Asian American identity and the mere inclusion of  Asian Americans into 
prevailing modes of  subjectivity in the US. 
	 Chuh inspires my approach to local Asian identity as a placeholder for singular 
lives and worlds. To better grasp the complexities of  that identity, I depart from Chuh’s 
focus on discourse. Although deconstruction helpfully flags the inability of  a local Asian 
identity to unambiguously cohere, a new materialist approach better tracks the emergence 
and composition of  local Asian and the attachments that bind it to the colony. 
	 I follow the materialist insights gleaned by Rachel Lee from posthumanisms and 
science and technology studies.  Observing that Asian American artists frequently turn 22
their attention to bodies and body parts, Lee advises the expansion of  Asian Americanist 
inquiry beyond textuality and suspicions of  the biological. Asian Americanists have 
understandably recoiled against the biological for its racist valences. But what if  Asian 
American studies were to give greater attention to racialized bodies in their parts and 
	 Kandice Chuh, Imagine Otherwise: On Asian Americanist Critique (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 21
2003), 151.
	 Rachel C. Lee, The Exquisite Corpse of  Asian America: Biopolitics, Biosociality, and Posthuman Ecologies (New 22
York, NY: New York University Press, 2014).
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connections with other bodies, some of  which are not human?  Could different notions 23
of  the biological and of  the material help to develop a more robust antiracist and 
decolonial politics? 
	 New materialisms help to address these questions and enrich critiques of  Asian 
settler colonialism. Across their variations, new materialisms consider the affectivity of  the 
biological but also dispute disciplinary separations of  biology and geology by arguing that 
agency, vibrancy, and liveliness do not abide by conceptual divisions between life and 
matter, between human and nonhuman.  My reasons for adopting a new materialist 24
approach to Asian settler colonialism are many. For one, it unsettles the Western 
modernist parsing of  life and matter that has sustained imperial, colonial, and racist 
powers by abjecting indigenous cosmologies and animisms as primitive, merely cultural, 
or pure superstition. 
	 Furthermore, claims to agency that elide the agency of  other entities can be 
biopolitically dangerous. Mel Chen points out connections between animateness and 
biopower: “When animacy hierarchies are implicated... we can say that an everyday 
	 Karen Cardozo and Banu Subramanian investigate this issue in “Assembling Asian/American 23
Naturecultures: Orientalism and Invited Invasions,” Journal of  Asian American Studies Vol. 16, No. 1 
(2013), 1-23.
	 Works that have shaped my thoughts here include: Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum 24
Physics and the Entanglement of  Matter and Meaning (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007); Jane 
Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of  Things (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010); Mel Y. 
Chen, Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012); 
William E. Connolly, Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota Press, 
2002); William E. Connolly, “The 'New Materialisms' and the Fragility of  Things,” Millennium: Journal of  
International Studies Vol. 41, No. 3 (2013), 399-412; Diana Coole, “Agentic Capacities and Capacious 
Historical Materialism: Thinking with New Materialisms in the Political Sciences,” Millennium: Journal of  
International Studies Vol. 41, No. 3 (2013), 451-69; Diana Coole and Samantha Frost (eds.), New 
Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010); Manuel DeLanda, 
A New Philosophy of  Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity (London: Continuum, 2006); Elizabeth 
Ellsworth and Jamie Kruse (eds.), Making the Geologic Now: Responding to Material Conditions of  Contemporary 
Life (Brooklyn: punctum books, 2013); Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002); Jasbir K. Puar, “'I would rather be a cyborg than a 
goddess': Becoming-Intersectional in Assemblage Theory,” philoSOPHIA Vol. 2, No. 1 (2012), 49-66; 
Kathleen Stewart, Ordinary Affects (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007).
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biopolitics takes place, a biopolitics that perpetually resituates, recombines, and 
rearticulates the matter of  life—and potentially its very own ecologies—in the 
particularized bodies of  its animals, objects, humans.”  Such hierarchies have played out 25
in Hawaiʻi where efforts to secure the survival and flourishing of  Asian settlers have 
erased the agency of  Native Hawaiians who are dehumanized. They reveal a 
commitment to the oftentimes deadly distinction between life and non-life. A ligament of  
what Giorgio Agamben has identified as the power of  sovereignty is wielded by Asian 
immigrants, settlers, and even activists when they affirm their lives and agency at the 
expense of  Natives.  This problem is particularly pressing in settler Hawaiʻi where the 26
biopolitics of  dispossession marks Native Hawaiians for states of  inertia, helplessness, and 
of  living death. Celebrations of  local Asian agency for securing upward mobility, civic 
equity, and political representation have had the racist effect of  casting Native Hawaiians 
as failed agents who cannot overcome poor health, incarceration, houselessness, and high 
mortality rates.  This effect is exacerbated by colonialist beliefs that indigenous peoples 27
remain wedded to a backwards past, that they lack the agency to pull themselves into the 
modern present, and that settlement is here to stay as Hawaiʻi’s future despite the 
resilience of  Native sovereignty movements. As Mimi Thi Nguyen writes in another 
context, “Imperialist discourse framed cotemporaneous territories and peoples as 
	 Chen, Animacies, 84-5.25
	 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: 26
Stanford University Press, 1998).
	 Haunani-Kay Trask writes “'Immigrants' who have struggled so hard and for so long deserve political 27
and economic superiority. By comparison, indigenous Hawaiians aren't in power because they haven't 
worked (or paid their dues) to achieve supremacy. In more obviously racist terms, Hawaiians deserve 
their fate” (“Settlers of  Color and 'Immigrant' Hegemony: 'Locals' in Hawaiʻi” in Asian Settler Colonialism: 
From Local Governance to the Habits of  Everyday Life in Hawaiʻi, eds. Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Y. 
Okamura [Honolulu: University of  Hawaiʻi Press, 2008], 48-9).
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primitive and anachronistic, or in other words, intransigent, or impassive, to forward 
movement or progress; such discourse encloses racial, colonial others as on the outside 
through instrumental uses of  time.”  In short, biopower at the hinge between neoliberal 28
capitalism and settler colonialism is predicated upon distributions of  agency, liveliness, 
and inertia. Because new materialisms counter the biopolitics of  hard-lined distinctions 
between life and its others (death, matter, inertia, inability), they are a pivotal resource for 
a decolonial politics in Hawaiʻi. 
	 Finally, new materialisms may better account for the persistence of  Asian settler 
colonialism and the possibilities for decolonization than do available criticisms that target 
local Asian identity. The exposure of  local identity as a settler ideology is but one 
beginning of  an understanding of  how Asian settlers remain bound to coloniality. A new 
materialism of  local Asianness locates the effects of  representation, identity, and ideology 
within a broader terrain of  bodies and forces, not all of  which are human and none of  
which are determined by social, cultural, and economic practices.  I refract local Asian 29
identity into a placeholder for worlds of  Asian settler colonialism that stretch across 
divides of  nature and culture, of  matter and meaning, of  privilege and diminishment, 
and of  domination and resistance. I find Asian settler colonialism where it usually isn’t 
found: in waves, sunsets, clouds, rocks, gestures, cardboard boxes, a donut, and on the 
streets of  Baltimore. In short, I track Asian settler colonialism as a “machinic geography 
of  race.” 
	 Mimi Thi Nguyen, The Gift of  Freedom: War, Debt, and Other Refugee Passages (Durham, NC: Duke 28
University Press, 2012), 16.
	 Jasbir Puar provides a new materialism of  race in “'The Turban is Not a Hat': Queer Diaspora and 29
Practices of  Profiling” in Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2007), 166-202.
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	 Arun Saldanha uses that term to move beyond the sociolinguistic focus and 
dialectical framework of  anti-essentialist critiques of  racism such as that of  Paul Gilroy. 
For Saldanha, race is neither biologically deterministic nor merely discursively 
constituted; it is the contingent, emergent effect of  “genetic endowments, environmental 
conditions, exercise, hormones, diet, disease, aging, etc.”  Furthermore, the effects of  30
race depend on the assemblages, ecologies, or geographies of  which it is a part. Following 
the work of  Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Saldanha employs “machinic” to denote 
how race: (1) consists of  parts, connections, and flows; (2) gains a consistency across 
components and becomings; and (3) produces effects that no single component could do 
alone.  31
	 As a machinic geography of  race, Asian settler colonialism is composed of  many 
bodies (human, nonhuman, social, cultural, political). The maintenance of  Asian settler 
colonialism is not due to the discipline and destruction of  Native Hawaiians alone. Asian 
settler colonialism gathers itself  through an expanse of  things into a consistency and 
absorbs disturbances as nutrition. It traffics in thick congestions and smooth flows. It 
resists concentrated attacks on local identity by shape-shifting as it extends its many 
tentacles through each settler. It takes root through innumerable, singular attachments 
between settlers and Hawaiʻi. 
	 Arun Saldanha, “Re-ontologising Race: The Machinic Geography of  Phenotype,” Environment and 30
Planning D: Society and Space Vol. 24 (2006), 12.
	 Arun Saldanha, Psychedelic White: Goa Trance and the Viscosity of  Race (Minneapolis: University of  31
Minnesota Press, 2007), 186.
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Reassembling the Local | Ideology, Affect, Attachment 
Local Asian identity in Hawaiʻi has changed over time.  Today, it holds racial overtones 32
and is defined more by cultural markers than by citizenship and politics. “Local” indexes 
an appreciation of  nature, a laid-back attitude, a sense of  cultural diversity, a taste for 
local foods, and an understanding of  pidgin (which is incorrectly referred to as “Hawaiʻi 
Creole English”). This understanding of  local is tied to Hawaiʻi’s plantation past. White 
plantation owners segregated Asian laborers by ethnicity to quell rebellion within an 
exploitative, racist environment. They failed. Cross-ethnic, cross-cultural alliances 
developed and “local” Asians would replace whites as the new ruling class in the 1950s. 
	 This narrative of  local identity sits comfortably with US ideologies of  capitalism 
and multicultural liberalism. Narratives of  the political and socioeconomic ascendance of  
Asians with statehood compose a local version of  American Dreams of  upward mobility, 
civic progress, and melting pot harmony.  These narratives have been put in the service 33
by the US in pursuit of  its colonial and imperial endeavors. During the Cold War, the 
perceived cultural and racial diversity of  Hawaiʻi had been mobilized as evidence of  
American exceptionalism to justify the imperial reach of  the US.  Flash-forward to the 34
 	 It originated in newspaper coverage of  the 1931 Massie case, in which five young men (two Native 32
Hawaiian, two Japanese, one Chinese-Hawaiian) stood trial for the kidnap and rape of  Thalia Massie, a 
white woman and spouse of  a Navy lieutenant. There, “local” marked Hawaiʻi as the place of  birth and 
of  upbringing of  the accused in opposition to the foreign, white status of  their US military accusers. In 
the 1970s, “local” became the banner under which working-class Asians and Native Hawaiians 
organized against development projects that would principally benefit haoles (whites) from the US 
mainland, Japanese investors, tourists, and members of  the US military. Native Hawaiians, in the midst 
of  a national renaissance, probed the limits of  “local” alliances as they doubted the capacity of  the civil 
rights conferred by a settler state to fairly adjudicate questions of  land and of  sovereignty. Asian settlers 
claimed local identity to distinguish themselves from haoles while erasing the importance of  Native 
genealogical connections to Hawaiʻi.
	 Trask, “Settlers of  Color and 'Immigrant' Hegemony,” 47.33
	 Dean Itsuji Saranillio, “Colliding Histories: Hawaiʻi Statehood at the intersection of  Asians 'Ineligible to 34
Citizenship' and Hawaiians 'Unfit for Self-Government,” Journal of  Asian American Studies Vol. 13, No. 3 
(October 2010), 289-90.
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1990s and 2000s, when the principle of  racial equality has been mobilized to chip away at 
what few institutional recourses Native Hawaiians have. Seeking to institute 
“colorblindness,” legal challenges have been launched, at times successfully, that cast 
Native Hawaiians as a privileged race rather than as a sovereign nation.  Supposedly a 35
bulwark against majoritarian power, civil rights have been an instrument for non-Native 
locals to continue the colonial project instituted by whites. 
	 Locals support ideologies of  US multicultural liberalism even as they distance 
themselves from the United States while reaping the benefits of  dispossession. Asian 
settlers in Hawaiʻi disaffiliate with the United States by self-identifying as “local” rather 
than as “Asian American.”  By doing so, they perform a twisted version of  Chuh’s 36
suggestion that “Asian Americanists conceptually disown ‘America,’ the ideal, to further 
the work of  creating home as a space relieved of  states of  domination.”  These 37
disarticulations depend upon a modicum of  privilege that, in Hawaiʻi, stem from US 
governmentality and jurisprudence, neoliberal capitalism, tourism, and militarism.  38
	 Bianca K. Isaki, “Colorblind Colonialism in the '50th State of  America'” in Deleuze and Race, eds. Arun 35
Saldanha and Jason M. Adams (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 113-28; J. Kēhaulani 
Kauanui, “Colonialism in Equality: Hawaiian Sovereignty and the Question of  US Civil Rights,” South 
Atlantic Quarterly Vol. 107, No. 4 (2008), 635-50, and “Precarious Positions: Native Hawaiians and US 
Federal Recognition,” The Contemporary Pacific Vol. 17, No. 1, 1-27; Judy Rohrer, “Attacking Trust: 
Hawaiʻi as a Crossroads and Kamehameha Schools in the Crosshairs,” American Quarterly Vol. 62, No. 3 
(2010), 437-55 and “'Got Race?' The Production of  Haole and the Distortion of  Indigeneity in the Rice 
Decision,” The Contemporary Pacific Vol. 18, No. 1 (2006), 1-31
 	 Oftentimes, this is done by invoking a notion of  the “aloha spirit” that has been shaped historically by 36
Christian theology, commodification by the tourist industry, and state ideology. Some locals even claim 
that they are “Hawaiian at heart” in an appropriation of  Hawaiianness as a thin cultural identity to 
which Native genealogical ties to the land are inconsequential. See Keiko Ohnuma, “'Aloha Spirit' and 
the Cultural Politics of  Sentiment as National Belonging,” The Contemporary Pacific Vol. 20, No. 2 (2008), 
365-94; Lisa Kahaleole Hall, “'Hawaiian at Heart' and Other Fictions,” The Contemporary Pacific Vol. 17, 
No. 2 (2005), 404-13.
	 Chuh, Imagine Otherwise, 124.37
 	 On the links between militarism, tourism, and imperialism, see Vernadette Vicuña Gonzalez, Securing 38
Paradise: Tourism and Militarism in Hawaiʻi and the Philippines (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013).
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Contrary to Chuh’s politics, however, local Asians maintain home as settlement rather 
than as a critical desire for a decolonial otherwise. Local identity, as Bianca Isaki writes, 
“remains a widespread and usual way of  cohering communities around a tacit agreement 
about the kind of  ‘home’ that Hawaiʻi should be.”  According to Jonathan Okamura, 39
local identity carries “a commitment to maintaining control of  Hawaii’s political and 
economic future from outside forces of  change such as foreign investment, tourism 
development, and in-migration from the continental United States, and immigration from 
Asian and the Pacific.”  In these turf  battles, Asian settlers use local identity to oppose 40
certain intrusions while conveniently excusing their own: a history of  migration and 
settlement that would lead Asians to outnumber Native Hawaiians; complicity in altering 
ecosystems through plantationization, urbanization, and gentrification; participation in a 
sprawling tourist industry; the militarization of  the islands; and the paternalistic 
management of  1.8 million acres of  ceded lands by Asian and haole agents of  the state. 
In short, local identity is a hinge that protects a Hawaiʻi made for settlers and not for 
Natives. Local Asians, in the words of  Haunani-Kay Trask, “claim Hawaiʻi as their own, 
denying indigenous history, their long collaboration in our continued dispossession, and 
the benefits therefrom.”  41
	 Criticisms of  local identity like Trask’s have been pitched within the terms of  
ideology, misrecognition, or miseducation and have posited the exposure of  colonial 
power as political salves. Trask attributes the power of  settler rule to “the resilience of  
	 Bianca K. Isaki, “HB 645, Settler Sexuality, and the Politics of  Local Asian Domesticity in Hawaiʻi,” 39
Settler Colonial Studies Vol. 2, No. 1 (2011), 86.
	 Jonathan Okamura, Ethnicity and Inequality in Hawaiʻi (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008), 117.40
	 Trask, “Settlers of  Color and 'Immigrant' Hegemony,” 46.41
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settler ideology.”  Eiko Kosasa suggests that the “nation of  immigrants” ideology to 42
which Japanese settlers in Hawaiʻi subscribe “is so powerful that most settlers are unable 
or unwilling to recognize any notions of  evidence that counter it.”  Dean Saranillio 43
argues that Filipino settlers strive to redress their lack of  socioeconomic and political 
privilege by identifying with the US “within the context of  colonial miseducation.”  44
Candace Fujikane writes that “The violence of  American colonialism is ideologically 
transformed into 'democracy,' masking the realities of  a settler colony that continues to 
deny Native peoples their rights to their lands and resources.”  Karen Kosasa echoes this 45
point and proposes “colonial exposure” as a counter-politics that “reveal[s] the hidden 
presence of  colonialism in all areas of  settler life.”  According to these critiques, local 46
Asians are uneducated, ignorant, or willfully blind to the workings of  settler ideology. 
Demystification uncovers colonial power, demonstrates how narratives of  local Asian 
success are vectors of  settlement, and educates settlers on histories that have been 
distorted or buried. 
	 Setting the record straight is undeniably important, especially because coloniality 
in Hawaiʻi has relied on a select archive. Many historians of  Hawaiʻi have propagated a 
colonialist myth that Native Hawaiians passively submitted to, and thus welcomed, 
colonization. Kanaka Maoli scholar Noenoe Silva has dispelled this myth by producing a 
	 Ibid., 48.42
	 Eiko Kosasa, “Ideological Images: US Nationalism in Japanese Settler Photographs,” in Asian Settler 43
Colonialism, 212.
	 Dean Itsuji Saranillio, “Colonial Amnesia: Rethinking Filipino 'American' Settler Empowerment in the 44
US Colony of  Hawaiʻi,” in Asian Settler Colonialism, 257.
	 Candace Fujikane, “Introduction: Asian Settler Colonialism in the US Colony of  Hawaiʻi,” in Asian 45
Settler Colonialism, 3.
	 Karen K. Kosasa, “Sites of  Erasure: The Representation of  Settler Culture in Hawaiʻi,” in Asian Settler 46
Colonialism, 196, 207.
248
counter-history from newspapers written in Hawaiian. She argues that “historiography is 
one of  the most powerful discourses that justifies the continued occupation of  Hawaiʻi by 
the United States today.”  But what if  Asian settler colonialism is rooted in a register that 47
remains undisturbed by critiques of  ideology, identity, and representation? 
	 Important as these critiques may be, they remain pitched at the level of  
representation and ideology. Their approaches have been complicated and enriched by 
scholarship on affect that shows how power operates through feelings, intensities, and 
impacts. There have been a few works on affect and settler colonialism in Hawaiʻi. Keiko 
Ohnuma observes that settler belonging to Hawaiʻi is predicated upon feeling in her 
examination of  “aloha spirit” as a disciplinary mechanism. “Aloha” serves to relieve Asian 
settlers from the traumas incurred by the coerced renunciation of  their homelands and by 
pressures to prove their worth to white American elites. The performance of  aloha spirit 
serves to displace the costs of  dispossession with good feelings. Nonetheless, Ohnuma 
primarily approaches “aloha” as a matter of  representation, ideology, and mystified 
power. “The signification of  aloha eludes us,” Ohnuma writes, “because it has served to 
obscure a history of  traumatic meanings, all carrying political investments that remain 
hidden.”  Her subtle analysis is ultimately less about how settler colonialism operates 48
through psychic and affective registers than in how it foments an empty process of  
meaning-making. Accordingly, Ohnuma holds out hope for more “rageful truth-telling.”  49
	 Bianca Isaki has developed the most sophisticated account of  the affective 
dimensions of  Asian settler colonialism. “Feelings function as placeholders,” she writes, 
	 Silva, Aloha Betrayed, 9.47
	 Ohnuma, 366.48
	 Ibid. Here, Ohnuma is borrowing the words of  Lauren Berlant.49
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“holding a present colonial order in place.”  Isaki traces settler affect through family, law, 50
community, reproductivity, and domesticity. Her understanding of  sensation is important 
but I find it at times too closely tethered to systems of  meaning-making. For Isaki, sensation 
is “the naming of  a sense as a feeling, the insertion of  that name into systems of  social 
intelligibility, and then the matching of  meaning with a truth claim.”  But affect does not 51
always circuit through sociolinguistic systems of  meaning and, as I show below, settler 
attachments do not always nestle into positional enclaves or normative sites such as 
sexuality, family, and domesticity.  Those sites are but shorthand for a complex array of  52
bodies, forces, and happenings. 
	 My own approach to the relationship between affect and settler colonialism 
focuses on attachments to Hawaiʻi as home that are composed of  an array of  
materialities, not all of  which are human. I refigure local identity into a placeholder for 
settler attachments that play out in multiple, not always coherent ways.  Attachments 53
throw themselves together from an expanse of  materialities in a process that is elusive and 
	 This comment pertains specifically to the settler work of  contrition in light of  the 1993 congressional 50
Apology Resolution but describes her analyses of  Asian settler colonialism more generally. Bianca K. 
Isaki, “Re-archiving Asian Settler Colonialism in a Time of  Hawaiian Decolonization, or, Two Walks 
along Kamehameha Highway” in Transnational Crossroads: Remapping the Americas and the Pacific, eds. 
Camilla Fojas and Rudy P. Guevarra, Jr. (Lincoln: University of  Nebraska Press, 2012), 270.
	 Ibid., 280.51
	 Brian Massumi has famously argued that affect eludes systems of  social meaning. See “The Autonomy of  52
Affect” in Parables for the Virtual, 23-45.
	 I am not opposing identity (meaning) to attachment (affect). I am deeply indebted to José Esteban 53
Muñoz's account of  group consolidation less through identity as such but through performances of  
affect, such that latinidad, recast as “identity-in-difference, is a matter of  “feeling brown” and a “brown 
sense of  the world (see “Feeling Brown: Ethnicity and Affect in Ricardo Bracho's The Sweetest Hangover 
(and Other STDs),” Theatre Journal Vol. 52 [2000], 67-79; “Vitalism's after-burn: The Sense of  Ana 
Mendieta,” Women & Performance: A Journal of  Feminist Theory Vol. 21, No. 2 [2011], 191-8). Muñoz's 
performative and affective account resonates with the new materialist approach to race and ethnicity, 
with the caveats that: my emphases lie less with performativity in public and aesthetic spaces than with 
the self-organizing emergence of  attachments in ordinary life, as elaborated below; and that Muñoz is 
primarily interested with the phenomenological and sociolinguistic aspects of  affect as emotions than in 
materialist processes of  emergence that do not always cross into consciousness and social meaning.
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ongoing. They are shaped by diverse historical trajectories, synchronic connections, and 
future aspirations, as well as in the scrambling of  these times. They are singular. There 
are indeed overlaps, but to mistake them for a structure of  Asian settler colonialism is to 
presume that other strands of  attachment are less important when in fact they may be 
defining. While available critiques of  local identity have been astute at discerning patterns 
of  settler ideology, they may leave untouched the firmest roots of  settler attachment. One 
cannot presume that settler attachments share a few characteristics that, if  identified, 
would light the way to decolonization. 
	 If  Asian settler colonialism is sustained through attachments to it, and attachments 
are composed partly by nonhumans, then nonhumans contribute to the shape, 
persistence, and trajectories of  the settler colony—not only because they are enlisted by 
local Asians in the service of  settler projects but because they have powers and 
propensities of  their own. Furthermore, if  the effects of  nonhumans elude complete 
human understanding and control, then Asian settler colonialism is not always what, 
where, or even when we think it is. Engagements with Asian settler colonialism are always 
haunted by an element of  surprise at what Asian settler colonialism involves, what it will 
have become, and what it can do. And this means that Asian settler colonialism cannot be 
undone by the sharpest of  understandings, the clearest of  intentions, and the strongest of  
willpowers on their own. 
	 How, then, might one account for Asian settler colonialism through the messiness 
and complexity of  attachments? How might decolonial politics be reconstructed? How 
might one write from within this impasse? 
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Political Autoethnography 
One way to appreciate impasse is to shift political theory into a compositional mode. 
“Rather than rush to incorporate the thing coming into form into a representational 
order of  political or moral significance,” writes Stewart, “compositional theory tries to 
register the tactility and significance of  the process of  coming into form itself.”  Less 54
definitional than generative, a compositional theory of  impasse fashions a critical poetics 
to register worlds that are stuck or leaking from all sides. Rather than a discussion at a 
remove, it is partly the effect of  an impasse that has come to express itself  through 
writing. Claims to knowledge become unsettled as the writing fills with mixed feelings, 
staccato, stumbling times, fragments, bursts of  loquaciousness, loose ends, dead ends, 
uncertainties, stickinesses. The value of  a compositional theory of  impasse lies not in 
truths told and hard-edged justifications. Nor does it seek alignment with available models 
of  political thought. What matters is the wiggle room opened. The affects induced. The 
attunements solicited. The styles of  approach inspired. In short, a compositional theory 
of  impasse blurs politics and theory, description and intervention, criticism and creation. 
	 Autoethnography is one version of  compositional theory. According to Stewart, 
“Autoethnography is one route into a broader-ranging, more supple exploration of  what 
happens to people, how force hits bodies, how sensibilities circulate and become, perhaps 
delicately or ephemerally, collective.”  Autoethnography is less representational than 55
exemplary. Through the singularities of  a life, it refracts an emergent situation that does 
not align with grand ideas and expansive explanations; as João Biehl insists, the rich 
	 Kathleen Stewart, “Tactile Compositions” in Objects and Materials: A Routledge Companion, eds. Penny 54
Harvey, Elearnor Conlin Casella, Gillian Evans, Hannah Knox, Christine McLean, Elizabeth B. Silva, 
Nicholas Thoburn, and Kath Woodward (London: Routledge, 2013), 119.
	 Stewart, “An Autoethnography of  What Happens,” 661.55
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textures of  ethnography should not be dulled down to evidence that substantiates the 
claims of  other disciplines.  Autoethnography focuses not on seemingly fixed and final 56
forms but on bundles of  intensities, becomings, and the squiggly lines of  a life unfolding. 
It strives to register emergence, intensification, and dissolution. It allows the rough edges 
and fuzziness of  ordinary life to find expression in writing.   57
	 Stewart writes that autoethnography “might skid over the surface of  a thing 
throwing itself  together or take pains at a slow description that pauses on each element. It 
might spread itself  across a scene, sampling everything, or hone in on a single strand to 
follow it as it moves, maybe document how it pulls into alignment with other strands or 
falls out of  sync, becoming an anomaly or a problem.”  Autoethnography develops a 58
close, painstaking attention to details, knitting them into the patchwork of  a life lived. Or 
it glides across the surface of  details in pursuit of  the abstractions that reverberate 
through them. 
	 For an autoethnographic political theorist, an abstraction might be the afterimage 
of  shifts in intensity rather than a transcendental ideal. It is composed of  impacts and 
avoidances that are real but not consolidated as a formed thing. Autoethnography might 
shift abstractions in political theory from identifiable forms and functions to forces that 
are vague but palpable. As abstractions, preformed concepts carry the possibilities and 
limits of  their emergence and thus remain insensate to shifts underway. Autoethnography 
recharges concepts by plugging them back into the intensities of  ordinary life. In this 
mode, concepts are abstractions that shape-shift through encounters with difference. 
	 João Biehl, “Ethnography in the Way of  Theory,” Cultural Anthropology Vol. 28, No. 4 (2013), 573-597.56
	 Ibid., 575.57
	 Stewart, “Tactile Compositions,” 121.58
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Their liveliness is energized, not dampened, through displacements and transits. 
	 Autoethnography returns a political theorist to the messy milieu that it might 
otherwise try to rise above. The political theorist “spread[s] out into the lateral spaces 
often drowned out by the demands of  argument and of  interlocutors who want ‘ways 
out’”; the theorist searches for ways of  attuning to clusters of  forces.  Its senses grows 59
intuitive, hypervigiliant. The theorist feels pulled by things that might be political precisely 
because they don’t readily seem to be. Rather than rolling over those things or 
pigeonholing them into preexisting narratives, the theorist might tend curiously and 
patiently to all sorts of  ephemera, atmospheres, half-formed tracks, and tiny thoughts. It 
strives to register the political in details and abstractions, across bodies and forces. Only 
after gathering a broad range of  convergences and displacements can an 
autoethnographer begin to write political theory. In other words, political theory begins to 
write itself  long before a theorist picks up a pen. 
	 Through a short autoethnography, I join other Asian settler scholars of  Hawaiʻi 
who reflect on their settler status. Peggy Choy and Candace Fujikane, for example, write 
about their shift from lauding the achievements of  local Asians to joining Native 
Hawaiians as allies.  Their narratives, however, do not linger within the space of  60
attachments to home. Dean Saranillio comes closer to doing so. Seeking to understand his 
“family’s positionality as settlers,” Saranillio traces his family’s history across generations 
to chart an “Asian settler genealogy of  both resistance to and collusion with US systems 
	 Berlant, “Starved,” 435.59
	 Candace Fujikane, “Foregrounding Native Nationalisms: A Critique of  Antinationalist Sentiment in 60
Asian American Studies” in Asian American Studies after Critical Mass, ed. Kent A. Ono (Malden: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2005), 90-1; Peggy Choy, “Anatomy of  a Dancer: Place, Lineage, and Liberation” in Asian 
Settler Colonialism, 279-93.
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of  violence.”  His endeavor to “give a human element” to complex settler lives resonates 61
with my call below to treat settler attachments critically but generously, though I hesitate 
to adopt a humanist frame due to its biopolitical risks and neglect of  the agentic effects of  
nonhumans. There are other important differences in our approaches as well. My 
autoethnography does not plot my family in regard to settler colonialism. It is less about 
positionality than about what keeps local Asianness bound to coloniality. Specifically, it 
registers textures, affects, and becomings of  a machinic geography of  Asian settler 
colonialism that elude analyses of  positionality: what room on a grid of  intersectional 
identities might there be for sparkling waters, haunting gestures, and shooting stars?  My 62
autoethnography zooms in on some of  the things and encounters that make up my 
attachments to Hawaiʻi. It shifts historical focus from a genealogy of  Asian migrants and 
settlers to the ongoing unfolding of  a life across select moments; it shifts from histories of  
migration and labor to deep histories of  the Earth that are palpable in mountains, oceans, 
clouds. 
	 Finally, my autoethnography does not mean to just report my life. It tries to open 
the singular unto the general, my attachments to home unto Asian settler colonialism. It 
strives to be a means by which, in Berlant’s words, “the singular becomes delaminated 
from its location in someone’s story or some locale’s irreducible local history and 
circulated as evidence of  something shared.”  My autoethnography expresses how Asian 63
settler attachments to home could be imbued with ambivalence by encounters with its 
colonialist effects. Those encounters are not restricted to my “irreducible local history” 
	 Saranillio, “Why Asian Settler Colonialism Matters,” 290, 291.61
	 For a critique of  positionality along these lines, see Puar, “'I would rather be a cyborg than a goddess'.”62
	 Berlant, Cruel Optimism, 12.63
255
but that attest to the affective conditions of  settler colonialism and of  decolonization as 
“something shared”—even if  what is shared is not a tangible thing but a fuzzy contact 
point. 
PLACE 
Place presents in singular but not accidental things. 
The timeless granite, the Dunkin’ Donuts sign, a 
common hand gesture, the biting air in January. It’s 
two-dimensional and it’s three. All talk and icon and 
then the taste of  a Macintosh apple. Less a structure 
than a prism, less a grammar than a collective 
search engine, it’s like scratching on a chalkboard 
already overcrowded with lines and erasures. And 
that means it has a body.   64
—Kathleen Stewart 
Hawaiʻi is not merely a geopolitical entity or a culturally exotified imaginary. It is a place, 
a regionality, a lived abstraction that flashes up from site to site, encounter to encounter.  65
It depends on what elements throw themselves together, how, and when. The patterns 
	 Kathleen Stewart, “More from The Hundreds,” Tag, http://cargocollective.com/tagyoureit/3-SHEEN-64
STEWART-DOLACK. Accessed on 15 March 2015.
	 “Regionality” is the term given by Stewart to places that attain a consistency by pulling together various 65
bits of  matter: “This place hangs together as a thing, then—a recognizable entity with qualities, lived 
modalities, and a history of  its social production and uses—not because its elements are coherent 
imprints or effects of  something else but because they have qualities and affects. They shift or roll. They 
can accrue, sediment, unfold, wear out, or go flat. There are stake sin the elements of  a place as living 
forms that generate a zone of  connectivity not because of  what they are but literally because of  what 
they do, the machinery they provide” (Stewart, “Regionality,” The Geographical Review Vol. 103, No. 2 
[2013], 279).
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and viscosities that emerge. The lines of  flight that shoot off  or get blocked. 
Autoethnography registers Hawaiʻi as a swarm of  forces coming to form or dispersing. 
	 Place stretches across borderlines. You carry it wherever you go. Or, it carries itself  
into another form through you. It latches onto the skin. Burrows into the viscera. Spikes 
up in moments of  pause and surprise. Moments like getting lost in a new city. 
“Displacement, and singular forms of  getting lost, are bubble worlds that reinvent the self-
in-place by testing its limits. There is a habit of  setting out alone, without a map. A 
venturing into a world that remains palpably unpredictable and seductive beyond the 
carefully cordoned zones of  familiarity.”   66
	 Baltimore is new. I wander along roads and alleys and find myself  lost. I plot 
myself  in relation to a road or two that forms the brittle backbone of  my slack sense of  
direction. Bearings eventually emerge. The grid helps. So does the sequencing of  streets. 
Okay this is 21st, so 22nd is next, then... My inner compass begins to align with that of  
maps: east of  Charles Street, south of  North Avenue...  
	 I realize that these metrics hadn’t informed my sense of  direction back in 
Honolulu. There were mountains. There was the ocean. Mauka and moana compose a 
local poetics of  direction that does not abide by a mapping of  north-south-east-west. So 
many roads there don’t follow a grid anyway. They wind and roll with the shape of  the 
island volcano called “Oʻahu.” In comparison, this part of  Baltimore feels so flat. The 
difference is not merely conceptual; it is the friction between hard-won habits and the grit 
of  remove. Honolulu doesn’t work in Baltimore. Displacement provokes the coordination of  
different strategies of  navigating complex ecologies—a mix of  the urban, the geological, 
	 Stewart, “Regionality,” 276.66
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the oceanic, the... It requires calibration to time. Honolulu is bus schedules, midday 
sunniness bookended by passing showers, standstill traffic that is worse than that of  Los 
Angeles, the dwindling of  restaurant options past 9pm. Baltimore is, among other things, 
drastic shifts in season: sore throats and pollen-filled sneezes, cranked-up heat and sticky 
humidity, sidewalks smusged by leaves after storms, ice-slicked paths that jar confident 
strides. 
	 A sense of  direction is a complex mapping of  place that throws itself  together 
from materialities, rhythms, and repetitions—all paved over histories that brood quietly in 
the lived present. Place is a palimpsest of  lives and worlds strewn across scales of  visibility, 
erasure, and duration that engender habits and break them apart. 
	  
HOME 
Home is where home is not. It registers the friction between places. It is a lure and a 
longing that emerges partly through a remove. It magnetizes desired returns and dreaded 
departures. Or dreaded returns and desired departures. It’s an attachment, after all, not 
necessarily a sense of  belonging. It tugs at the heart through all sorts of  ambivalences. 
	 Displacement can register the plenitude of  things that make up home. Colors 
matter. Shades and tones matter. Climate matters. The Earth’s cycle matters. So does the 
tilt of  the planet. Timing too. 
	 I arrive in Honolulu on an early December afternoon. The range of  vibrant 
greens and blues strikes my eyes, accustomed as they’ve become to the grays and whites 
and browns of  Baltimore winters. Later that day I walk to the park, sit on a bench by the 
playpen, take off  my shoes and socks. It takes a few moments to realize how strange it’s 
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become to sit outside. My feet sink into the cool, prickly grass. Mānoa Valley is alive. The 
air is full of  birdsongs myriad, the guttural cries of  mynah birds especially distinct since 
they’ve been etched into my chest. Gray clouds brew over the northern mountain but 
elsewhere the sky is all shiny and blue. You can be dry in one part of  the valley while 
horizontal sheets of  rain drench another. When the wind blows, you can hear all the 
leaves of  the valley rise up like waves of  the ocean. Midnight walks brim with cricket 
chirps, the rare car sailing down the dark street, a dog or two being walked, the crinkling 
of  the stream that winds through the valley, the three sets of  traffic lights that cycle 
through green-yellow-red for no one, clear skies filled with stars and constellations and the 
high-hanging moon, the two or three houseless people asleep on the bus benches outside 
of  Starbucks, the quiet solitude that spills into a sense of  oneness with the world. 
	 Home is a psychic, social, cultural, and political construct, but not only. It is the 
shorthand given to an array of  materialities that throw themselves together into a 
complex attachment. Home is a contraction of  details and abstractions. It is grass. It is 
sun. It is clouds, leaves, mountains, water, birdsongs, open spaces—all linked by an 
invisible thread that runs from the vast cosmos to hidden depths of  the heart.  It is a 67
force-field that accrues more than we could ever know and patterns them in ways to 
which we have yet to catch up. The unfinishedness of  home shape-shifts through transits 
and ventures through other places and other times. 
	 Home is when home is not. It comes long formed but remains partly open. It is 
belated, a feedback loop, a layer that recomposes the lifelines to which it is added. It is the 
	 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari write that “A fiber stretches from a human to an animal, from a 67
human or an animal to molecules, from molecules to particles, and so on to the imperceptible. Every 
fiber is a Universe fiber” (A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi 
[Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota Press, 1987], 249).
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palpable distance between the present moment and a no-longer. Or maybe a never-had. 
Home is an affective fact, a hollow that magnetizes worldings of  potential and threat.  68
The strange temporality of  home expresses itself  through wayward longings and so many 
unanticipated phantom pains. 
	 I take a walk in the morning. Another in the afternoon. One more at sundown. 
Then it’s time to leave. I breeze through airport security to much displeasure—I could’ve 
had more time amongst the twitterings of  birds, the soft air, the ducks the sail down the 
stream, the strangers who walk so leisurely because they have tomorrow. Minutes have 
become precious though just days earlier they dissolved without a care. I drag myself  
toward the gate. The walkway is outside. I dawdle to savor the island air even though it’s 
full of  exhaust from the airport shuttles. There are no stars. 
	 I board the plane and take my seat. An itch has grown over the years. It makes me 
want to leap up, to grab my things, to dash past the stares and glares and out the door 
with a crazed grin and the glow of  achievement. Then would cascade all the daydreams 
of  more time: absorbing the sun and the wind in the park, meandering through the night, 
stuffing my face with the food only found here, wasting more time with friends because 
that’s what we do so well. Yes, I just have to deplane, hop on the #19 bus, transfer to the 
#5, cross the street, and then I’m— 
	 “The cabin door is now closed. Please turn off  all major electronic devices.” 
	 Just like that, the urge vanishes. Until it returns next time, pulling me even closer 
to the edge of  my seat. 
	 Brian Massumi, “The Future Birth of  the Affective Fact” in The Affect Theory Reader, eds. Melissa Gregg 68
and Gregory J. Seigworth (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 52-70.
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HOMELESSNESS 
On a resplendent day, I head to Kakaʻako Waterfront Park, a place that evokes home. It’s 
clear and sunny here even as clouds brood over the mountains to the north. The hills of  
the park are so green and rolling that you’d never know they were built on a landfill. 
People talk story in truck beds as remote control cars zoom about the parking lot. The 
palm trees are curved by the trade winds that carry the salt of  the sea. A promenade of  
smooth bricks rolls out along the ocean. Fishermen rest their poles in the cracks of  the 
large rocks that make up the shore and gaze out at the shimmering waters. Children run 
about as their parents and uncles and aunts soak in the day. A cruise ship sails at sunset. 
The couples getting their wedding photos taken savor the golden aura around all things. 
The sea swallows the sun and then the light. The park empties. The night is quiet, save 
for the brushing of  waves against the large rocks and the hum of  the occasional airplane 
overhead. 
	 The park evokes many memories. Gliding down the grassy hills on cardboard 
boxes as a kid. The rainy day when sea and sky merged in the hidden horizon. The night 
when my camera was stolen. The picnic before I moved to Baltimore, when a friend 
tagged a pole with our names. Roaming the hills and listening to the waves with a close 
friend on the first day of  her first trip to Hawaiʻi. The clouds ablaze with pink at 
sundown. All the summer nights bursting with shooting stars. Gazing up in wonder or 
slowly falling asleep, lulled by the gentle breeze flowing through the palm trees. 
	 At some point in time, tents began to appear on the sidewalks leading to the park. 
Just a few dots at first. Then lines. The tent cities seemed to have grown each time I 
returned from Baltimore, until they were gone. Razed by cops on orders of  the city to 
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keep paradise pretty for business and tourists. As Kakaʻako gentrifies with shiny new high 
rises, the homeless have received increasing hostility from the public and politicians. 
Vitriol fills the comments section of  Honolulu Star-Advertiser articles on houselessness. The 
law forbids sitting or lying on sidewalks in Waikīkī. Its draconian reach has recently 
expanded to other areas of  the island. Many bus stop benches have been updated with 
metal partitions to prevent people from lying down. A local representative takes his 
sledgehammer to shopping carts of  the houseless; the public cheers. The homeless in 
Honolulu increasingly become choice targets of  violence in the night. Meanwhile, the 
state neglects hundreds or thousands of  homeless Native Hawaiians on the Waiʻanae 
Coast. 
	 Memories of  the homeless unfold. The times when I, as a kid, thought that the 
other families on the beaches of  Waiʻanae were just camping too. Or, years earlier, when I 
watched a man sift through a dumpster while I ate a donut that tasted like dirt. There’s 
the slow gait of  the weighty woman who lugs her shopping cart down King Street. The 
flipping-up of  a half-open hand of  the woman who talked to ghosts. The tuxedoed man 
who has walked through the valley for decades. The thud in my stomach when I saw that 
the man to whom I offered apples had no teeth. The man on the bridge into Waikīkī who 
was a statue with a hand held out. He became animated with my approach and asked if  I 
had any change to spare. I gave him my leftover pizza and left, unable to give him the 
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change that he didn’t ask for.  69
	 What would be required for that change to happen? What kind of  losses would 
need to be incurred? Would my attachments to home be spared? What new form might 
they take? Home meets homelessness. It becomes weighty, more a question mark than a 
confirmation. Ethical and political issues loom up and haunt it with the cold breath of  
possible loss. 
IMPASSE 
Red-eye flight, before take-off. The cabin is warm. The air is fuzzy. The white noise of  
the engine is soothing. I drift, drift to sleep. 
	 Sounds of  soda cans snapping open snap me awake. They snap on. The cabin 
acoustics amplify their aggression. I try to return to sleep. Turns out that the time 
between boarding and the beverage service makes for the perfect power nap. Great. And 
there’s coughing all around. There’s a baby wailing (there always is). There’s the person 
behind me who knees my chair once, twice. Who pulls my chair down with all their 
weight to hoist themselves up. Thanks. I sigh. 
	 A hand full of  irritation turns on the light. Flips through the airline magazine and 
rips out the page of  sudoku puzzles. They don’t help. Reading doesn’t help. Restlessness 
grows. No room. The cabin is cramped, not only with people but with worlds. 
	 Not all of  these people are Native Hawaiian though many are. Houselessness in Hawaiʻi is not reducible 69
to dispossession, but the two are largely related. Laura E. Lyons convincingly links the two by identifying 
that the houselesss are disproportionately Native Hawaiian (“From Indigenous to Indigent: 
Homelessness and Settler Colonialism in Hawaiʻi” in Studies in Settler Colonialism: Politics, Identity and 
Culture, eds. Fiona Bateman and Lionel Pilkington [New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011], 140-52). 
Importantly, Lyons observes that a biopolitics of  cultural memory divides the houselesss into those who 
are worthy of  state protection and those who are unworthy and left to die. Because the line is defined by 
the esteemed place of  agricultural labor in Hawaiʻi’s historical imaginary, the condition of  valuable 
houseless life is tied to dispossession and settlement. One might say that Native houselessness is partly 
the product of  Asian settler colonialism.
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	 An airplane ride can be mired in stuckness. Or it can brim with still lifes. 
	 No thoughts come in the dark. Then they do. They phase in and out of  
consciousness.  They wander. They don’t amount to anything at first. Then they do. 70
They shuffle through lists of  what needs to get done. The errands. The chores. All the 
reading and writing. The labor of  reacclimating to a partly alienating place. 
	 I then puzzle over missing a home that is a thicket of  memories and yearnings—
more of  an affective atmosphere than a solid, polished thing. Over what the carbon 
footprint of  a feeling might be. Over the comforts of  being a racial majority in Honolulu. 
They had become apparent only after I moved to Baltimore, where I feel unwelcome 
often enough. Like the time when the white middle-aged stranger thought it was good 
form to open conversation with “Are you Indian or white?” and proceeded to detail his 
yearly summer trips to India. Or when the two white men addressed me sharply through 
some made-up Asian dialectic on an empty street late at night. Or when the drunk white 
guy screamed “brief  coat wearing fag!” before rushing in my direction. And then, there's 
all the gawking. The streets are full of  stares that just won’t go away whether or not I 
return eye contact. I wonder what it means when a sense of  home is built on stolen lands, 
built on houselessness. That returning home is returning to the scene of  a crime. How to 
live in a home filled with the air of  dispossession and ghosts of  the unmourned. 
Decolonial Mood Work 
Decolonial strategies might seek to rewire the affective relays of  settler colonialism. As 
	 For Deleuze, thought flits about the penumbras of  consciousness. It is the product of  encounters rather 70
than the voluntary effort of  brains. As a result, they arise as question marks rather than as what is 
already known. See Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, 139.
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Isaki writes, “decolonization involves a shift in sensation... The idea is that undoing (not 
just historicizing) affective, corporeal, felt dimensions of  attachments that keep us 
engrossed in broken political systems, like a US-occupied Hawaiʻi, might allow us to 
remake those attachments.”  While Isaki follows attachments to home that have formed 71
largely within Hawaiʻi, I have expanded Hawaiʻi beyond its geographical specificity to 
track home through displacements and transits. And while Isaki advises that home be 
undone, maybe it just needs to be decolonized. An attachment to Hawaiʻi could be one of  
the main relays for settler subjects to support decolonization. It is for me. Neither of  these 
approaches is superior to the other. Their contrasts attest to the complexity of  
attachments to home, elicit greater attentiveness to the singularity of  settler subjectivities, 
and urge that efforts toward decolonization be subtle rather than sweeping. 
	 One avenue of  affective decolonization is mood work. Jennifer Carlson and 
Kathleen Stewart write that “the challenge of  writing mood while intentionally attending 
to mood work lies in constantly attuning to the force of  things, events, bodies and 
situations, their social physics.”  For them, mood is not about nameable emotions but the 72
vibrancy of  materialities in self-organizing scenes of  ordinary life. Mood work does not 
filter experience to fit disciplinary molds. Instead, it is the difficult, uncomfortable, 
painstaking effort of  keying to what converges but remains ungathered. It strives to 
register impacts and happenings that are barely graspable but forceful. 
	 The autoethnographic writing of  impasses can be a form of  mood work that uses 
the self  to register the breakdown of  worlds. While mood work is usually the labor of  
	 Isaki, “Re-archiving Asian Settler Colonialism in a Time of  Hawaiian Decolonization, or, Two Walks 71
along Kamehameha Highway,” 281.
	 Jennifer D. Carlson and Kathleen Stewart, “The Legibilities of  Mood Work,” New Formations: A Journal 72
of  Culture/Theory/Politics Vol. 82 (2014), 133.
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becoming sentient to something throwing itself  together, the mood work of  impasses 
follows the fading of  sentience. It might be the leaping into expressivity of  a cluster of  
fragilities, resiliences, blockages, and tiny openings. It registers encounters with what is 
enigmatic yet captivating, the gestures that haunt one’s memory, the ambivalence that 
snakes through attachments, the murk of  threat and promise, the jumpiness and agitation 
of  bodies, all the outbreaks of  the nerves, the scrambles to patch things up and the leaps 
of  faith into something half-formed, the bouts of  nostalgia for better, safer times which 
may never have been, the daydreams and nightmares that seep into one’s anxious waking 
hours. 
	 Mood work is an avenue through which decolonization of  settler attachments to 
home adds an aesthetic component to its historicist, legalist, activist, and academic 
dimensions. It could heed the “politics of  aesthetics” elaborated by Jacques Rancière to 
reorganize “partitions of  the sensible” that underlie a settler order: “Politics breaks with 
the sensory self-evidence of  the 'natural' order that destines specific individuals and 
groups to occupy positions of  rule or of  being ruled, assigning them to private or public 
lives, pinning them down to a certain time and space, to specific ‘bodies’, that is to specific 
ways of  being, seeing and saying.”  A decolonial politics of  aesthetics unsettles the 73
seeming naturalness of  a settler colony by rewiring its sensory underpinnings in home. 
This politics shares with ideological critique a commitment to denaturalization but it does 
not seek to illuminate some truth that would compel a specific course of  action. Instead, it 
strives to generate new ways of  affectively processing home when settler rule no longer 
appears natural, when home is no longer felt to be walled off  from coloniality, when 
	 Jacques Rancière, Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics (London: Continuum, 2010), 139.73
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indigenous lives are no longer relegated to the past, and when indigenous voices are heard 
by settlers as political speech rather than as mere noise. 
	 By inserting dissensus into the sensorium of  settler worlds, a decolonial politics of  
aesthetics generates ambivalence in settler experiences of  home. Of  course, settler 
attachments to home might be riddled with ambivalences such as domestic violence, 
socioeconomic precarities, and other forces that have already made home a site of  stress, 
anxiety, and strife. The ambivalence generated by a decolonial politics of  aesthetics is 
specific: that home is built upon dispossession. Decolonial mood work strives to turn 
home into an impasse in Asian settler colonialism. Impasses in Asian settler colonialism 
are felt viscerally when home is figured as, in Berlant’s words, “a singular place that’s a 
cluster of  noncoherent but proximate attachments that can only be approached 
awkwardly, described around, shifted.”  Decolonial politics might generate impasses 74
partly through better education and sharper legal claims, partly by imbuing settler 
attachments with ambivalence. 
	 Part of  that ambivalence emerges when settler attachments to home are keyed to 
dispossession.“Perhaps it is time to abandon the notion that home is where we do not 
become embroiled in the ugliness of  Empire,” writes Seri Luangphinith, “where we can 
lead self-indulgent lives, where we can be guaranteed the kind of  inclusion we ‘hanker' 
after.”  Settler homes cannot be maintained as a private, domestic, sentimentalist enclave 75
that is parsed from a constellation of  effects that arise from dispossession, such as 
homelessness, disproportionate imprisonment, and a diaspora in which more Native 
	 Berlant, “Starved,” 434.74
	 Seri Luangphinith, “Homeward Bound: Settler Aesthetics in Hawaii’s Literature,” Texas Studies in 75
Literature and Language 48, No. 1 (Spring 2006), 76.
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Hawaiians live outside of  Hawaiʻi than within. Local Asians will have to grapple 
affectively with unresolved questions of  coloniality, during the time of  settlement and 
beyond. 
	 When turned into an impasse, home becomes susceptible to divesting from a 
settler regime and moving toward solidarity with Native Hawaiians. A decolonial politics 
might connect this impasse to broader ones in US and local narratives of  multicultural 
liberalism. By generating ambivalence in attachments to home that have been partly tied 
to multicultural liberalism, optimism in the settler state to remedy colonial histories is 
troubled. Settlers then might be pushed beyond the political registers of  voting and of  
civil rights to join Native Hawaiians in an effort to, as J. Kēhaulani Kauanui suggests, 
compel the US to: honor all treaties with indigenous nations; return stolen national parks; 
confer federal recognition on all nations that seek it; and to restore federal 
acknowledgment to tribes whose status had been terminated. Surely other ends may be 
pursued too. Kauanui notes that “the United States will not take action on any of  these at 
this particular moment in time because the US state would collapse. This is a crisis that is 
inherent to the US nation-state.”   76
	 Imaginations of  such a decolonized future are valuable precisely because they 
seem impossible. Impasses involve brushes with the impossible, which is often really a 
name for a change so sweeping that it is sensed to be unbearable. Recall that, according 
to Lee Edelman, “The unbearable names what cannot be borne by the subjects we think 
we are. We build our worlds in the face of  it so as to keep ourselves from facing it, as if  we 
implicitly understood that the unbearable as such can have no face and works to deprive 
	 Kauanui, “Colonialism in Equality,” 648.76
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us of  ours.”  A decolonized future is felt to be unbearable for local Asians who have tried 77
to ward it off  by fortifying their attachments to home, clinging to local identity, and 
reproducing settler ideology. It threatens to disassemble the attachments that Asians have 
to a colonized Hawaiʻi. It threatens home. 
	 While the unbearable force of  decolonized futures might provoke defenses of  the 
colony, it might also lead settlers to strive for the decolonization of  their attachments and 
to help build a world in which Native Hawaiian life may thrive. For this end, decolonial 
politics would need to cultivate sensibilities that make Asians more amenable to prospects 
of  decolonized futures.  78
	 As they pursue both disruptive and generative aims, decolonial engagements will 
have to navigate the torsions of  criticism and generosity. Settler attachments are both 
problematic and important: problematic, because they help to sustain the colony; 
important, especially for the historically minoritized, because they provide a sense of  self  
and world. Decolonial politics might strive to better acknowledge how settler attachments 
can remain strong even when evidence of  their damage has been effectively relayed and 
understood. 
	 Pausing the jump to judgment enables decolonial politics to better sift through the 
intricacies of  attachments and becomes better poised to modify the affective ligaments of  
settlement. Because Asian settler colonialism is the emergent effect of  a preponderance of  
things, its points of  instability are diverse and many. No one knows in advance which 
	 Lee Edelman, “It Isn't Over” in Lauren Berlant and Lee Edelman, Sex, or the Unbearable (Durham, NC: 77
Duke University Press, 2014), 121-2.
	 Jane Bennett has written about arts of  the self  as positive micropolitical practices. See The Enchantment of  78
Modern Life, 131-158 and Thoreau's Nature: Ethics, Politics, and the Wild (London: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 2002), 16-46.
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pressure points might lead the colony to topple. Decolonial efforts fall short if  they posit 
Asian settler colonialism to be a solid thing rather than an amorphous monster. They 
should not only marshal a critical mass against overlaps in attachments that are 
approximated as local ideology. They might also prioritize difference over identity and 
instigate proactive reformations of  local Asian attachments and affects across multiple 
sites, linking the half-felt threads of  coloniality to the very heart of  settler homes. The 
complexity and singularity of  settler attachments to home requires that decolonial politics 
develop a greater sensitivity to affect. This process strives to pull settler attachments from 
the orbit of  settler regimes. It also seeks to address Asian settler colonialism in its 
tentacular forms by viewing the countless sources of  attachment to Hawaiʻi as resources 
that may be drawn into support for decolonization. 
	 Because decolonial mood work is complicated, slow, and tedious, and because of  
the urgency needed to dismantle systems of  dispossession that, as I write, continue to 
diminish the lives of  Native Hawaiians, I understand the urge to fall back on blanket 
criticisms that are direct and hard-hitting. The challenge for decolonization, then, is to be 
critical yet generous, to be agonistic yet respectful, to accelerate confrontation on some 
fronts while slowing down where attachments may be reworked, and to apply firm 
pressure without crushing settlers who might, as a result, recoil violently and cling to the 
colony more strongly. In short, the challenge is not to destroy Asian settler attachments to 
home but to decolonize them. 
	 Finally, the aesthetic components of  decolonial efforts may rework the biopolitics 
of  Asian settler colonialism. The unbearability of  a decolonized future involves a world in 
which indigenous life will be valued by settlers. As Jodi Byrd forcefully argues, “the most 
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we can say, given the lack of  possibility of  an Indian future anteriority in which Indians 
will have been decolonized, is that Indians are lamentable, but not grievable.”  Byrd 79
draws upon Judith Butler’s arguments concerning grievability while dropping their 
emphasis on reworking the sensoria that connect personal and political life.  Decolonial 80
mood work brings the senses back into reworking the biopolitics of  settler colonialism. 
The grievability of  Native Hawaiian life, I argue, is predicated upon the prehension of  
decolonial futures as real, desirable possibilities even if  what those futures look like 
remains unclear. Decolonial mood work rewires colonialist sensoria by which grievability 
is afforded to settlers but denied to Natives based on notions of  having a life via having a 
home. 
Tangent | Decolonial Hordes and the Then and There of  Indigenous Futurity 
Just as nonhumans can glue together the colony, so too can they become powerful agents 
of  decolonization. Humans have to do their part, but to think that we can do it alone is to 
overlook how nonhumans solicit attachments to home that may play an important role in 
efforts for decolonization. After they became apparent, my attachments to Hawaiʻi 
nudged me into learning more about Hawaiʻi’s historical and political context. When 
coupled with academic and communal circles invested in social justice, those attachments 
drew me into feeling my place in the colony differently. This shift did not happen on 
account of  me being a self-enclosed human who forms intentions independently and 
implements them irresistibly (I’m not). As someone who grew up eschewing local identity, 
	 Byrd, The Transit of  Empire, 38.79
	 See Judith Butler, Frames of  War: When Is Life Grievable? (London: Verso, 2009).80
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who dreamt often of  leaving Hawaiʻi, and who felt prepared to forget it after finally 
moving, I am surprised to be writing this. Attachments developed while I lived unbeknownst to 
me, not only due to the limits of  my (human) perception but also due to the subtle, sly 
workings of  nonhumans. Those attachments continued to develop as my sensorium was 
rewired by life in Baltimore. Attachments to Hawaiʻi as home may be a prime resource 
that generates strong commitments to decolonization, as Native Hawaiians so fiercely 
demonstrate. The nonhumans that shape attachments are thus vital to decolonial efforts. 
	 “Can attempts to rethink the boundary between human and nonhuman others,” 
ask Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller and Noenoe Silva, “allow indigenous theory to assert itself  
as an alternative form of  governance?”  Settler governance in Hawaiʻi typically locates 81
Native Hawaiians and nonhuman animals beyond law through feats of  sovereignty that 
have, among other things, sanctioned the mass killing of  sharks in the aftermath of  
attacks and managed ecosystems through selective appropriations of  Hawaiian cultural 
values. Goldberg-Hiller and Silva navigate Hawaiian cosmologies and Western 
posthumanisms to highlight the connections, interactions, and metamorphoses across the 
human/animal boundary that underpins the Hawaiʻi state.  In the cosmology of  the 82
Kumulipo, for example, “humans are part of  a vast family that includes celestial bodies, 
plants, animals, landforms, and deities. Sentient beings that interact with humans include 
	 Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller and Noenoe K. Silva, “Sharks and Pigs: Animating Hawaiian Sovereignty 81
against the Anthropological Machine,” South Atlantic Quarterly Vol. 110, No. 2 (2011), 434.
	 This method, I think, might alleviate concerns raised by Jodi Byrd regarding the place of  recent turns to 82
ontology in the academy. Byrd has criticized object-oriented ontologies that allow an “anarchy of  
objects” to play out in an ontological “wilderness” that erases indigeneity. When asked whether she 
might be open to object-oriented ontologies and new materialisms were they to be revised in light of  
indigenous cosmologies, Byrd responded by saying that the process by which we arrive at claims matters 
and that she accordingly worries that indigeneity will mainly be put in the service of  Western claims. 
Jodi A. Byrd, “Beasts of  America: Sovereignty and the Anarchy of  Objects,” talk given at ASE 
Commons at the University of  Southern California, 5 November 2014.
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pigs, sharks, stones, and forests.”  Some of  these beings, moreover, are not confined to 83
one “species;” they are kino lau, or of  many bodies, whose shape-shifting confounds the 
settler state. The political import of  interspecies, metamorphic powers is elucidated by 
“The ways that sharks and pigs (and monk seals) reterritorialize Hawaiʻi across contested 
legal boundaries and thus expand the places where cultural resources are preserved and 
the ways in which family and community can come to see themselves preserved in 
‘aumākua and friendship with a monk seal.”  They conclude that kino lau might supply 84
an avenue “for Hawaiians to own and reconstruct... yet to be imagined worlds again.”  85
	 What one might call the “then and there of  indigenous futurity” emerges through 
the interactions and becomings of  humans and nonhumans.  Asian settler colonialism is 86
sustained by partitions of  sensibility that: apportion space and time by settler modernity; 
register certain affects but not others; accord value to certain bodies but not others; 
receive indigenous peoples as racial minorities rather than as a vibrant nation; discredit 
the agency and value of  an array of  nonhumans. Those partitions might be decolonized 
by nonhumans, despite Rancière’s restriction of  political activity to humans.  Efforts 87
toward decolonization would be enriched by expanding attention beyond what seems to 
	 Goldberg-Hiller and Silva., 436.83
	 Ibid., 443.84
	 Ibid., 444.85
	 I am riffing on Muñoz's felicitous phrasing (see Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of  Queer Futurity [New 86
York: New York University Press, 2007]). While Muñoz argues that queerness is only futurity, I am not 
suggesting that indigeneity be defined as such. Rather, I point to the utopian aspect of  indigenous 
imaginations of  other worlds that could be pressed into this one. Furthermore, relating indigeneity to 
futurity is an important political maneuver in light of  Western efforts to lock up Natives in the past. 
Finally, futurity for Native Hawaiians has been constitutive. Because they have relied upon the land and 
the sea for their survival, Bryan Kuwada eloquently and forcefully observes that “The future is a realm 
we have inhabited for thousands of  years” (“We Live in the Future. Come Join Us,” Ke Kaʻupu Hehi ʻAle, 3 
April 2015, https://hehiale.wordpress.com/2015/04/03/we-live-in-the-future-come-join-us/. Accessed 
on 3 April 2015).
	 Rancière, Dissensus, 216.87
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immediately bear upon settler coloniality, such as local identity, settler ideologies of  Asian 
success, and optimism in liberal multiculturalism and civil rights. They might hone 
greater sensitivity to the powerful workings of  nonhumans—how they solicit attachments, 
how they generate modes of  care and concern, and how they might prove fatal for a 
settler state whose biopolitical commitments to colonialist distributions of  animatedness 
leave it insensate to the hordes of  humans, rocks, pigs, and deities that are banging at the 
door of  the colony with indigenous futures whose force, when unleashed, might be 
nothing short of  unbearable. 
Messy Theory, Wild Thoughts 
I have not been trying to establish what autoethnography as political theory should be or 
how it should be conducted. Less a direct critique than a creative detour, my 
autoethnography performs a different style of  political inquiry. Through it, I have invited 
reflection upon the genres of  political theory while modestly expanding their range. 
	 Impasse has led me to be unfaithful to the disciplinary edge of  political theory. For 
Rancière, a discipline is not only a body of  knowledge about approved objects and 
certified methods. It is a war-like campaign that delimits what is thinkable by correlating 
bodily states with enforced regimes of  perception and meaning. Against this “pacifying 
operation,” Rancière proffers “indisciplinary thought.”  Rather than a true knowledge 88
that must be saved from power-induced ignorance, indisciplinary thought ignores 
established thinking to facilitate what Foucault calls an “insurrection of  subjugated 
 	 Jacques Rancière, “Thinking between Disciplines: An Aesthetics of  Knowledge” (trans. Jon Roffe), 88
Parrhesia 1 (2006), 9.
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knowledges.”  For Rancière, the indisciplinary thinker seeks to restore the intensities of  89
“words and discourses which freely circulate, without master, and which divert bodies 
from their destinations.”  Indisciplinary thought recalls Rancière’s broader work on the 90
politics of  aesthetics when it disorganizes power-induced relations between social 
positions, sense experience, and thought. Indisciplinary political inquiry does not seek 
certification from the idols of  political thought, nor does it only critique the conditions of  
disciplinary knowledge; it reworks disciplinary relationships between thought, sensibility, 
and power. It makes a mess of  things. 
	 Striving to register messiness within academic work, Katrin Pahl wonders what 
forms of  thought might emerge when one “abandon[s] the will to know and to offer a 
clear picture and an intelligible articulation.”  I have been trying to express the messiness 91
of  impasse not only by mucking up thought but also style. I have been trying to register 
impasse through gestures, allusions, and ellipses, through the pacing of  sentences and 
paragraphs, through discussion of  a sprawl things, sometimes in too terse a phrase. The 
loose ends invite moments of  reverie. Repetition with variation fills these pages; a thought 
that takes off  in one direction returns later with unfinished business, expressing the 
haunted timelines and indirection of  dark atmospheres. My hope was to fashion a messy 
concept of  impasse whose charge could be felt. This endeavor involved allowing 
atmospheric darkness to cloud these pages. Shifting narrativity away from mastery. 
Channeling swarms of  affect, haunted timelines, becomings that unfold darkly, feelings of  
 	Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976, trans. David Macey 89
(New York: Picador, 2003), 7.
 	 Rancière, “Thinking between Disciplines,” 9.90
 	 Katrin Pahl, “What a Mess,” MLN  130, no. 3 (2015), 528-9.91
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threat and promise, moments of  stuckness and surge. 
	 The point has not been to rid of  argumentation, evaluation, and prescription but 
to diminish their sway over the conduct and genre of  political theory and inquiry. Berlant 
suggests that we might “dedramatiz[e] the performance of  critical and political judgment 
so as to slow down the encounter with objects of  knowledge that are really scenes we can 
barely get our eyes around.”  Stewart also aspires to “slow the quick jump to 92
representational thinking and evaluative critique long enough to find ways of  
approaching the complex and uncertain objects that fascinate because they literally hit us 
or exert a pull on us.”  93
	 I also wish to pause the reach to the conventional tools of  political theory—not to 
retire them but to fashion a sensibility that is more generous to the life of  impasse. The 
form of  inquiry that follows tracks power through the canals and dead ends of  ordinary 
life. It detects patterns and viscosities while cultivating greater sensitivity to emergence, 
incipience, becoming, dispersion. These impasse matters are registered through the 
weight and the frailty of  a lingering past, as well as in the ghosts of  other times. Life is 
stuck. But it is also moving, however faintly, toward something else, toward futures that 
are pressing upon the present. It lives futures not in any safe and sure way, but in 
hauntings and reveries. 
	 Impasses lead political inquiry away from demystification and toward intuition—
toward feeling about for the rhythms, textures, and aura of  power. Intuition is helpful 
since power is not always what it seems—not only because it conceals itself  but because it 
	 Berlant, “Starved,” 434.92
	 Stewart, Ordinary Affects, 4.93
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is changing, sometimes more rapidly than others. Stewart writes that “Politics starts in the 
animated inhabitation of  things, not way downstream in the various dream boats and 
horror shows that get moving.”  The political takes form through a process of  94
accumulation that is not at all smooth. At each step of  the way, power is susceptible to 
being thrown off  course. In an impasse, one might intuit how power is reorganizing to 
maintain itself. In addition to responding to the powers that be, they might anticipate the 
accretion and dispersal of  power. In short, intuition can be a political sensibility that is 
keyed to the metamorphosis of  power. 
	 Political intuition is a sensibility of  watching and waiting to see how the political 
might arise (or not). Intuition is crucial because one cannot know in advance what shape 
the political might take. The well-worn axes of  the political are but a few starting points 
in a vast nebula of  forces. Political intuition is an alertness to all sorts of  shimmers, even 
those that seem to have nothing political about them. It insists that embodied, situated 
knowledge matters, especially in a largely disembodied discipline. It tends more 
generously to ordinary life by dwelling in and dilating on the many forces (some human, 
others not) that typically pass for big systems (such as settler colonialism, racism, 
orientalism, homophobia, urbanization, privatization). Political engagement might view 
those systems as patterns and viscosities while cultivating greater sensitivity to emergence, 
incipience, becoming, dispersion. A broader grasp of  the intricacies of  the political might 
follow. When informed by intuition, political theory registers the materialities, 
happenings, and affects through which the political might emerge. 
 	 Stewart, Ordinary Affects, 15-6.94
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	 It might seem as though this exquisite, capacious attention bears a family 
resemblance to the frenetic searches conducted under demystification. I am not 
advocating a hermeneutics of  suspicion that seeks power under every rock or intensity. 
Instead, I am pursuing a sensibility that is more patient, more curious, more open to 
surprise. Inquiry into an impasse becomes voracious, tentative, speculative. A political 
theorist tends to fragilities and resiliences in an impasse without hope for some underlying 
truth or structure of  power that would ground a clear path of  action. Political claims 
become more modest, unable to wield disciplinary knowledge as blunt weapons in turf  
battles. Forms of  writing emerge that are more expressive than representational. 
	 These ends are served well by the experimental quality of  ethnography. Michael 
D. Jackson writes that “Ethnography forces the life of  the mind from contemplation to 
experimentation.” It cultivates a “practical and social involvement” in the lifeworlds of  
others by following “a method of  displacing ourselves from our customary habitus.”  95
Autoethnography might take oneself  as other in experiments to refashion the gaps 
between a life lived and lives that could be. While autoethnography proceeds through an 
“I,” autoethnography of  an impasse takes place when that “I” is falling apart. Its self  is 
less a clear mirror than cracked glass. The effort is to bring analysis and activity into 
closer relation through experiments within an impasse unfolding. 
	 Autoethnography can be an experimental shift from concept application to 
concept creation. Received knowledge and normalized senses put us on cruise control 
through ordinary life. Every now and then, however, something enigmatic comes our way. 
It stops us. Forces us to think. But as we puzzle over an impact that is at once vague and 
	 Michael D. Jackson, “Where Thought Belongs: An Anthropological Critique of  the Project of  95
Philosophy,” Anthropological Theory Vol. 9, No. 3 (2009), 241.
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compelling, things roll on. We scramble to catch up to what outpaces us. Stories 
proliferate. They grasp about a moment, thing, or atmosphere. They land in thickets of  
ineloquence and pause. Or they shoot off  on garrulous lines of  flight. They become 
nostalgic, whimsical. Dreamy. Received concepts grow so stale in the air of  densely 
haunted moments and vibrant landscapes. Faithful recounting of  what’s happening 
matters less than expression that is rinding up around something enigmatic and 
spellbinding. Whatever concepts that are then fashioned bear the vibrancy of  encounters. 
For Gilles Deleuze, concepts are neither dead tools of  analysis nor mere records of  lived 
experience. They are contact zones of  expression between detail and abstraction. They 
disorganize humans because they bear the charge of  an encounter. “Concepts are indeed 
things,” Deleuze says, “but things in their free and wild state beyond anthropological 
predicates.”  96
	 The idea of  concepts as wild things is befitting of  impasses. Jack Halberstam has 
elaborated the wild as a potentiality that jostles us out of  social, cultural, political, and 
conceptual slumber. The wild festers within the here and now. Its energy is restless, its 
intrusions are relentless, its trajectories are rife with swerves, and its capacity to surprise is 
inexhaustible.  I think impasses arise when people and power attempt to barricade 97
themselves from the wild. Still, people cannot deny feeling something unsettling. The wild 
is a thought-imbued affect that has a wide range, from the faint sense that something is 
	 Gilles Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 96
xx-i.
 	 See Jack Halberstam, “Charming for the Revolution: A Gaga Manifesto,” e-flux 44 (April 2013); “Go 97
Gaga: Anarchy, Chaos, and the Wild,” Social Text 31, No. 3 (Fall 2013), 123-34; “The Wild Beyond: With 
and for the Undercommons,” in Stefano Harney and Fred Moten, The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning & 
Black Study (Brooklyn: Autonomedia, 2013), 5-12; “Wildness, Loss, Death,” Social Text 32, No. 4 (Winter 
2014), 137-48.
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afoot to thicker states like unease, anxiety, worry, and misery, but also allure, exhilaration, 
and wonder. 
	 I do not wish to disregard political theory but to intensify its wildness. Political 
inquiry into impasses might register the wildness that sizzles therein. It might evoke the 
atmosphere of  struggles between the wild and the walls. Wind itself  around the loopiness 
of  time. Arrange a montage of  ethnographic fragments and reflections whose charge lies 
between each section as much as within and that infuses theory with tactility and vitality.  98
Fashion concepts that are themselves wild—that upturn landscapes of  affect, freed from 
the slaughterhouse of  disciplines. 
	 And how might guidance by this mode of  theory alter politics of  impasses? 
Political engagements might treat attachments critically but generously while striving to 
refashion them or inflect them in other directions. While responding to the powers that 
be, they anticipate the accretion of  power through creative activity.  Engagements with 99
impasse are not primarily about historicizing a stuck present but about exploring what 
futures could be—sometimes with the aim of  fostering more open conditions for living, 
other times with a patience to see what might emerge of  its own accord, other times to 
preempt the arrival of  more nefarious futures. 
	 Intuition forms only one component of  a politics of  impasses. An impasse is rife 
with tensions between, on the one hand, the need for greater sensitivity to potential shifts 
afoot and an openness to what futures might emerge and, on the other hand, need for 
	  Stewart's Ordinary Affects exemplifies this method.98
	 A genealogy of  affirmative political stances runs through Nietzsche, Foucault, Deleuze, Connolly, and 99
Bennett. Brian Massumi is one of  the latest to affirm the virtual field of  emergence as a critical site of  
politics for the left given its engagement by neoconservatives and neoliberals. See “After the Long Past: A 
Retrospective Introduction to the History of  the Present” in Ontopower (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2015).
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more, intensified political activity across selves and collectives. As William Connolly puts 
it, “we must simultaneously slow down at key points and moments as we enhance 
sensitivity to the course of  things outside our habitual modes of  perception, expectation, 
and security and speed up a series of  changes in contemporary role definitions, identities, 
faiths, public ethos, state priorities, and economic practices.”  These divergent needs do 100
not sit comfortably together even as they are vital to each other. The torsion between 
intuition, experimentation, and openness has to be calibrated moment to moment in 
impasse. 
Are You Still There? 
Living otherwise within impasse requires more than a critique of  what has inhibited 
desires, longings, and imaginations from taking root. It works through a keener sensitivity 
to alternatives that whisper today, experiments to push them into greater life, and an 
openness to how we will be changed, quite jarringly, by futures that never quite match our 
dreams of  them. We imperil the lives that we are living. We risk losing something intimate 
of  ourselves and our worlds. But we may be on the way to something too—even though 
that something might turn out to be nothing, to be bad business as usual, or to be a world 
that we never knew we needed so much but that we somehow, strangely, already have… 
 	William E. Connolly, The Fragility of  Things: Self-Organizing Processes, Neoliberal Fantasies, and Democratic 100




Close the door 
and blow out 
the candles. 
Feel the walls fall 
as you fade 
into darkness. 
It may get cold 
but know that you are not 
alone.
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